Extensies en intensies van semantische categorieën by Djalal, Farah Mutiasari
 
 
 
 
FACULTY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND 
EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Extensions and 
intensions of semantic 
categories 
 
 
2017 
Farah Mutiasari Djalal 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Gert Storms 
Co-supervisors: Dr. Eef Ameel 
Dr. Tom Heyman 
 
 
 
BRAIN AND COGNITION 
 
Doctoral Thesis offered to obtain 
 the degree of Doctor in Psychology  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cover designed by: 
Farisa Saranadya Djalal 
and vector by Istock. 
iii 
 
Farah Mutiasari Djalal. Extensions and intensions of semantic categories. 
Dissertation submitted in order to obtain the degree of Doctor in Psychology, 2017. 
Supervisor Prof. Dr. Gert Storms Co-supervisors: Dr. Eef Ameel & Dr. Tom Heyman 
 
As Murphy (2002) said, “concepts are the glue that hold our mental world together” (p. 1).  
People carve up the world into concepts that capture what things are and what properties they have. So 
in order to understand a novel object, one could compare it with objects that have similar properties, 
and group them together. For instance, a never-seen object that has fur, four legs, a tail, and the tendency 
to bark, can be compared to similar exemplars and classified into the category of dogs. This example 
shows that concepts have two important aspects that play a role in categorization: the intension (i.e., the 
properties that define or characterize concepts) and the extension (i.e., the set of category members). 
Both theoretical constructs have been the topic of much research, however, there are still some crucial 
issues that remain unsolved. In this dissertation, three research lines were developed that focus on the 
category extension, category intension, and how these two aspects are measured and connected. 
A first research line focused on the measurement of category extension and intension. Chapter 
2 describes an alternative method to measure category extension in young children. Crucially, the 
method, which was called the typicality ranking task, does not require advanced numerical or linguistic 
knowledge. Furthermore, Chapter 3 comprises a detailed investigation of category intensions across 
different age groups. More specifically, I examined the kind of properties that people generated and how 
these properties predict their category extension. 
In a second research line, the relationship between extensions and intensions was investigated. 
It has been a long-held belief that category extension and intension have a direct relationship, until a 
recent study by Hampton and Passanisi (2016) challenged it. Two experiments, described in Chapter 4, 
were conducted to test this relationship and the results actually provided evidence in favour of a link 
between extension and intension at the subject level. To further examine when this relationship begins 
to occur, Chapter 5 was devoted to investigating its developmental trajectory. The aim was to test to what 
extent children’s category extensions are based on their own category intensions, and how this 
relationship evolves during language learning. 
Finally, the last research line looked into other factors, besides a list of properties (i.e., 
intensions), that can affect category extension. Concept representation is arguably more than a list of 
properties or memories of previously encountered instances. Other factors such as the contexts in which 
words figure, the relation to other words in the semantic network, the actual words that are used for 
particular referents, and pragmatics can also play an important role (Hollis & Westbury, 2016; Spalding 
& Gagné, 2015). Chapter 6 and 7 look into these factors, specifically focussing on the role of vocabulary 
across different languages. 
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Zoals Murphy (2002) zei, “concepten zijn de lijm die onze mentale wereld samenhouden” (p. 1). 
Mensen delen de wereld op in concepten die vatten wat dingen zijn en welke eigenschappen ze bezitten. Om 
een nieuw object te begrijpen, zou men het kunnen vergelijken met objecten die soortgelijke kenmerken 
hebben, om ze vervolgens in dezelfde categorie in te delen. Zo zou een nooit gezien object dat een vacht, vier 
poten, een staart, en de neiging om te blaffen heeft, vergeleken kunnen worden met gelijkaardige exemplaren 
en in de categorie honden worden ingedeeld. Dit voorbeeld toont aan dat concepten twee belangrijke aspecten 
bevatten die een rol spelen bij categorisatie: de intensie (de eigenschappen die concepten definiëren of 
typeren) en de extensie (de leden van de betreffende categorie). Beide theoretische constructen zijn het 
onderwerp van veel onderzoek (geweest), maar er zijn nog steeds een aantal onopgeloste vragen. In deze thesis 
werden er drie onderzoekslijnen ontwikkeld die focussen op categorie-extensies, categorie-intensies, en hoe 
deze gemeten worden en gerelateerd zijn aan elkaar. 
Een eerste onderzoekslijn richtte zich op de meting van categorie-extensies en -intensies. Hoofdstuk 
2 beschrijft een alternatieve methode om categorie-extensie te meten bij jonge kinderen. Belangrijk daarbij is 
dat de methode, die de typicaliteitsrangordeningstaak werd genoemd, geen gevorderde numerieke of 
linguïstische kennis vergt. Daarop volgt Hoofdstuk 3, waarin de categorie-intensies van verschillende 
leeftijdsgroepen in kaart wordt gebracht. Meer bepaald onderzocht ik het soort eigenschappen dat mensen 
genereren en hoe deze eigenschappen hun categorie-extensies voorspellen. 
In een tweede onderzoekslijn werd de relatie tussen extensies en intensies onderzocht. Traditioneel 
wordt er aangenomen dat er een direct verband bestaat tussen categorie-extensie en -intensie, maar die 
assumptie werd door een recente studie van Hampton en Passanisi (2016) in twijfel getrokken. Twee 
experimenten, beschreven in Hoofdstuk 4, werden uitgevoerd om deze relatie te testen. De resultaten gaven 
echter evidentie vóór een link tussen extensie en intensie op het niveau van een persoon. Om verder te 
onderzoeken wanneer deze relatie zich begint te manifesteren, werd Hoofdstuk 5 gewijd aan het 
ontwikkelingstraject hiervan. Het doel was om na te gaan in hoeverre de categorie-extensies van kinderen 
gebaseerd zijn op hun eigen categorie-intensies, en hoe deze relatie evolueert naarmate kinderen taal leren. 
De laatste onderzoekslijn, ten slotte, bekeek andere factoren, naast de lijst van kenmerken (d.w.z., de 
intensies), die een invloed kunnen hebben op categorie-extensie. De representatie van een concept bestaat 
allicht uit meer dan een lijst kenmerken of herinneringen aan eerder ervaren exemplaren. Andere elementen 
zoals de context waarin woorden voorkomen, de relatie met andere woorden in het semantische netwerk, de 
eigenlijke woorden die gebruikt worden om te verwijzen naar bepaalde instanties, en pragmatische factoren 
kunnen ook een belangrijke rol spelen (Hollis & Westbury, 2016; Spalding & Gagné, 2015). Hoofdstuk 6 en 7 
bestuderen deze elementen, en in het bijzonder de rol van woordenschat in verschillende talen. 
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Preface 
 
Every chapter, excluding the introduction and the concluding remarks, corresponds to 
a journal article that is either published (Chapters 2, 3, and 6), under review (Chapters 
4 and 7), or in preparation (Chapter 5). Consequently, it has a similar Introduction-
Methods-Results-Discussion-References structure. Although every chapter stands on 
its own, there are three overarching research lines and chapters are ordered 
accordingly. As I greatly value transparency, the data and materials for all studies are 
stored on Open Science Framework.  
The last chapter (Chapter 8: Concluding remarks) describes some insights and 
limitations, as well as useful feedback I got during the review process and from 
discussions with colleagues. It also comprises a brief description of projects that are 
currently “in the pipeline”. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“Without concepts, mental life would be chaotic” is a quote from Smith and 
Medin (1981, p.1) stating how important concepts are in our everyday life. People have 
knowledge about the world, including what things are in it, what they look like, and 
what they are for. However, we still often encounter unfamiliar novel objects, people, 
or situations, and we try to understand what they are and what we can expect from 
them. To overcome this problem, we normally compare these novel things to something 
that we already know, that is, to the representation of a category that we are familiar 
with. This process is what we call categorization, the way how people carve up the world 
in order to understand it. Or as Medin (1989) wrote “categorization involves treating 
two or more distinct entities as in some way equivalent in the service of accessing 
knowledge and making predictions” (p. 1469). 
Categorization is a process that happens every day, and often it seems that it 
happens automatically, without any effort or conscious attempt. Imagine you 
encounter a novel animal that has a similar face-shape as a duck, but it has a long neck, 
it stands erect like penguins, and walks or runs with quick steps rather than waddling. 
You would call it a ‘duck’ when you talk about this experience to other people, not only 
because you recognized some properties that resemble those of normal ducks, but also 
to let the listener imagine this novel animal. Thus, categorization is a process of relating 
similar things, with a multitude of goals, varying from inferring unobserved properties, 
to naming, to communicating successfully with other people.  
2 Chapter 1 
 
1.1     Concepts and categorization 
In order to understand what this duck-faced-long-necked-weird-walking-
animal1 exactly is, you would first observe its properties (see Figure 1.1). For instance, 
you recognize that it has a beak, feathers, two wings, webbed feet, it quacks, and it lays 
eggs. You will then compare these properties with other objects that you know also have 
those properties, and then you could group the novel object together with other similar 
objects, in this case into the category of ducks. Thus, in order to categorize, there are 
two aspects that play an important role: the properties that characterize the concepts 
(i.e., the intension) and the set of category members (i.e., the extension). 
This example shows that we group things into a category because they share 
similar properties. That is, people use the properties to make predictions and to draw 
inferences about whether an object is a member of a category. As explained in most 
theories of concept representation (e.g., Hampton, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975), it is assumed that there is a close relation between extension and 
intension, such that category membership somehow depends on property-based 
similarity. This similarity notion underlies several major theories of categorization. I 
will briefly discuss these theories in turn. 
                                                   
 
1 The duck-faced-long-necked-weird-walking animal I refer to here is an Indian runner duck (Anas 
platyrhynchos domesticus). 
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Figure 1.1. Indian runner duck (Anas platyrhynchos domesticus). 
1.2     Relation between category extension and intension 
1.2.1     The classical view 
According to the classical view, in categorization, we group things into categories 
because they share some fundamental properties with each other. This view assumes 
that concept representations or categories consist of properties that are individually 
necessary and collectively sufficient to define category membership (Medin, 1989; 
Smith and Medin, 1981). Thus, in order to be endorsed as a category member, an object 
has to have defining properties. Back to the example of the duck-faced-long-necked-
weird-walking animal. In order to be categorized into the category of ducks, something 
has to have all of the defining properties of ducks, say: it should quack, lay eggs, and 
have a beak and webbed feet. According to the classical view, if the animal is missing 
one of these properties, it cannot be categorized as a member of the duck category. 
The classical view is faced with some problems as a conceptual theory, though. 
As argued in Smith and Medin (1981), one of the most problematic issues is that it is 
difficult to specify which properties are the defining properties. What makes a duck a 
duck? This question is difficult to answer not only for lay people but also for experts. 
What if this duck-faced-long-necked-weird-walking animal does not have webbed feet, 
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would it still be considered a duck, even though it has all other properties that most of 
the ducks have? 
 
1.2.2     Prototype models 
Failing to come up with defining properties, scholars shifted to prototype 
models, which reject the notion of defining properties. McCloskey and Glucksberg 
(1978) stated that categories consist of sets of properties that are characteristic rather 
than defining. They explained that characteristic properties are those that are 
possessed by many category exemplars. Those properties do not represent the 
necessary conditions for category membership as emphasized by the classical view. 
Hence, this led to the argument that categories are fuzzy sets, without clear boundaries 
of membership (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). Therefore, membership within 
categories is naturally graded instead of all or nothing. According to prototype models, 
this graded category membership depends on having enough properties in common 
with a prototype, which is supposed to be a sort of summary representation of a 
category. Thus, the more properties an object shares with the prototype, the more 
typical category member an object will be (Hampton, 1979; Rosch, 1975; Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974).  
Back to the example of the duck, one can assume that the Indian runner duck 
can be considered a typical member of the duck category because it has quite some 
properties in common with a prototypical duck (e.g., has a beak, webbed feet, quacks), 
but it will be considered an atypical member of the bird category because it only shares 
few properties with prototypical birds (e.g., Indian runner ducks cannot fly, whereas 
prototypical birds can). 
 
1.2.3     Exemplar models 
Another model family based on the notion of fuzzy categories, is the exemplar 
view. Unlike the prototype model that assumes that the degree of category membership 
depends on the proportion of shared properties with the prototype, the exemplar model 
suggests that categories are represented by means of stored memory traces of 
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exemplars (Heit & Barsalou, 1996; Nosofsky, 1984; Storms, 2004; Storms, De Boeck, 
& Ruts, 2000, 2001). Thus, in this model, the Indian runner duck would be considered 
a member of the duck category, not because it shares some properties with the 
prototype of ducks, but because it has properties that various known ducks have in 
common.   
 
1.2.4     Hybrid models 
In contrast with the previous models (i.e., prototype and exemplar models) that 
assume a single conceptual representation, either as an abstract representation or as 
an abstraction-less storing of individual exemplars, hybrid models argue that there can 
be multiple concepts for the same category. According to Machery’s (2009) view, these 
multiple kinds of concepts (i.e., prototypes, exemplars, and theories2) are processed by 
different cognitive processes (see Rice, 2014; Weiskopf, 2009, for further discussion of 
pluralistic hybrids). For instance, based on this view, one could have several duck 
concepts, each of which addresses a particular kind of concept (e.g., kind 1 of duck 
concepts, kind 2 of duck concepts, kind 3 of duck concepts, etc.). Due to these multiple 
kinds of concepts, people can use several different processes to categorize objects. Such 
hybrid models also seem to suggest that the extensional and intensional judgments can 
be independent from each other because they are used in distinct cognitive processes 
(Hampton & Passanisi, 2016). 
 
1.2.5     Decision bound models 
The last model family to be discussed here are the decision bound models. These 
models assume that an object can be represented as a point in a multidimensional space 
and the degree of membership depends on the distance between the object and the 
boundary line in the perceptual space (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Ashby & Lee, 1991). 
                                                   
 
2 The theory view of concepts claims that concepts are similar to scientific theories (Murphy & 
Medin, 1985 in Rice, 2014). 
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This boundary line can be perceived as the cut-off that optimally distinguishes between 
two different categories and one can decide the category membership of an object by 
the region the object falls in. Though boundary models have been presented as general 
categorization models, they cannot easily be applied to rich semantic concepts.  That is 
why they have been tested only in the context of perceptual stimuli, where the 
underlying properties that define the similarity space are perceptual dimensions 
(Alfonso-Reese, Ashby, & Brainard, 2002). 
In sum, all the models described above (with the exception of hybrid models) 
suggested that an object will be grouped into a certain category if it has necessary and 
sufficient properties (i.e., the classical view) or shares certain properties with other 
members in the category (i.e., prototype, exemplars, and decision bound models). Such 
property-based models have been used in numerous studies of categorization, many of 
which assumed or found evidence for a clear dependency of extension on intension and 
vice versa. 
1.3     Category extension and intension in developmental theories 
Almost all the aforementioned theories were based on studies using adult 
participants. However, many developmental models are no different in that they also 
assume that children’s category extensions are somehow related to their category 
intensions. That is, children would group things together because they share similar 
properties. In what follows, I will briefly discuss three major (‘classic’) theories3 about 
the developmental trajectory of the extension-intension relation. 
One of the earliest theories that provided a specific prediction on the extension-
intension relation was the intension-based approach from Clark (1973), who proposed 
the abstraction theory of concept formation through the acquisition of word meaning. 
                                                   
 
3 There are more than three developmental theories that could be discussed here. However, I opted 
to only discuss Clark (1973), Nelson (1974), and Mervis (1987) because they have inspired the more 
recent studies about the development of the extension-intension relationship. 
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Her semantic feature hypothesis suggested that “the child will begin by identifying the 
meaning of words with only one or two general properties rather than with the whole 
combination of meaning properties that are used by adults” (Clark, 1973, p.193). She 
further assumed that, as children gain more experience, they will add more properties 
and gradually learn the full meaning of the word. Thus, initially, children would only 
have a partial understanding of the word’s meaning. Therefore, their lexical categories 
may often differ from the corresponding categories of adults. This leads to larger sets 
of category members, that is, to overextension, as children use only a few instead of the 
whole combination of properties to delineate categories. 
An alternative view on concept formation was proposed by Nelson (1974). She 
claimed that children form a concept through their interaction with the world (through 
people, objects, and the relationships between both). According to Nelson, 
development of a new concept begins when a child attends to a single instance, for 
example, a particular ball. This instance maps onto a concept consisting of relations to 
the self, to possible actors (e.g., mother), to its actions (e.g., throw, pick up, catch), to 
locations (e.g., living room, playground), and to the effects of action over time (e.g., 
roll, bounce). These relations depend upon the context of the interaction and change 
over time. The only constant here is the ball itself. However, for the child, the ball never 
exists outside these relations. Thus, in contrast with Clark (1973), Nelson proposed that 
children initially incorporate more properties than adults to represent all these 
relationships in order to form a concept (e.g., the idea of ballness). This approach 
predicts that children will tend to underextend, that is, their categories will have fewer 
instances than the corresponding categories of adults.  
Yet another view was forwarded by Mervis (1987), who suggested that the 
number of generated properties is not the main issue in forming a concept. She focused 
more on the nature of the properties. According to Mervis, children are simply 
generating different kinds of properties compared to adults. Mervis claims that 
children tend to emphasize properties of an object that are unimportant from the 
adults’ point of view and deemphasize the important ones. Mervis argued that children 
fail to generate the crucial properties due to a lack of knowledge of the culturally 
appropriate function of objects. As children grow older, they will learn to attach the 
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correct weights to the appropriate properties. Consequently, Mervis’ theory predicts 
children to display both over- and underextensions since the property differences cause 
them to have different sets of extensions; children’s list of category members might 
exclude objects that are included in the adults’ list, while including objects that are 
excluded from the adults’ list of category members. 
The theories of Clark (1973), Nelson (1974), and Mervis (1987) were all 
forwarded to explain the relation between categories’ intensions and extensions and 
they all assume a direct connection between intension and extension. More specifically, 
they all assume that the properties that “define” a category precisely outline the set of 
exemplars of a category and that the exemplar set perfectly corresponds to a collection 
of delineating properties. 
1.4     A quick run-through  
As explained above, many theories dealing with categorization, in children and 
in adulthood, assume that there is a close relationship between category extension and 
intension. Both theoretical constructs have been the topic of much research, however, 
there are still some crucial issues that remain unsolved. Thus, all the chapters (Chapter 
2 until 7) in this dissertation are devoted to investigating category extension, category 
intension, or how these two aspects are measured and connected. Although every 
chapter stands on its own, there are three overarching research lines and chapters are 
ordered accordingly. 
A first research line focused on the measurement of category extension and 
intension. Chapter 2 describes an alternative method to measure category extension in 
young children. In this chapter, I focused on whether typicality, an extensional measure 
that has been studied frequently in adults, can be reliably measured in young children. 
Contrary to the long tradition of using rating-based procedures to derive typicality 
judgments, I propose a method that is based on ranking rather than rating typicality. 
This method is more suitable for young children as it does not require advanced 
numerical or linguistic knowledge. In Chapter 3, I again focus on category development 
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in young children but this time I studied the intension, that is, whether children 
generate similar kinds of properties to define categories as adults and whether the same 
sorts of properties do the work in determining category membership. 
In a second research line, the relationship between extensions and intensions 
was tested. In Chapters 4 and 5, I challenge Hampton and Passanisi’s (2016) recent 
claim that category intension and extension are independent, both in adults (Chapter 
4) and in children (Chapter 5). 
As evidenced by the results of the studies described in Chapters 3 to 5, the 
relation between extension and intension is surely not perfect. Therefore, in the last 
research line, I look into other factors that can affect category extension. It is known 
that other factors such as the contexts in which words figure, the relation to other words 
in the semantic network, the actual words that are used for particular referents, and 
pragmatics can also play an important role (Hollis & Westbury, 2016; Spalding & 
Gagné, 2015). In Chapters 6 and 7, I specifically focus on whether and how lexical 
information contained in category labels affects people’s category representations. To 
this end, I conducted a cross-linguistic study in which similarity and typicality 
judgments from three language groups (Indonesian, Dutch, and English speakers) were 
compared. More specifically, I paired asymmetrically informative items (e.g., jellyfish, 
which is kwal in Dutch and ubur-ubur in Indonesian) with superordinates (e.g., fish) 
or items that are considered to be related to the referenced category (e.g., salmon or 
goldfish). The question was whether such lexical suggestions affect the corresponding 
concept representations and thus lead to different typicality and similarity ratings 
across languages.  
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Abstract 
An alternative method for deriving typicality judgments, applicable in young children 
that are not familiar with numerical values yet, is introduced, allowing researchers to 
study gradedness at younger ages in concept development. Contrary to the long 
tradition of using rating-based procedures to derive typicality judgments, we propose 
a method that is based on typicality ranking rather than rating, in which items are 
gradually sorted according to their typicality, and that requires a minimum of linguistic 
knowledge. The validity of the method is investigated and the method is compared to 
the traditional typicality rating measurement in a large empirical study with eight 
different semantic concepts. The results show that the typicality ranking task can be 
used to assess children’s category knowledge and to evaluate how this knowledge 
evolves over time. Contrary to earlier held assumptions in studies on typicality in young 
children, our results also show that preference is not so much a confounding variable 
to be avoided, but that both variables are often significantly correlated in older children 
and even in adults. 
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2.1     Introduction 
Since the seventies, many researchers studying natural language concepts 
showed that category membership is graded and that there is a stable within-category 
structure, usually described as the typicality gradient (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973; 
Rosch, 1973). This typicality gradient implies that members of a category vary in how 
good an example they are or how typical they are of the category. For example, for the 
category of birds, a pigeon is a very good or typical member, in the sense that it is an 
example that you easily think of when you think of the category, while penguin is a very 
bad or atypical member, in the sense of it being an example that is rather unusual to 
think of when you think of the category. Likewise, a chair is a more typical example of 
the category of furniture than a carpet. 
Typicality has been universally acknowledged to be a very important notion in 
the study of natural language concepts and therefore accurate measurement of this 
variable is crucial. As Murphy (2002, p. 22) wrote: “Typicality differences are probably 
the strongest and most reliable effects in the categorization literature”, or as Heit and 
Barsalou (1996, p. 415) stated “Typicality is arguably a better overall predictor of 
category performance than any other variable”. Furthermore, typicality has been 
empirically shown to affect a wide range of variables related to natural language 
categories, including consistency of category endorsement (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 
1978), ease of judging category membership (Rips, Shoben, & Smith, 1973), 
categorization response times (Hampton, 1979; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000), 
exemplar generation frequency (Mervis, Catlin, & Rosch, 1976), speed with which 
category exemplars are learned (Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976), usefulness for 
making inferences (Osherson, Smith, Wilkie, López, & Shafir., 1990; Rips, 1975), 
priming effects (Rosch, 1975), semantic substitutability (Rosch, 1977), memory 
interference effects (Keller & Kellas, 1978), and so on. As such, typicality offers us 
probably the best window into the mental representation of semantic categories. 
It has been shown extensively that subjects can judge typicality in a very reliable 
way for most natural language concepts (Barsalou, 1985; De Deyne, Verheyen, Ameel, 
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Vanpaemel, Dry, Voorspoels, & Storms, 2008; Rosch, 1975; Ruts, De Deyne, Ameel, 
Vanpaemel, Verbeemen, & Storms, 2004) and several methods have been proposed to 
measure typicality judgment. The most widely used method is the typicality rating task 
which requires the participants to judge the degree of typicality of an exemplar in a 
particular category on a numeric rating scale. In most research, a six- or seven-point 
rating scale is used, ranging from 1 for very poor examples of the category to 6 or 7 for 
very good examples. However, this method can only be used reliably to derive typicality 
judgments from a population that can appropriately handle numerical values. 
Therefore, the method cannot be used with very young children who cannot identify 
the relative values of numbers between 1 and 7 (Bjorklund, Thomson, & Ornstein, 1983; 
Maridaki-Kassotaki, 1997). This level of numerical knowledge has not been achieved 
yet by 5-year-old children, which forms a serious problem in the study of concept 
development, where this age is of particular importance (Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008, 
2014). 
A study from Bjorklund, Thomson, and Ornstein (1983) tried to overcome this 
problem by introducing a method to derive typicality judgment from children using 
schematic faces. They reduced the 7-point rating scale to a kind of 3-point rating scale 
by means of three schematic faces, a smiling face, a neutral face, and a frowning face, 
to indicate the typicality judgments of a very good example, an “okay” category 
member, and a very poor example of a category, respectively. They also stressed that 
the children needed to determine how good an example each item was for the studied 
category, not how much they liked the items. They compared the results of the 
children’s typicality judgment derived from the schematic faces with adults’ judgment 
on a 3-point rating-scale and found that the typicality judgment of the three children 
groups were highly correlated with the adult ratings. Furthermore, the correlations 
tended to increase with age.  
Several years later, Maridaki-Kassotaki (1997) hypothesized that the words 
“good” and “bad”, used by Bjorklund et al. (1983) in the instructions, could lead to a 
misinterpretation in terms of personal preference rather than typicality. Bjorklund et 
al. had already tested this possibility and failed to find a significant correlation between 
typicality ratings and personal preference scores in a different group of children of the 
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same age, but in Maridaki-Kassotaki’s replication using the same group of children for 
both tasks, she did find a significant correlation. Interpreting this correlation as 
evidence for a confounding effect, she concluded that the three-schematic-faces 
procedure of Bjorklund et al. was not a reliable method for deriving typicality 
judgments from children. Maridaki-Kassotaki proposed an alternative method to 
derive typicality from children based on family resemblance, a procedure introduced 
by Rosch and Mervis (1975) to predict prototypicality in semantic concepts. Family 
resemblance was defined as the amount of properties an item has in common with 
other items of that same category. In order to derive family resemblances scores, 
Maridaki-Kassotaki (1997) asked children and adults to generate as many properties as 
possible for the items in every category. For the 5-year-old children, a low correlation 
was found between family resemblance scores and typicality ratings derived from the 
three-schematic-faces procedure of Bjorklund et al. (1983), but a high correlation was 
found between children’s family resemblance scores and both adult’s family 
resemblance scores and typicality ratings. Furthermore, the family resemblance scores 
from 5-year-olds did not significantly correlate with their personal preferences. From 
these results, Maridaki-Kassotaki concluded that family resemblance scores yield a 
reliable method to derive typicality judgments, not only from adults, but also from 
young children. 
However, there are some methodological problems concerning the research of 
Maridaki-Kassotaki (1997). First of all, she compared several typicality scores of 
children with those of adults using the adults’ scores as the standard. Yet, previous 
research (Bjorklund et al., 1983; White, 1982; Ameel, et al., 2008) has found that the 
mental representations of categories are not robust over time, but gradually converge 
to adult mental representations. In order to further examine this, typicality data from 
different age groups, starting from the earliest age where typicality judgments can be 
meaningfully gathered, should be compared. 
Second, based on a high correlation in 5-year-olds between typicality ratings 
derived from the three-schematic-faces procedure of Bjorklund et al. (1983) and 
personal preference data, Maridaki-Kassotaki stated that the method of Bjorklund et 
al. was not suitable to derive typicality judgments from children. However, she never 
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gave any rationale why there should not be any relationship between typicality and 
preference and this has never been thoroughly explored so far in adults, nor in older 
children. It is possible that typicality is related to personal preference, even in adults. 
Furthermore, Maridaki-Kassotaki measured the correlation between typicality and 
preference group-wise, that is, across participants, while personal preference can differ 
widely between persons. To draw a conclusion about the relation between typicality 
and personal preference, this correlation should be calculated on an individual level 
and in different ages. 
Third, the family resemblance measure assumes a particular concept 
representation, where exemplars that resemble the central tendency of a category more 
will be judged more typical. Several studies, however, challenged this central tendency 
idea and presented representation models that start from ideals, rather than from 
averages (Atran, 1999; Barsalou, 1985; Voorspoels, Vanpaemel, & Storms, 2011).   
The main purpose of the present study is to evaluate an alternative method that 
allows researchers to measure typicality judgments in young children who cannot 
handle numerical information yet. The proposed method, which could push the age 
limit to study typicality from 9-year-olds down to 5-year-olds, uses a ranking rather 
than a numerical rating procedure, making use of the well-established finding that 
young children, even pre-verbal infants, are able to reliably perform ordinal judgments 
(e.g., Dehaene, 2001). An additional advantage of ranking over rating is that in adults, 
agreement among participants in typicality ranking is greater than in rating (Barsalou, 
1989). The procedure further relies only to a limited extent on linguistic knowledge in 
the sense that participants are expected to understand the task instructions, but the use 
of the words “typical” and “atypical” is avoided. Finally, the method aims to be a theory-
free measurement instrument that is compatible both with a central tendency view on 
concept representation and with an ideal-based representation. 
The usefulness of the alternative method will be measured based on three 
requirements. First, since the rating method is generally considered a reliable method 
to measure typicality, the reliability of the ranking data obtained from an age group 
should be equally high as that of rating data from the same age group and the reliability 
of the ranking data of the youngest children (who are not yet able to do the rating task) 
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should not be much lower than that of older age groups. This would prove that the 
ranking method is as reliable to measure typicality as the standard rating method. 
Second, if the ranking task is a valid alternative method to derive typicality judgments, 
the ranking results should correlate strongly with the results of the standard rating 
procedures. Third, since ratings obtained from different ages converge slowly towards 
the typicality ratings of adults as the children get older, a similar converging pattern 
should emerge in the rankings. This would be evidence that the ranking method is able 
to depict the evolvement of typicality as in the rating method. 
An additional goal of the paper is to investigate the possibly confounding 
influence of preference on typicality by studying the relation between typicality 
judgments and personal preferences both in children and adults on an individual level. 
Three studies were performed. In the first study, adults’ typicality ranking data 
were compared to adult standard 7-point-scale typicality rating data, since the latter 
has proven to be a valid method to derive typicality ratings from adults (Ameel & 
Storms, 2006; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). In a second study, 
similar tasks were conducted and compared in children. More specifically, 9- to 14-
year-olds were asked to perform a 7-point-rating scale task. A typicality ranking task 
was presented to participants of the same age groups, but also to younger children aged 
5 and 7 and the results of the two procedures are compared. Finally, in a third study, 
the relation between typicality and preference is investigated systematically in the 
different age groups by correlating these measures on an individual level, since 
personal preference is a subjective measurement that is not necessarily robust across 
participants. 
2.2     Study 1: Adults’ typicality rating and ranking 
In the first study, an alternative method of typicality measurement was 
introduced to the adults. A method that is based on typicality ranking was proposed. In 
this method, items are gradually sorted according to their typicality. As a comparison, 
typicality ratings were also gathered from a different group of adults using a 7-point-
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rating scale. The results of the typicality ranking task were compared with the typicality 
ratings in order to test whether the ranking method is a reliable alternative to derive 
typicality judgments. We predicted that scores derived from the ranking task would 
significantly correlate with scores gathered through a standard typicality rating task. 
 
2.2.1     Method 
2.2.1.1   Ethics statement 
Study 1 was conducted with the approval of the Social and Societal Ethics 
Committee (SMEC) of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants before starting the task. 
2.2.1.2   Participants 
A total of 42 adults (average age 29 years 1 month; SD = .40) performed the 
typicality ranking task. The adults were friends and colleagues of the researchers, 
recruited in Flanders, Belgium. Each of the participants performed the task for only 
half of the categories, thus four out of eight categories. Concretely, half of the 
participants performed the tasks for the categories birds, kitchen utensils, vegetables, 
and vehicles (group 1), the other half for the categories fruit, mammals, musical 
instruments, and tools (group 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the 
two groups. In order to examine the relation between preference and typicality on an 
individual level, this group of participants also performed the preference task that will 
be described in Study 3. 
Twenty-four subsequent adult participants (average age 24 years and 1 months; 
SD = 3.69) performed the standard typicality rating task on a 7-point scale. 
2.2.1.3   Materials 
The stimuli were 96 coloured pictures printed on 10 x 15cm cardboard 
representing each exemplar from eight categories. There were four artefact categories 
(kitchen utensils, musical instruments, tools, and vehicles) and four of natural 
categories (birds, fruit, mammals, and vegetables). Each category contains 12 of 
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possible exemplars. The exemplars were selected from a norm study of De Deyne et al. 
(2008). The selection criteria were adult typicality and estimated age of acquisition, 
two variables which were collected by De Deyne et al. (2008). Initially, the minimum 
age of acquisition was set at five years old, since this was the age of our youngest 
children. However, this age criterion resulted in a too small set of items for certain 
categories. For example, for the category of birds, only two item names were estimated 
to be acquired before the age of five (chicken and duck). Therefore, we decided to 
increase the minimum age of acquisition to seven years old in order to be able to select 
at least 12 exemplars for each category. Besides age of acquisition, items were also 
selected on the basis of their adult typicality score in order to make sure that the 
selected items were representative for the full range of typicality within a category. 
Based on the adult typicality ratings, we selected for each category 4 typical examples, 
4 atypical examples, and 4 moderately typical examples. The 12 items selected for each 
category are presented in Appendix 2.A. The category of insects was used to illustrate 
the idea of typicality. This example category contained two typical items (mosquito and 
fly) and two atypical items (butterfly and worm). As with the target categories, these 
items were chosen on the basis of age of acquisition (learned before the age of seven) 
and adult typicality. A pilot study with two 5-year-olds revealed that these children 
were familiar with all the items of the eight categories and the example category, except 
for one, even though the estimated age of acquisition of the names of many more items 
exceeded the age of the pilot participants. The item asparagus was not recognized. 
Nonetheless, we decided to include this item in the final stimulus set. This decision was 
taken after we calculated, for each age group and for both typicality ranking and rating 
tasks, Spearman-Brown reliability estimates and Pearson correlation without the item 
asparagus and compared it with the actual data set (in which the item asparagus was 
included). The results show the differences are not significant. 
2.2.1.4   Procedure 
All the participants were tested in a quiet room. The participant and the 
experimenter sat at a table facing each other. Before the actual task started, the 
experimenter explained the instructions and the participant was given some examples 
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to practice. The examples were four exemplars from category insects (mosquito, fly, 
butterfly, and worm) and the experimenter explained that some examples –like 
mosquito and fly- are good examples of the category insects, while other examples –
like butterfly and worm- are poor examples. Once it was clear that the participants 
understood the concept of typicality, the actual typicality ranking task was conducted. 
All the 12 items from a certain category were spread out on the table so that the pictures 
were visible. As with the practice category, participants were first told the category 
name and asked to look through the items to indicate whether they knew all items’ 
names or were familiar with the objects presented. If not, participants were told the 
name of the objects. Next, participants were told that all 12 items belonged to the 
mentioned category and that items might differ in how good an example they are for 
that particular category. Participants were told that an item can be a good example of 
the category or rather a bad example. 
The actual ranking task consisted of three stages which each participant had to 
go through. In the first stage, the participants were asked to construct two piles: one 
pile with the items that she considered to be good examples of the category, further 
called the “good example pile” and another pile with items that she considered to be 
bad examples, called   “bad example pile”. Participants were explicitly told to judge how 
good the items are as examples for the particular category and not to base their 
judgment on how much they liked the items. They were also told that the two piles 
could differ in size. After this first stage, the bad example pile was taken away and 
participants were asked to look at the items of the good example pile and to construct 
again two piles: one pile with very good examples of the category (the “best example 
pile”) and one pile with somewhat less good exemplars (the “less good pile”). 
Participants were subsequently asked to repeat this procedure with the bad example 
pile, which resulted in a “less bad example pile” and a “worst example pile”. Finally, 
participants were asked to order the items of each of the four piles according to their 
goodness starting with the item they thought of as the best example and ending with 
the one they considered as the worst example. Participants were instructed to start with 
the best example pile and to rank these according to their goodness. The items of the 
less good pile, the less bad pile and the worst example pile, were successively added to 
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the ranking, one pile at a time. This procedure was repeated four times, for four 
different categories. 
The three-stage procedure simplified the ranking procedure, since subjects 
initially had to sort all items into two and subsequently into four piles before making a 
typicality ranking of all the items.  
For the standard typicality rating task, all 12 items of a category were put 
randomly in front of the participants. Once they had looked through the pictures, 
participants were asked if they were able to name all items presented and if they were 
familiar with the objects. Next, the experimenter explained that all items belonged to 
the same category and that they might be different in how good an example they are of 
the particular category. Contrary to the typicality ranking task, all items were taken 
away and presented again to the participant one at a time. Participants were now asked 
to rate each item on a 7-point rating scale according to their typicality with 1 being a 
very bad example of the category and 7 being a very good example of the category. This 
procedure was repeated for each of the eight categories. As with the typicality ranking 
task, the instructions were first made clear with the example category of insects. 
For both tasks, the order of category presentation as well as the order of item 
presentation was counterbalanced across participants. 
 
2.2.2     Results and discussion 
In the typicality-ranking task, each item received a score ranging from 1 to 12 
according to its position in the typicality ranking of a participant1. Score 1 indicates the 
worst example of the category and 12 indicates the best example in the category. The 
final typicality ranking score for an item, then, is the average of scores across 
participants. The higher any of the typicality scores, the higher the perceived typicality 
of the item was. 
                                                   
 
1 The data can be found on Open Science Framework (osf.io/pnk5s) 
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For the typicality rating task, the items were given a score between 1, indicating 
the worst example, and 7, indicating the best example. Scores for each item were then 
averaged across participants. A high averaged typicality rating score reflected the best 
example, while the worst example of a category was reflected by a low averaged 
typicality rating score. 
The consistency of the typicality rankings and ratings over the participants was 
computed using the split-half method followed with the Spearman-Brown formula (see 
Lord, Novick, & Birnbaum, 1968). This was done by splitting the number of 
participants randomly into two parallel halves (rhalf). Then the correlation was 
computed between averaged typicality scores of these two half splits and replicated for 
ten thousand random splits. The halves-reliability estimates were then adjusted using 
the Spearman-Brown prediction formula (2*rhalf /(1+ rhalf)) and averaged across the 
distributions. Table 2.1 shows these estimated reliabilities for the typicality ranking and 
typicality rating scores for the eight categories. As can be seen, all reliabilities exceeded 
.90. These results indicate a very high consistency between subjects, with virtually no 
difference between the two tasks. 
To evaluate whether the typicality rating is a valid method to derive typicality 
scores, Pearson correlations were computed between the typicality rating scores and 
the alternative method of typicality ranking scores. The results, as can be seen in Table 
2.1, revealed significant (p < .0001), very high correlations for all studied concepts.  
In sum, the typicality ranking task shows equally high between-subject 
consistency as the standard typicality rating task. The high correlations between 
ranking and rating scores strongly suggest that the newly introduced typicality ranking 
task is a valid method to derive typicality judgments from adults. We expected similar 
results for the children as well. Therefore, in Study 2, the same two methods were used 
to collect typicality judgments in groups of children with different ages to see whether 
ranking is also a valid method to derive typicality from children. 
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Table 2.1 
Reliability estimates and Pearson correlations between the typicality rating and 
ranking scores for the eight categories. 
Category 
Reliability 
Pearson 
correlation 
Typicality 
ranking 
Standard 
typicality 
rating 
Birds .97 .98 .92* 
Fruit .99 .99 .96* 
Kitchen utensils .97 .97 .98* 
Mammals  .98 .97 .94* 
Musical instruments .99 .98 .97* 
Tools .98 .98 .96* 
Vegetables .97 .97 .94* 
Vehicles .99 .98 .97* 
*correlation is significant at the .0001 level 
 
2.3     Study 2: Children’s typicality rating and ranking 
Even though the typicality ranking task was proven to be a valid method to 
derive typicality from adults in Study 1, the question still remains whether the task is 
also appropriate to measure typicality in children, especially in children that are too 
young to master numerical information. Therefore in Study 2, children’s typicality 
judgments, gathered in a typicality rating task, were compared, within the same age 
group, with typicality judgments from the ranking task. 
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2.3.1     Method 
2.3.1.1   Ethics statement 
Study 2 was conducted with the approval of the Social and Societal Ethics 
Committee (SMEC) of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all the adult participants and the parents (on behalf of the children who 
enrolled in this study) before starting the task. 
2.3.1.2   Participants 
A total of 210 children, from five different age groups, performed the typicality 
ranking task: 42 5-year-olds (average age 5 years and 6 months; SD = .27), 42 7-year-
olds (average age 7 years and 8 months; SD = .29), 42 9-year-olds (average age 9 years 
and 9 months; SD = .30), 42 11-year-olds (average age 11 years and 8 month; SD = .31) 
and 42 14-year-olds (average age 14 years and 2 months; SD = .20). The children were 
recruited from Dutch-speaking kindergartens and elementary and high schools in 
Flanders, Belgium. The native language of all participants was Flemish (Belgian 
Dutch). The 5-, 7- and 9-year olds had very limited knowledge of French or English, 
and the 11- and 14-year olds had minimal additional knowledge of French and English 
through formal instruction at school that started at the age of 11. All of the schools were 
public institutions that have pupils populations that are representative of the Belgian 
population in terms of socio-economic status and cultural background (which means a 
vast majority of Caucasians and a small minority of second generation immigrants).  
Half of the participants of each age group conducted the typicality ranking task, 
as well as a personal preference task (to be described in Study 3), for the categories 
birds, kitchen utensils, vegetables and vehicles (group 1), the other half for the 
categories fruit, mammals, musical instruments and tools (group 2). Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of the two groups. 
A different group of children ranging from 9 to 14 years performed the typicality 
rating task on 7-point-scale. There were in total 44 children from three age groups: 17 
9-year-olds (average age 9 years and 8 months; SD = .57), 15 11-year-olds (average age 
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11 years and 9 months; SD = .35), and 12 14-year-olds (average age 13 years and 11 
months; SD = .33). The children were recruited in different schools in Flanders, 
Belgium. They performed the typicality rating task on a computer for all the eight 
categories. We did not gather typicality rating data from children of 5 and 7 years old 
since the procedure requires more linguistic and numerical knowledge than such young 
children have acquired so far (as is recognized in Bjorklund et al., 1983; Maridaki-
Kassotaki, 1997). 
2.3.1.3   Materials 
Stimuli were the same eight categories used in Study 1, with four artefact 
categories (kitchen utensils, musical instruments, tools, and vehicles) and four of 
natural categories (birds, fruit, mammals, and vegetables). 
2.3.1.4   Procedure 
In general, the same procedure was used to conduct the typicality ranking task 
as in Study 1, except for the youngest group (children aged 5), where the experiment 
was conducted in a more playful context. The children of 5-years-old were asked to 
imagine a friendly spaceman being lost on earth who had come to their school. The 
spaceman did not know what X was, with X any of the example category (insects) or 
target categories (e.g., birds). To help the spaceman understand what X are, the 
experimenter told that it would be a good idea to give the spaceman a few examples of 
X: Some examples are good to give the spaceman an idea of what X are. These are 
examples that people would quickly think of when they think of X. Others are bad or 
not suitable to give the spaceman an idea of what X are. These are items that would not 
quickly cross people’s mind if they think of X. This playful cover story was used both to 
explain the concept of typicality by means of the example category and to introduce 
each of the target categories in the actual typicality ranking task. For the older children 
(7-, 9- 11-, and 14-year-olds), the spaceman story was not used in the instruction. 
Due to their limited attention span, children of 5-, 7-, 9-, and 11-years-old 
provided typicality ranking data in two separate sessions of half an hour each (two 
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categories per session). The order of category and item presentation was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
For the standard typicality rating task, children performed the task individually 
on a computer accompanied by the researcher. All the items were shown on colourful 
pictures presented one by one on the screen and the participants were asked to click a 
number that reflected their typicality judgments. Before proceeding to the actual task, 
the participants were given six trial questions where they had to rate typicality 
judgments on each of the six examples from the category clothes (trousers, socks, skirt, 
t-shirt, shoes, and hat). They were asked to rate each item on a 7-point rating scale with 
1 indicating a very bad example of the category and 7 indicating a very good example of 
the category. Once they understood the instruction, the actual task was conducted. The 
participants gave their typicality judgments for all the 96 items. 
 
2.3.2     Results and discussion 
Typicality ranking scores were calculated in the same way as in Study 1. Each 
item received a score from 1 to 12 according to its order in the ranking made by every 
participant. For the typicality rating scores, each item received a score ranging from 1 
to 7 from every participant. Both for typicality ranking and the typicality rating, the 
scores were averaged across participants for each age group and for each item. The 
higher the averaged typicality score, the higher the perceived typicality. The data can 
be found on Open Science Framework (osf.io/pnk5s). 
2.3.2.1    Reliability of typicality ranking and rating scores 
The consistency of the typicality scores in an age group was computed using the 
same method as in Study 1, (i.e., split-half method combined with the Spearman-Brown 
formula) for both tasks separately. For the typicality ranking task, most reliability 
estimates were higher than .85. For only one category for 7-year-olds reliability 
dropped below the threshold of .85 (i.e., mammals: .80), and half of the studied 
categories for the youngest age group yielded only modest reliabilities: musical 
instruments (.59), vehicles (.71), tools (.48) and mammals (.65). Even the 5-year-olds, 
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however, showed reliability coefficients up to .91 for the category of birds. These results 
suggest that the limit for using the ranking method will be around the age of 5, as the 
internal consistency is high for half of the categories, but drops to moderate for the 
other half. For the typicality rating task, the reliability estimates were higher than .80 
for all tested age groups and all categories. 
An ANOVA was performed on the Spearman-Brown coefficients for typicality 
ranking scores with age and category as independent variables. We found that only the 
effect of age was significant, F(5, 35) = 12.64, p < .0001. In order to see whether there 
is a significant increase or decrease in reliability estimates with age across all eight 
categories, an analysis using contrast matrices with age as a fixed effect was run. The 
results revealed that there is a significant positive effect of age (t = 4.728, p < .0001), 
where the reported t-statistic was treated as z-statistic to derive a p-value. This result 
suggests that reliability estimates tend to increase across age. 
In order to have a clear overview of the comparison between the two tasks, the 
reliability estimates were averaged across all the eight categories. First, each of the 
reliability estimates from both tasks was transformed into Fisher Z’ scores, then these 
scores were averaged across categories. The averaged Z’ scores were then re-
transformed back into Spearman-Brown coefficients. The results for the typicality 
ranking task from 5-, 7-, 9-, 11-, 14-year-olds, and adults were, respectively, .79, .92, 
.95, .96, .96, and .98; and for the typicality rating task from 9-, 11-, 14-year-olds, and 
adults were .92, .95, .95, and .98, respectively (see Table 2.2). The results showed that 
both of the tasks, typicality ranking and rating, are reliable methods to derive typicality 
for children in the sense of being inter-individually consistent in the tested age groups. 
More specifically, the reliability estimates of the typicality ranking were equally or more 
stable than the ratings from 9-year-olds onwards. They drop slightly in the 7-year-olds 
(.92), and decrease further in the 5-year-olds to the still acceptable level of .79.  Note 
further that in the typicality rating task, the consistency dropped slightly sooner, from 
11- (.95) to 9-year-olds (.92). In sum, the new alternative method, typicality ranking 
task, is a reliable method to derive typicality from young children. 
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Table 2.2 
Pearson correlations and corrected correlations between typicality ranking and 
rating. 
Age groups 
Reliability Pearson 
correlation 
Adjusted 
correlation rating ranking 
5 yos - .79 - - 
7 yos - .92 - - 
9 yos .92 .95 .92** .98** 
11 yos .95 .96 .89* .93** 
14 yos .95 .96 .85* .89* 
adults .98 .98 .96** .98** 
*correlation is significant at the .001 level 
**correlation is significant at the .0001 level 
 
2.3.2.2    Correlations between typicality ranking and rating 
To test whether typicality ranking can be used as a method to derive typicality 
scores from children, one does not only need to show that the rankings are reliable, but 
also that they provide a valid measure. Therefore, Pearson correlations were computed 
between the typicality ranking scores and typicality rating scores from children of 9-, 
11-, and 14-years-old. First, the correlations were computed for all the eight categories. 
The results revealed significant (p < .01) correlations, with most of the values exceeding 
.75, except for the category tools for 11-year-olds (.69) and vegetables for 14-year-olds 
(.38). Next, these correlations were transformed into Fisher’s Z’ scores and then 
averaged across categories. These averaged Z scores were re-transformed back into 
correlations. In order to see what the correlation would be if one could measure the 
typicality ranking and rating with perfect reliability, the adjusted correlation (i.e., after 
correction for attenuation; a method developed by Spearman [1904], to avoid possible 
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error variance in a measurement that provides more accurate estimations) was also 
computed by dividing the empirically obtained correlation between typicality ranking 
and rating by the product of the square root of the reliability coefficients of the 
typicality ranking and the typicality rating tasks. The results (see Table 2.2) showed 
that all the correlations were high and significant (p < .001), even for the 9-year-olds 
(r = .92 and adjusted r = .98) 
2.3.2.3    Correlations between age groups 
Pearson correlations were again computed to explore the evolution of typicality 
scores across age for both the ranking and the rating task. First, correlations were 
computed between age groups for all the eight categories in each task. These 
correlations were then transformed into Fisher’s Z’ scores and then averaged across 
categories. Next, these averaged Z scores were re-transformed back into correlations. 
The results can be seen in Table 2.3 for the ranking task and Table 2.4 for the rating 
task. 
Table 2.3 
Pearson correlations between age groups for the typicality ranking task. 
 5 yos 7 yos 9 yos 11 yos 14 yos 
7 yos .83** - - - - 
9 yos .85** .91*** - - - 
11 yos .77* .86** .95*** - - 
14 yos .75* .82* .93*** .95*** - 
Adults .67* .72* .88** .94*** .94*** 
*correlation is significant at the .05 level 
**correlation is significant at the .001 level 
***correlation is significant at the .0001 level 
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Table 2.4 
Pearson correlations between age groups for the typicality rating task. 
 9 yos 11 yos 14 yos 
11 yos .93* - - 
14 yos .89* .92* - 
adults .88* .94* .94* 
*correlation is significant at the .001 level 
 
Significant correlations were found between all age groups in both tasks. These 
correlations indicate that children and adults agree well upon typicality. Furthermore, 
agreement upon typicality scores increases gradually as the age gap becomes smaller. 
These gradual increases are clear in the typicality ranking task, where the correlation 
is higher whenever the age difference of any pair of age groups is smaller, and this was 
even the case for the young children of 5- and 7-years-old. For instance, the correlation 
between 7- and 9-year-olds was higher than the correlation between 7- and 11-year-
olds. For the typicality rating task, again the correlations between age groups were all 
significant, but the gradual increase as the age gap decreased, however, could not 
always be observed. Furthermore, the correlations for the ratings were also slightly 
lower than the corresponding values for the typicality ranking task. 
2.3.2.4    Typicality in children and adults 
The results show that there is a clear evolution in the correlations between age 
groups in the typicality ranking task, where the correlation is higher whenever the age 
difference of any pair of age groups is smaller. This finding suggests that children and 
adults differ in their mental representation of category structure, and as children get 
older, they gradually attend to the adults’ category structure. For example, the item 
potato in the category vegetables was endorsed more as a typical item by 5-year-olds 
(M = 7.71) than by the adults (M = 2.38), as was sled in the category vehicles (M5-year-
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olds = 5.90 and Madults = 1.43), and vice versa for seagull in the category birds (M5-year-olds 
= 4.76) than the adults (Madults = 9.14).  
Summarizing, the results of Study 2 indicate that even from a very young age 
onwards, the averaged typicality ranking of children and adults is both a reliable 
measure, as shown in the high consistency over rankings of different participants 
within every age group, and a valid measure, since the derived scores correlate highly 
with the generally accepted (golden) standard of ratings. Moreover, the fact that the 
convergence pattern to the adult typicalities as children grow older is also clearly 
present in the ranking data provides further evidence for its validity. 
2.4     Study 3: Children’s and adults’ personal preferences 
In Study 3, the relationship between typicality and personal preference for 
adults and its evolution across age were explored. Furthermore, as a critic to Maridaki-
Kassotaki’s (1997) study, in which she correlated typicality and preference data that 
were aggregated over participants from an age group, we will calculate correlations on 
an individual level, since personal preference may not be robust across participants. 
Furthermore, if there is indeed a close relationship between typicality and personal 
preference in adults, this would be reflected in a significantly high correlation between 
both scores for adults. For the evolution of the correlation between typicality and 
preference, there are several possibilities. On the one hand, it is possible that young 
children, as Maridaki-Kassotaki claimed, misinterpret typicality in terms of preference 
because of their limited numerical and linguistic knowledge. In that case, we predict 
that the correlations between typicality and preference decrease with increasing age. 
On the other hand, if typicality and personal preference are closely related to each other 
in adults, the correlation between typicality and preference might gradually increase 
over time to converge to the adult correlation. A third possibility is the lack of evolution 
over time. If the typicality ranking task does not rely on elaborated numerical and 
linguistic knowledge, misinterpretations of typicality in terms of preference might be 
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minimal, implying that no evolution of the relation between typicality and preference 
over time is expected. 
 
2.4.1     Method 
2.4.1.1   Ethics statement 
Study 3 was conducted with the approval of the Social and Societal Ethics 
Committee (SMEC) of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all the adult participants and the parents (on behalf of the children who 
enrolled in this study) before starting the task. 
2.4.1.2   Participants 
The typicality ranking scores for the six age groups, as gathered in Study 1 and 
2, were reused in this study. Personal preference scores were collected from the same 
participants. 
2.4.1.3   Materials 
Stimuli were the same eight categories used in Study 1 and 2. 
2.4.1.4   Procedure 
All twelve items of a category were put on the table in a random order so that all 
the pictures were visible. Participants were asked to look at all the items and pick out 
the item that they preferred most. The most preferred item was then put aside and 
again, they were asked to pick out the most preferred of the remaining 11 items. The 
selected item was taken away after every choice. This procedure was repeated until all 
12 items were ordered according to the participant’s preference. 
Participants provided personal preference data for four different categories. As 
in Study 1 and 2, category and item presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants. As mentioned earlier, the same participants in Study 1 (adults) and Study 
2 (children) performed both the ranking and the preference tasks. The order of the 
tasks was fixed: the typicality ranking task was always conducted prior to the personal 
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preference task, in order to eliminate the possible undesirable effect of personal 
preference on the typicality ranking task (Maridaki-Kassotaki, 1997). 
 
2.4.2     Results and discussion 
The typicality ranking scores for all categories were taken from the previous 
studies. The personal preference scores were derived by assigning a score to each item, 
ranging from 1 to 12 according to the participant’s preference2. A score of 1 was given 
to the least favourable item of the participant; a 12 was given to the most favourable 
item. 
2.4.2.1   Subjectivity in personal preference 
In order to demonstrate that preference is a person-specific, subjective 
measurement, variance of typicality scores and the personal preference scores were 
compared for each category. First, the variance of each item from a particular category 
over participants was calculated. Next, these variances were averaged across the 12 
items. This was done for both tasks, typicality and personal preference, and for every 
age group in all the eight categories. The variance of the typicalities and of the personal 
preferences was then compared. In 41 out of 48 cases (8 categories and 6 age groups) 
the variance of the preference scores exceeded the variance of typicality scores, showing 
that there is more variability in the personal preferences scores then in the typicality. 
This was the case in all age groups, even in the young children. 
2.4.2.2   Relationship between typicality and personal preference 
To investigate the relation between typicality and personal preference, we 
calculated for every category the correlation between both measures on an individual 
level for every participant of each age group. The percentage of participants that show 
a significant correlation was counted. In all six age groups and in all categories, we 
                                                   
 
2 The data can be found on Open Science Framework (osf.io/pnk5s) 
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found at least 25% of the participants (6 out of 21 participants) showing a significant 
correlation between typicality and preferences, except for 11-year-olds in the category 
vehicles (only 1 participant out of 21), 14-year-olds in the category mammals (5) and 
birds (3), and adults in the category birds (5). These findings clearly illustrate that there 
is a relation between typicality and preference, even in adults. 
We further studied the evolution of the correlation between typicality and 
preference across age groups. Figure 2.1 contains the Z’- transformed correlations 
averaged across category for every age group. A mixed effects analysis was performed 
on the Z’- transformed correlations to test the effect of age (5-, 7-, 9-, 11-, 14-year olds, 
and adults) and the effect of category. A random effect of participants was also included 
in the analyses. The analysis was carried out in R (version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package 
(Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Four models were fitted in order to test the 
main effects of age and category and the interaction between the two. The first model 
had two random effects for participants (in which participants are allowed to have a 
different intercept and can vary in the effect of category) and two fixed effects (age and 
category). The second and the third models were identical to the first model except that 
only one fixed effect was included in each; the fixed category effect was eliminated in 
the second model; and the fixed age effect was eliminated in the third model. The fourth 
model was identical to the first model, except for the addition of the interaction term 
(i.e., age*category). 
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Figure 2.1. Z’-transformed correlation between typicality ranking and preference 
averaged across category for each age group. 
 
To test the main effect of category, the first and the second model were 
compared. The results show that the first model provided a significantly better fit to 
the data (χ²(7) = 119.37, p < .0001). This means that there were significant differences 
in the correlation between typicality and preference across categories. The main effect 
of age was tested by comparing the first model and the third model. The results show 
that the first model, where the age effect was included, fits the data significantly better 
(χ²(5) = 37.69, p < .0001). This result suggests that the relation between typicality and 
preference differs among the six age groups. Finally, to test the interaction between age 
and category, the first and the fourth model were compared. The results revealed that 
the effect of age on the relationship between typicality and preference differs in 
different categories (χ²(35) = 103.05, p < .0001). Since the effect of age was significant, 
an additional analysis was run in order to see whether there is a significant (linear, 
quadratic, or cubic) trend in the correlation between typicality and preference across 
age. Analyses using contrast matrices with age as a fixed effect revealed significant 
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negative quadratic trends (see Figure 2.1). We report the t-statistic and treat it as a z-
statistic to derive p-values (t = -2.347, p = .019). This means that the relationship 
between the typicality and preference starts to increase from the young children and 
reaches the peak on 9-year-olds and decreases gradually towards the adults. 
Further, we estimated the age effect for each category separately. The same 
analyses were carried out to test the simple main effect of age, but this time only two 
models were compared for each category. The first one was similar as the second model 
described above, where only one main effect of age and two random effects of 
participants were included. The second model was similar, but without the age effect. 
The results revealed that in five out of eight categories, the effect of age was significant 
and quadratic trends were found: birds (χ²(5) = 29.29, p < .0001 and t = -3.46, p = 
.0005),  fruit (χ²(5) = 12.51, p = .028 and t = -2.66, p = .008), musical instruments 
(χ²(5) = 20.39, p = .001 and t = 2.67, p = .007), vegetables (χ²(5) = 51.62, p < .0001 
and t = -4.64, p < .0001), and vehicles (χ²(5) = 13.82, p = .017 and t = 2.05, p = .04). 
In the category of kitchen utensils, mammals, and tools, the effect of age was not 
significant: p = .08, p = .46, and p = .16, respectively.  
For the categories of birds, fruit, and vegetables, this relation first increased and 
then decreased over age, while the reverse pattern was found in the categories musical 
instruments and vehicles. For the other categories, no clear age trend was present. In 
sum, a clear relation was found between typicality and personal preference, even in 
adults. Also in children at different ages, typicality and personal preference were closely 
related to each other. 
2.5     General discussion 
The purpose of the studies described in this paper was to develop an alternative 
method to derive typicality scores from young children using a typicality ranking 
instead of typicality rating task. Like the family resemblance based method of 
Maridaki-Kassotaki (1997), our newly developed typicality ranking task does not rely 
on participants’ numerical knowledge and only to a limited extent on linguistic 
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knowledge. Unlike the family resemblance method, which assumes that categories are 
represented by an abstract central tendency, the method to derive typicality is 
independent of any representational theory.   
Three studies were conducted in six different age groups (5-, 7-, 9-, 11-, 14-year-
olds, and adults) to investigate whether a typicality ranking task is a valid method to 
derive typicality scores. Four artefact categories (kitchen utensils, musical instruments, 
tools, and vehicles) and four natural categories (birds, fruit, mammals, and vegetables) 
with 12 possible exemplars in each category were used in all three studies. In Study 1, 
the typicality ranking task was introduced to the adults and was compared to the 
standard 7-point-scale typicality rating task. In Study 2, the same method was applied 
to children. Finally, in Study 3 the relation between typicality and personal preference 
was explored. 
 
2.5.1     Towards a new method to derive typicality judgments from 
children 
The typicality ranking task was compared to the standard 7-point-scale 
typicality rating task in order to test whether the new alternative method is a reliable 
and a valid method to derive typicality judgments. We found that the reliability 
estimates from the typicality ranking were high and, in line with the finding from 
Barsalou (1989), the rankings were slightly more stable in most age groups in 
comparison with the typicality rating task. We also found high correlations between 
ranking and rating scores both in adults (Study 1) and children (Study 2). Further, the 
correlation between age groups were compared and revealed that convergence towards 
adult typicality increases gradually as the age gap becomes smaller. 
The results for the rankings should not come as a surprise. It is a well-
established finding in the psychology of mathematics that children master ordering 
very early in their development, even before they learn to count verbally (Dehaene, 
2001). Also in terms of measurement theory, the requirements for a participant in the 
rating task are higher than those in a ranking task. In the former, judgments at an 
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interval level are required, while ordinal information is needed in the ranking task 
(Stevens, 1946). 
Our findings show that deriving typicality from averaged rankings in an age 
group succeeds in lowering the age from which graded structure in semantic categories 
can be obtained from primary school children to pre-school aged children. However, 
our results also suggest that the age of 5 probably approaches the limit at which 
children are capable of judging the goodness of examples of a category, because the 
inter-person consistency with which the rankings are made decreased from very high 
for all categories in 7-year-olds to moderate for half of the categories (and high for the 
other half) in the 5-year-olds. Given the fact that children are able to give order 
judgments (like quantity, size, etc., of concrete stimuli) at an age considerably younger 
than 5 years, the decreasing consistency should be attributed to the specific task, that 
is, judging gradedness in semantic categories, rather than the general cognitive ability 
of ordinal judgment. 
One might wonder whether averaging over the essentially ordinal measures of 
different subjects is allowed. Strictly speaking, however, rating scale information might 
also fail to result in trustworthy interval data. The fact that the correlation between the 
averages of the two different methods is very high can, though, reassure us of the 
tenability of the assumed numerical properties in the averaging process. Furthermore, 
the increasing pattern of the correlations as the age gap between groups decreases 
provides further evidence for this.  Finally, the high consistency of the ranking data, 
also reported in Barsalou (1989), argues for treating the average ranking as a reliable 
measure of typicality in an age group. 
 
2.5.2     Typicality and personal preference 
While Maridaki-Kassotaki (1997) claimed that a typicality measure can only be 
suitable to derive typicality judgments from children if that measure is not related to 
personal preference data, we found significant correlations between typicality and 
personal preference, even in adults, when correlations were calculated on an individual 
level. These results suggest that personal preference might play an essential role in 
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typicality perception (or vice versa). Another possibility is that the relation between 
typicality judgment and personal preference is mediated through a third factor. This 
factor might be mere exposure, frequency of exposure or familiarity with a category 
item. Previous research already showed a significant relation between typicality 
judgments and familiarity (Barsalou, 1985; Hampton & Gardiner, 1983; Malt & Smith, 
1982): The more familiar we are with a certain category member, the more typical we 
think that member is of the category. It is very likely that the more familiar we are with 
an object the more we like it. In the field of social psychology, research on the 
phenomenon of mere exposure has provided evidence for the fact that people have a 
higher affinity for those things they have been repeatedly exposed to (Maslow, 1937; 
Zajonc, 1968). It is not surprising that those items that are most frequently 
encountered, are also the ones we are most familiar with, and hence, are also perceived 
as most typical for the category. Yet another factor that could mediate the relation 
between typicality and preference is actual conceptual knowledge of the studied 
categories, as shown by Alt, Meyers, and Alt (2013). More research is needed to explore 
the relation between typicality, personal preference, familiarity, frequency of exposure 
and conceptual development. 
2.6     Conclusion 
The typicality ranking task is shown to be a good, direct and brief alternative to 
derive typicality judgments from both adults and children from the age of five years 
onwards. In the typicality ranking task, items are gradually sorted according to their 
typicality. Contrary to the typicality rating task, no advanced numerical or linguistic 
knowledge is required from the participants, which makes the task suitable for young 
children. Its validity was demonstrated by high consistency between subjects and high 
correlations with the standard typicality rating task. The results show that the typicality 
ranking task can be used to assess children’s category knowledge and to evaluate how 
this knowledge evolves over time. 
  
2.A  Appendix: Selected items for the eight target categories 
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Abstract 
The present study investigates category intension in school-aged children and adults at 
two different levels of abstraction (i.e., superordinate and basic level) for two category 
types (i.e., artefacts and natural kinds). We addressed two critical questions: what kind 
of properties do children and adults generate to define semantic categories and which 
properties predict category membership judgment best at each abstraction level? 
Overall, participants generated relatively more entity properties for natural kinds 
categories, compared to artefact categories, as well as for basic level categories, 
compared to superordinate categories. Furthermore, the results showed that older 
children and adults generated relatively more entity properties than younger children. 
Finally, situation properties play the most important role in the prediction of category 
judgments at both levels of abstraction. Theoretical implications and comparable 
results from previous studies are described in detail. 
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3.1     Introduction 
The world is a complex place that consists of an infinite number of different 
stimuli. Humans try to overcome the problems posed by this diversity by cutting up the 
environment into a classification structure, a process called categorization. In order to 
categorize, people need to focus on attributes or properties related to particular 
concepts so that they can simplify the different stimuli into these concepts. Using these 
properties people can decide whether an object belongs to a certain concept or not (e.g., 
Malt & Johnson, 1992; Vanoverberghe & Storms, 2003). However, the quality of 
potential properties may differ. Some attributes are better suited to define category 
membership than others. Furthermore, the importance of a property in defining 
category membership can differ across age groups (e.g., Mervis, 1987). 
Over the years, several methodologies have been used to investigate what kind 
of properties play important roles in delineating categories, both in studies with adult 
participants and in developmental studies. The techniques varied from studying 
dictionary definitions (Farah & McClelland, 1991), over providing featural descriptions 
of to-be-categorized exemplars (Gelman, 1988; Hampton, Storms, Simmons, & 
Heussen, 2009; Keil & Batterman, 1984), to property generation studies 
(Vanoverberghe & Storms, 2003). First, we will provide an overview of these studies’ 
main findings, from which we will then derive the specific predictions that are tested 
in the present study. 
 
3.1.1   Studies with adult participants 
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the array of studies using adult 
participants. First, perceptual properties (e.g., “has wings”) tend to be more important 
in decisions about category endorsement for natural kind categories, while functional 
properties (e.g., “used to work with”) are more important to decide on membership in 
artefact categories (Barr & Caplan, 1987; Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Farah & McClelland, 
1991; Medin & Ortony, 1989; Rips, 1989; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-
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Braem, 1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984)1. Contrary to this general view, however, 
Malt and Johnson (1992) found that membership decisions for artefacts were 
influenced more by perceptual properties than by functional information, leading them 
to claim that functional properties alone are not sufficient to determine membership in 
artefact categories. 
Second, level of abstraction also plays an important role in determining the type 
of properties that define category membership. Rosch et al. (1976) found that 
functional properties were generated most frequently for superordinate categories, 
while perceptual properties were generated most frequently at the basic level. The latter 
finding was taken to mean that the basic level forms the most abstract level at which an 
object can be perceptually identified while at the superordinate level differences in 
physical appearance are not as salient as at the basic level. Rosch et al.’s (1976) claims 
were partly supported by the findings from a property generation study from 
Vanoverberghe and Storms (2003), who found that perceptual properties are more 
important for the basic level, while for the superordinate level, perceptual and 
functional properties are equally important. 
 
3.1.2   Developmental studies 
Many studies have been conducted to investigate the developmental shift of 
category representations based on properties. We will highlight some key findings that 
served as building blocks for the present study. In one of the earliest studies of this kind 
Mervis and Crisafi (1982) asked children (aged 2- to 5-year-olds) to divide pictured 
stimuli into categories defined at different hierarchical levels. They found that the 
acquisition of property types is influenced by the order in which category levels are 
acquired. Since the basic level is acquired first, children start predominantly with 
                                                   
 
1 Note, however, that the distinction between natural kinds and artefacts is not a strict dichotomy, 
since there are borderline cases, such as cultivated fruits, bred animals, and mineral compounds . 
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perceptual properties, but as they get older they rely more on functional properties, 
which become more important for the superordinate level. 
Using a different paradigm, Keil and Batterman (1984) investigated children’s 
early category representations by focusing on characteristic and defining properties. 
They presented school-aged children (kindergartens, second graders, and fourth 
graders) with two kinds of stories about potential exemplars of a category (e.g., hats, 
churches). In one kind of story, exemplars were described as being characterized by 
correct defining properties, which were mostly conceptual in nature, but they lacked 
important characteristic properties, which were mostly perceptual. The second sort of 
stories consisted of the opposite pattern. Keil and Batterman asked children whether 
the described instance was a true member of the category. The results showed that 
there is a shift across age groups from using characteristic, mostly perceptual 
properties to defining, mostly non-perceptual properties, and children who are in the 
transitional phase tend to use both types of properties. Thus, the shift might denote an 
increasing ability to understand concepts and to attend to attributes that are not 
directly apparent. 
Keeping basically the same research paradigm, Keil (1989) followed up on this 
finding by explicitly investigating the shift in different types of categories, namely 
natural kinds and artefacts. In one of his studies, he investigated the transformation of 
objects’ identities based on changes in the type of applying properties. Keil told school-
aged children (aged 5 to 11) stories in which certain changes were introduced in natural 
kind and artefact objects. He found that kindergartners relied on appearance more than 
on function for both artefacts and natural kinds. Keil argued that, since younger 
children have shallower theories, they tend to rely more on perceptual (a-theoretical) 
similarities, while older children rely more on function and less on appearance, 
especially for artefacts.  
Gelman (1988), using an inductive interference task, also investigated the role 
of different types of properties in pre-schoolers and second graders. She taught the 
children a new fact (i.e., a new property) about a category exemplar and checked 
whether they generalized it to other category members. Second graders tended to find 
the functional properties more generalizable than perceptual properties for artefacts, 
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while for natural kinds, the opposite pattern was found. For the pre-schoolers, this 
distinction was less pronounced than in second graders. 
3.2     Current study 
Summarizing, various developmental studies suggest that young children seem 
to focus on perceptual properties. As they get older, they evolve towards a focus on 
functional properties, but this is more pronounced for artefacts. However, even though 
all of the described papers tried to find out which (kind of) properties are important in 
the categorization process of children, none of the studies addressed the question 
directly by asking children to generate relevant properties. The present study tries to 
fill this gap by having children of different age groups, as well as adults, sum up 
properties that are important to determine membership for a set of natural kinds and 
artefacts. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that allows a systematic 
comparison between groups of different ages in terms of the kind of properties 
(perceptual versus functional) they generate. 
We also wanted to investigate which properties predict category membership 
judgment best. Furthermore, we examined these two questions using different kinds of 
categories: natural kinds (e.g., fruit and berries) and artefacts (e.g., vehicles, bicycles, 
etc); as well as categories defined at different levels of abstraction: superordinate (e.g., 
clothes, musical instruments, etc.) and basic categories (e.g., trousers, guitars, etc). For 
these purposes, we gathered property generation data and category judgment scores 
from different age groups. Generated properties were classified into the four basic 
categories of Wu and Barsalou’s (2009) coding scheme: taxonomic, introspective, 
entity, and situation properties. Taxonomic properties refer to the position of the 
concept in the category taxonomy and includes synonyms, superordinate, subordinate, 
and coordinate categories as well as specific instances of the concept (e.g., car - 
automobile; cat - animal). Introspective properties refer to the mental state evoked by 
the concept, such as affects and emotions, evaluations, etc (e.g., apples - I like; smashed 
car - anger). Entity properties are properties of a concrete entity, such as external 
surface properties, internal surface properties, and external and internal components 
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(e.g., apple - red; watermelon - juicy). Finally, situation properties refer to situations in 
which the concept functions in an event with one or more participants, at some place 
and time (e.g., shirt - worn; car - transport). Crucial for the purpose of our study is that, 
for the concrete concepts that we used as stimuli, perceptual properties are classified 
as entity properties and functional properties are coded as situation properties2.  
Regarding the type of properties people generate, three hypotheses were derived 
from the described literature. First, we expect predominantly entity properties for 
natural kinds, while for artefact categories, we expect a more even mix of situation and 
entity properties (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Vanoverberghe & Storms, 2003). Second, 
based on the findings from Rosch et al. (1976) and Vanoverberghe and Storms (2003), 
entity properties are expected to be generated more frequently for the basic level 
categories, whereas situation properties are expected to be generated more frequently 
for the superordinate level categories. Third, in line with Keil and Batterman (1984) 
and Keil (1989), we predict that the youngest children start off mainly with entity 
properties and as children get older, they will rely more on situation properties. 
However, the latter might depend on the category type and the level of abstraction. 
That is, developmental studies suggest that older children (and adults) will still 
generate (mainly) entity properties for basic level categories (Mandler, 2000; Mervis & 
Crisafi, 1982) and natural kinds categories (Gelman, 1988; Keil, 1989). 
To examine the value of the entity and situation properties in predicting 
categorization decisions we used the family resemblance model from Rosch and Mervis 
(1975), which has been shown to relate strongly to category related variables (e.g., 
Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008; Verheyen, De Deyne, Dry, & Storms, 2011). The general 
idea is that objects are more likely to be considered category members if they possess 
the most important properties for that category. Put differently, the higher an objects’ 
family resemblance score, the higher the likelihood of belonging to the category in 
question. So besides a property generation and category judgment task, we also 
                                                   
 
2 Although Wu and Barsalou’s (2009) coding scheme contains further subdivisions, we only use the 
four basic classifications here.  
60 Chapter 3 
obtained property applicability judgments in order to calculate family resemblance 
scores (see the Results section for more details). The critical question is whether the 
entity-based family resemblance scores predict category judgments better or worse 
than the situation-based family resemblance scores. More specifically, category type, 
level of abstraction, and age should have an analogous effect on the type of properties 
that predict category membership as on the type of properties that people generate 
(see above). 
 
3.2.1   Method3 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Children of three different age groups and adults performed the property 
generation and the category judgment task. A total of 96 children, consisting of 32 5-
year-olds (18 males and 14 females; mean age: 5 years and 6 months), 32 7-year-olds 
(15 males and 17 females; mean age: 7 years and 6 months), and 32 10-year-olds (22 
males and 10 females; mean age: 10 years and 7 months) were recruited from two 
different schools in Flanders, Belgium. Sixteen adults (8 males and 8 females; mean 
age: 26 years and 10 months) performed the same tasks. An additional 16 adults (6 
males and 10 females, mean age: 30 years and 5 months) volunteered to fill out the 
property applicability judgment task. All adult participants were friends and colleagues 
of the researchers, recruited in Flanders, Belgium. 
3.2.1.2 Materials 
Eight semantic categories were selected in pairs of a basic (low level) and a 
corresponding superordinate (high level) category belonging to the same semantic 
domain (i.e., trousers-clothes; berries-fruit; guitars-musical instruments; bicycles-
vehicles). A total of 120 coloured pictures (11x10 cm), 15 per category, were created for 
                                                   
 
3 All the data analyzed in the current paper were collected as part of a large study with a different 
focus, described in Djalal, Hampton, Storms, & Heyman (Chapter 4). 
 Investigation of category intension 61 
 
the category judgment and property applicability judgment tasks. Each set of 15 
pictures consisted of ten pictures depicting presumed category members and five 
portraying related non-members (based on discussions of the selected materials by 
three of the authors). Figure 3.1 displays some of the stimuli. All the stimuli used in this 
study can be found in Appendix 3.A. 
In the property generation task, participants only received the category labels. 
Participants’ responses were processed using McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg’s (1997) 
procedure and subsequently used as input for the property applicability judgment task. 
The former involved tallying all responses per category, after which synonym 
properties (i.e., properties with essentially the same meaning such as to race and to 
compete) were merged, adjective-noun combinations (e.g., heavy iron) and 
conjunctive properties (e.g., red and small) were split up (if they provided different 
information), redundant quantifiers (e.g., most of them) were dropped, and exemplars 
of the category (e.g., pear for the category fruit) were removed. The resulting property 
lists were combined with the 15 exemplars per category to form property × exemplar 
matrices. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Example stimuli of the categories clothes, fruit, musical instruments, 
vehicles, trousers, berries, guitars, and bicycles (from the top left to the bottom right). 
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3.2.1.3 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in one test session. Their first task was a 
property generation task, which was followed by a category judgment task. The order 
of these two tasks was fixed across all participants, except for the additional group of 
adults who performed only the property applicability task. For the children, both tasks 
were conducted in a playful context. Whereas adults performed both tasks for all the 
studied categories, in order to limit the duration of the task, children performed the 
tasks for four categories, each belonging to a different domain, two of the high and two 
of the low level (e.g., clothes, musical instruments, berries, and bicycles). The 
combination of categories was randomized across participants. 
For the children, the property generation task was presented in the context of 
helping Mr. Mouse and Mrs. Monkey (presented as stuffed animal versions of a mouse 
and a monkey), who came from another planet, to understand the meaning of the 
category terms. By means of an example, the experimenter explained to Mr. Mouse and 
Mrs. Monkey what furniture was by giving properties of furniture (e.g., it is in the 
house, you can sit on it, you can put something on top of it, etc.). The child could begin 
the actual property generation task when she understood the task instructions 
properly. The adult participants were simply given an excel file, consisting of eight 
different sheets, one for each of the studied categories. They too were asked to imagine 
they had to explain the terms to someone who did not know its meaning. The adults 
performed the task individually by writing down the properties in an excel file. 
The category judgment task was also presented to children in a playful context, 
where this time children had to help Mr. Mouse and Mrs. Monkey to judge which items 
belonged to the category. The category name was first mentioned and then the 15 
pictures were presented one by one. Children were asked whether the pictured 
exemplar belonged to the category X (e.g., “is this furniture?”). The adult participants 
performed the task on a computer. They were given a link to an online survey, where 
each set of 15 pictures was presented and they made their judgments by clicking on the 
pictures of items they judged to be members of the category. 
 Investigation of category intension 63 
 
For the property applicability task, participants were presented with a matrix 
with the 15 pictured exemplars as columns and the (47 to 74, depending on the 
category) generated properties as rows. Participants were asked to indicate whether the 
exemplars possessed the properties, by entering a 1 if the property applied to the 
exemplar, or a 0 if not. Each participant was randomly assigned to fill out the matrices 
for two categories. In total, four participants were assigned to each category. 
3.2.2   Results 
3.2.2.1 What kind of properties do people generate? 
Coding. The responses obtained in the property generation task were first 
processed following the procedure outlined in the Materials section. The only 
difference is that category exemplars were not removed this time since they are in fact 
taxonomic properties. The resulting properties were then classified into the four basic 
categories proposed by Wu and Barsalou (2009): taxonomic, introspective, entity, and 
situation properties. The classification resulted in an agreement of 92%. Disagreements 
were resolved via discussion. 
Data summary. In order to get a general idea of the kind of properties that 
people generated, we first simply collapsed the data across the eight categories and four 
age groups. On average, entity properties were produced the most (M = 2.04, SD = 
2.11), followed by situation properties (M = 1.91, SD = 1.73), taxonomic categories (M 
= 0.64, SD = 1.25), and introspective properties (M = 0.18, SD = 0.48). Figure 3.2 gives 
a more detailed overview of the property distribution broken down by category type, 
level of abstraction, and age. As can be seen, participants generated relatively few 
introspective and taxonomic properties. This observation and the fact that we had no a 
priori predictions regarding introspective and taxonomic properties prompted us to 
only focus on entity and situation properties henceforth. 
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Figure 3.2. Property distribution broken down by category type (artefact vs. natural 
kinds), level of abstraction (superordinate vs. basic), and age group (5-, 7-, 10-year-
olds, vs adults). 
 
Mixed effects analyses. We wanted to test whether the variables category 
type, level of abstraction, and age were significantly related to the kind of properties, 
entity or situation, people generated. To this end, mixed effects analyses were 
conducted in which the relative amount of entity versus situation properties was 
predicted. In addition to the fixed effects of category type (natural kinds vs. artefacts), 
level of abstraction (basic level vs. superordinate), and age (5-, 7-, 10-year-olds, vs 
adults), we also included random participant effects. Following Barr, Levy, Scheepers, 
and Tily (2013), a maximal random structure was used (see OSF link: osf.io/ph8uz, for 
the analysis code and the models that were tested). The analyses were carried out in R 
(version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). 
The results revealed main effects of category type (χ²(1) = 17.50, p < .001), level 
of abstraction (χ²(1) = 67.07, p < .001), and age (χ²(3) = 36.91, p < .001). On average, 
natural kinds’ category labels elicited relatively more entity responses compared to 
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artefacts’ category labels. The same is true for basic level categories compared to 
superordinate categories. Furthermore, as participants get older, they tend to list 
relatively more entity properties (see also Figure 3.2). However, these main effects are 
qualified by two significant interactions (other interactions were not statistically 
significant). That is, participants produce relatively more entity properties for natural 
kinds compared with artefacts, but this is only true for superordinate categories 
(category type × level of abstraction: χ²(1) = 32.64, p < .001). Relatedly, participants 
give relatively fewer entity properties for superordinate categories compared with basic 
level categories, but this only holds for artefact categories. Finally, the tendency of older 
participants to generate more entity properties only manifests itself in the artefact 
categories (category type × age: χ²(3) = 17.26, p < .001). 
3.2.2.2 What kind of properties predict category judgments? 
Data pre-processing. First, to compute the family resemblance scores of 
every exemplar, the applicability judgments (0 or 1) were summed over the four 
participants who completed the property applicability judgment task of each property 
across the 15 exemplars, resulting in frequency scores that ranged from 0 to 4 for every 
item × property combination. The weights were calculated for every property by 
summing the frequency scores of the 10 exemplars that were considered members of 
the category. The family resemblance score of an exemplar was then calculated by 
summing, over all properties, the product of the property weight and the corresponding 
frequency scores. The procedure is illustrated in Appendix 3.B. Family resemblance 
scores were computed using only those properties that were generated by the specific 
age group at study. In this way, one can learn which type of properties generated by a 
particular age group gives the best prediction of category judgments in that age group. 
So, it is important to recognize that family resemblance scores were computed for both 
property types (i.e., entity and situation) separately. The resulting family resemblance 
scores will be used in a next phase to predict category endorsements. The latter were 
quantified by scoring each decision as 0 or 1, depending on whether the item was 
judged a non-member or a member of the category, respectively. 
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Data summary. To develop some intuitions about what the data look like, we 
first conducted an exploratory analysis in which item-specific category judgments were 
obtained by summing across participants per age group. A high category judgment 
score of an item in a category for a certain age group thus indicates that the item was 
endorsed often as a category member by that age group, while a low score indicates that 
the item was usually not judged to belong to the category. Further, in order to 
investigate which types of properties contribute most in predicting category judgments, 
Spearman rank-order correlations were calculated between category endorsements of 
each age group and the family resemblance scores based on both types of properties, 
generated by each age group. This was done for all eight categories separately, but in 
order to simplify matters, we averaged across some categories to focus on the four 
category level × level of abstraction combinations (see Figure 3.3). The results suggest 
that situation properties in general have more predictive value than entity properties. 
To test this more formally, we again conducted mixed effects analyses. 
Mixed effects analyses. The dependent variable of these analyses are the 
unsummed category judgments (i.e., 0 if an item was considered a non-member, 1 if it 
was considered a member). In order to reduce model complexity, we conducted 
separate analyses for all four category type × abstraction level combinations. Hence, 
the only fixed effects are age, and entity-based and situation-based family resemblance 
scores. However, when analysing the artefact data, we also included the variable 
category (bicycles, guitars, and trousers for the basic level data; vehicles, musical 
instruments, and clothes for the superordinate data). The random structure of the 
model featured both participant and picture effects, though, because of convergence 
issues, only random intercepts and random slopes for the main effects (where 
applicable) were incorporated. Because the latter may yield high Type I error rates 
when testing interactions (Barr, 2013), we adjusted our alpha level to .01 in those 
instances. Here, we will only focus on the main effects of the family resemblance 
variables and interactions involving one or both family resemblance variables. 
The situation-based family resemblance score significantly predicted category 
judgments, but only in the artefact categories (χ²(1) = 4.96, p = .026, for the basic level 
categories; χ²(1) = 30.98, p < .001, for the superordinate categories). In contrast, the 
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main effect of entity-based family resemblance was never statistically significant. None 
of the interactions involving any of the family resemblance measures was statistically 
significant except for the category × entity-based family resemblance interaction in the 
basic level artefact category data (χ²(2) = 14.80, p < .001). Examining this interaction 
showed that the entity-based family resemblance did significantly predict category 
judgments for two out of three categories (Z = 4.74, p < .001, for bicycles; Z = 2.31, p = 
.02, for trousers). 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Spearman rank-order correlations between category judgments and 
entity-and situation-based family resemblance scores separated per category type 
(artefact vs. natural kinds), level of abstraction (superordinate vs. basic), and age group 
(5-, 7-, 10-year-olds, vs. adults). As a reference, additional lines (grey dotted lines) were 
added to show the correlations of category judgments with family resemblance scores 
based on entity and situation properties generated by all four age groups combined. 
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3.3     General discussion 
In this study, we investigated category intension, assessed via a property 
generation task, and category extension, measured via a category judgment task, in 
school-aged children and adults. More specifically, we examined a) what kind of 
properties children and adults generate to define semantic categories and b) which 
properties predict category membership judgment best. We will address both questions 
in two separate sections, which have a similar structure. First, we will summarize the 
main findings and then we will relate them to previous findings and discuss their 
implications.  
3.3.1   What kind of properties do people generate? 
Participants predominately produced entity and situation properties, whereas 
taxonomic and especially introspective properties were less prevalent. Furthermore, 
we found that people generated relatively more entity properties for natural kinds 
categories compared to artefact categories, but only for superordinate categories. 
Analogously, relatively more entity properties were listed for basic level categories than 
for superordinate categories, but this was only the case for artefact categories. Finally, 
we found that older participants tend to give relatively more entity properties than the 
young children (5-and 7-year-olds).  
The first two hypotheses listed in the introduction are (partly) supported by the 
data. That is, in line with the literature, it seems that entity properties are more salient 
in basic level categories (Rosch et al., 1976; Vanoverberghe & Storms, 2003) and in 
natural kinds categories (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Vanoverberghe & Storms, 2003). 
The only exception seems to be the basic level × natural kinds combination (see Figure 
3.2), which actually comprises only the category berries. One possible explanation is 
that people, especially children, may not be very familiar with the category berries. It 
is also a fairly heterogeneous category without a clear prototype. Furthermore, family 
resemblance predictions of category endorsement fail completely in the berries 
category. This was even the case after including all entity properties generated by the 
four age groups (Figure 3.3, light grey dotted lines). It actually suggested that entity 
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properties generated by the adults worsened the category membership prediction for 
the children. Taken together, it is arguably a rather unusual basic level category, which 
might have obscured the general pattern.  
The observed developmental trend (i.e., children begin with situation properties 
and shift more towards entity properties as they get older) contradicts with the 
conclusions emerging from several studies (e.g., Keil & Batterman, 1984; Keil, 1989; 
Mervis & Crisafi, 1982), in which it was claimed that children shift from relying on 
perceptual properties to both perceptual and functional properties, depending on the 
type of category. This contradiction may be due to differences in the design and focus 
of the studies. For instance, Keil’s (1989) task was very specific to children, as he asked 
children to judge the importance of different types of properties in the transformation 
of entities. Our study was more straightforward, in the sense that we asked children 
(and adults) to generate properties for different kind of categories. Although this is the 
traditional way of gathering properties (De Deyne et al., 2008; McRae, Cree, 
Seidenberg, & McNorgan, 2005), it is acknowledged that the nature of the task might 
bias participants to list information that allows them to distinguish the concepts. This 
would result in generating relatively more properties that could separate members 
from non-members, such as situational properties, and less properties that are shared 
across objects, such as entity properties. However, McRae and colleagues argued that, 
instead of interpreting this bias as a weakness, it should actually be seen as a strength 
of this kind of task, since distinguishing (often situational) properties play a more 
important role in object identification in comparison to broad (often entity) properties. 
The idea that functional properties are more distinctive than perceptual properties is 
supported by analyses of early-learned noun-property networks (Hills, Maouene, 
Maouene, Sheya, & Smith, 2009) and it also resurfaces in the present data. Relative to 
entity properties, situational properties tended to have higher distinctiveness values, 
calculated as the difference between the average applicability judgments for the ten 
pre-determined members and the average applicability judgments for the five non-
members (see Table 3.1). 
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Table 3.1 
Average distinctiveness scores based on the applicability judgments for each property 
category generated by each age group collapsed across the eight categories.   
Property 
categories 
Average distinctiveness score 
5 yos 7 yos 10 yos adults 
Entity 0.47 0.52 0.62 0.40 
Situation 0.65 0.69 0.88 0.82 
 
Furthermore, one might assume that children, even the youngest in our sample, 
tend to generate functional properties more than other types, since they use their 
experience as their basic knowledge when generating properties (Barton & Komatsu, 
1989; Gelman, 1988; Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Indeed, directly asking 
children to explain the meaning of a category label (e.g., clothes) might elicit more 
situational properties, because they truly convey the essence of a concept (e.g., to wear, 
to keep you warm), especially artefact categories. Adults, on the other hand, may 
provide some additional, non-crucial, information in the form of entity properties (e.g., 
it exists in different colours, different styles, etc.). This is also in line with Nelson’s 
(1974) functional core theory, in which she claimed that children begin with functional 
properties, such as properties that relate to possible actors (e.g., mother), to an entity’s 
actions (e.g., throw, pick up, catch), to the location of activity (e.g., living room, 
playground), and to the effects of action over time (for further discussion, Mandler, 
2000). All these properties are classified as situation properties in Wu and Barsalou’s 
(2009) taxonomy. 
3.3.2   What kind of properties predict category judgments? 
We found that situation properties contributed significantly to the prediction of 
category judgments, but solely for the artefact categories. On the other hand, entity 
properties only had unique predictive value in the categories bicycles and trousers. In 
addition, there was no significant interaction with age, suggesting that, as people get 
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older, neither property type becomes more or less important in determining category 
extensions. 
The finding that situation properties predict category judgments for artefacts is 
in line with several studies in the literature (Barr & Caplan, 1987; Barton & Komatsu, 
1989; Rips, 1989) reporting that functional properties, such as situation properties, are 
more important than perceptual properties (i.e., entity properties) for category 
membership decisions of artefact concepts (but see Malt & Johnson, 1992). The current 
results also support Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings’ (2005) view that the meaning of a 
concept is understood and represented against background situations. They claimed 
that a concept is easier to process when the situation is available. For instance, to 
understand the meaning of vehicle, people do not rely (solely) on the physical entities, 
but on the setting where they are found (e.g., roadway) and the activities performed 
with them (e.g., driving). Knowing the relevant situations where a concept occurs 
strengthens the knowledge of that concept. Therefore, situation properties seem to play 
an essential part in the representation of concepts. Relatedly, situation properties are 
often defining properties, whereas entity properties are mostly characteristic 
properties (see also Keil & Batterman, 1984). Therefore, it shouldn’t come as a surprise 
that situation properties are better at predicting category judgments, especially given 
the nature of the property generation task (i.e., “explain the meaning of X”), which 
might prompt participants to list more properties that discriminate between exemplars 
and non-exemplars. However, it is remarkable that the entity properties have so little 
predictive value. Based on previous studies and the property generation data, one 
would expect entity properties to play a (crucial) role in natural kinds categories. 
Perhaps the low number of natural kinds categories (i.e., two) and the previously 
mentioned peculiarity of the berry category, could explain the unexpected results.  
An important finding from our study is that the results suggest there is a 
disconnection between the type of properties people generate and the type of properties 
that delineate category extensions. Even though natural kind categories elicited 
relatively more entity properties, there is no significant gain in terms of ability to 
predict category judgments. These findings thus support the notion that there is no 
perfect link between category intensions and their extensions (Hampton & Passanisi, 
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2016; Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999).  Especially (young) children, but 
even adults (Smith & Medin, 1981), may lack the ability to introspectively decide what 
properties are important to define a category. This was also reflected by the fact that 
including all entity and situational properties generated by the four age groups only 
improved the category membership prediction modestly (see Figure 3.3). 
A similar argument applies to the developmental effects: On the one hand, we 
found a developmental shift from generating situation properties to entity properties, 
which seems to partially contradict the aforementioned studies (e.g., Keil & Batterman, 
1984; Keil, 1989; Mervis & Crisafi, 1982). However, situation properties do play an 
important role in predicting category judgments across all age groups. Put differently, 
despite the fact that people seem to add (mostly entity) properties as they get older, the 
property-based prediction of category judgments does not improve significantly. This 
would again suggest that there is a discrepancy between “what they generate” (the 
intensions) and “what they actually use” in judging category membership (the 
extensions). 
 
 
  
 
3.A   Appendix: Stimulus set 
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3.B  Appendix: Illustration of the procedure to calculate the family 
resemblance scores 
Step 1: Calculating the property weights 
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Step 2: Calculating the family resemblance scores 
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Chapter 4 
Relationship between extensions and 
intensions in categorization 
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Abstract 
The present study investigated the relationship between category extension and 
intension for eleven different semantic categories. It is often tacitly assumed that there 
is a (strong) extension-intension link. However, a recent study by Hampton and 
Passanisi (2016) examining the patterns of stable individual differences in concepts 
across participants called this hypothesis into question. To conceptually replicate their 
findings, two studies were conducted. We employed a category judgment task to 
measure category extensions, whereas a property generation (in Study 1) and property 
judgment task (Study 2) were used to measure intensions. Using their method, that is, 
correlating extension and intension similarity matrices, we found non-significant 
correlations in both studies, supporting their conclusion that similarity between 
individuals for extensional judgments does not map onto similarity between 
individuals for intensional judgments. However, multi-level logistic regression 
analyses showed that the properties a person generated (Study 1) or endorsed (Study 
2) better predicted her own category judgments compared to other people’s category 
judgments. This result provides evidence in favour of a link between extension and 
intension at the subject level. The conflicting findings, resulting from two different 
approaches, and their theoretical repercussions are discussed. 
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4.1     Introduction 
In studies of natural concepts, many theories have claimed that in order to 
categorize, people may recognize objects as having shared properties with other 
objects, and as a result group these objects together into the same category. For 
instance, if you encounter a novel object that has fur, four legs, a tail, and barks, you 
might compare it with objects that you know have similar properties, and then you 
could group this novel object together with other similar objects, in this case into the 
category of dogs. This example shows that concepts have two important aspects that 
play a role in categorization: the intension (the properties that define or characterize 
concepts) and the extension (the set of category members)1.  
It has been a long-held belief that category extension and intension are somehow 
related (e.g., Aristotle, 4th century BC/1961; Frege, 1948; for a recent overview see 
Hampton & Passanisi, 2016). As proposed by property-based models (Hampton, 1979; 
Rosch, 1975; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 1974), the world is divided 
into natural categories that are structured by clusters of properties. People use these 
properties to make predictions and to draw inferences in deciding whether an object is 
a member of a category. Thus, an object will be grouped into a certain category if it has 
necessary and sufficient properties (i.e., the classical view) or shares certain properties 
with other members in the category (i.e., the probabilistic view, Smith & Medin, 1981). 
Such property-based models have been used in numerous studies of categorization, 
many of which conclude or assume that category extension and intension are closely 
related (e.g., Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2014; Caplan & Barr, 1989; Hampton, Dubois, & 
Yeh, 2006; Murphy, 2002; Verheyen, De Deyne, Dry, & Storms, 2011).  
 
  
                                                   
 
1 In philosophical semantics, the terms extension and intension refer to different sides of the same 
coin (i.e., they map to each other by definition). Here we follow the psychological literature in which 
extension usually refers to the list of category members that people endorse, whereas intension 
refers to the properties that they believe characterize concepts. 
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4.1.1  Moving in the opposite direction: Intension is not everything 
Besides properties as the intensional information, other researchers focused on 
similarity to stored exemplars of categories in predicting category membership (Heit & 
Barsalou, 1996; Nosofsky, 1984). Storms, De Boeck, and Ruts (2000), for instance, 
found an exemplar-based model to be a better predictor of category membership than 
a property-based model.  Furthermore, other studies have found that the relationship 
between extensions and intensions is not as direct as some have claimed. Malt, Sloman, 
Gennari, Shi, and Wang (1999) studied the names of containers in three different 
languages and argued that categorization can also be influenced by the linguistic and 
cultural histories of the language itself. More specifically, they proposed three 
mechanisms (i.e., chaining, convention, and pre-emption) that explain why properties 
alone may be insufficient for capturing the complexity of naming choices. These 
mechanisms may explain why object clustering is not solely based on a particular set of 
properties (see also Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008). 
There are also accounts that presume a reverse relationship between exemplars 
and properties (Spalding & Gagné, 2013). In this view, category membership is a given 
rather than guided by the properties an exemplar possesses. Common or defining 
properties of a concept are derived from the exemplars of the category2. Despite their 
differences, all of these theories would expect some kind of (causal) relationship 
between category extension and intension. 
However, Hampton and Passanisi (2016, henceforth H&P) recently called this 
assumption into question, suggesting instead that in one important respect intension 
might not map onto extension at all. They reasoned that if there is an intension-
extension link (dis)similarity between individuals in terms of their category intensions 
should translate to (dis)similarity in their category extensions. Using a property 
importance rating task to measure category intensions and a typicality judgment task 
for category extensions, H&P examined whether individual variation in the 
                                                   
 
2 We thank Thomas Spalding for bringing this to our attention. 
 Relationship between extensions and intensions in categorization 89 
 
 
representation of category extensions indeed maps to inter-individual variability in 
category intensions. That is, if two persons show similar typicality judgments, H&P 
argued that their judgments of property importance should also be similar. Conversely, 
if two persons weight properties differently, the idea is that their category extension 
(i.e., typicality ratings) should also diverge to a certain extent. For instance, if person A 
considers physical activity to be an important property of sport, whereas person B 
considers having rules to be more important, one would expect their typicality 
judgments to vary correspondingly. That is, hiking would be a more typical sport for 
person A, whereas snooker would be a more typical sport for person B. Analogously, if 
person A and C both consider physical activity to be an important property of sport, 
one would expect similar typicality ratings for hiking (i.e., relatively high ratings) and 
snooker (relatively low ratings).  
To formally test this prediction, they constructed two similarity matrices for 
participants, one for extensions (i.e., consisting of all pairwise correlations between 
participants’ typicality judgments) and a second one for intensions (i.e., consisting of 
all pairwise correlations between the same participants’ property importance 
judgments). They then correlated these similarity matrices from the two tasks to test 
whether there is a relation between extensional and intensional representations. Across 
four studies (with slight variations in the methodology), they came to the conclusion 
that similarity between individuals in extensional judgments did not map onto 
similarity between individuals in intensional judgments. Estimates of the correlation 
between similarity matrices were close to zero in spite of test-retest reliability 
correlations for both matrices obtained in two of the studies of around .35, significantly 
above zero. Put differently, their results contradict the widely accepted view that 
intensions map to extensions. H&P proposed instead that category intension and 
extension are not integrated, but rather that they are stored independently from each 
other. More concretely, there might be an exemplar-based system underlying 
extensional judgments (see e.g., Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000) and a 
theory/schema-driven system underlying intensional judgments. Such a hybrid form 
of concept representation can account for H&P’s findings by assuming that the 
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typicality and property importance judgments tap into different systems, which are 
stored separately in semantic memory.  
H&P’s conclusions have far-reaching repercussions for theories of concept 
representation and category learning, because most theories assume there is a link 
between intension and extension. Hence, the first aim of this paper is to conceptually 
replicate their findings. An important difference from H&P’s experiments is that we 
employed a category judgment task to measure category extensions, and a property 
generation task (Study 1) and property judgment task (Study 2) to measure category 
intensions. Besides testing whether H&P’s findings generalize to other, related 
measures, we used category judgments instead of typicality ratings to address the 
concern raised by H&P that different properties may determine category membership 
as opposed to typicality judgments (for some concepts). Indeed, they speculated that 
“judgments of feature importance might reflect involvement in category membership 
decisions rather than typicality, so that variability in the two measures would not match 
up” (p. 507). The present set-up allows us to test this possibility. 
A second goal is to compare H&P’s approach with a more direct method to link 
people’s intensions and extensions. Indeed, their (controversial) conclusion might find 
its roots in the nature of the methodology they used. To address this (potential) 
concern, we used a more straightforward measure of the extension-intension relation 
inspired by Hampton (1979). More concretely, we will examine whether a participant’s 
own properties predict her category judgments better than the properties of another 
participant. 
4.2     Study 1 
4.2.1   Method 
4.2.1.1 Ethics statement 
All research was conducted with the approval of the Social and Societal Ethics 
Committee (SMEC) of the University of Leuven. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants before starting the task.  
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4.2.1.2 Participants 
Sixteen adults (8 females); ranging in age from 20 to 46 years old (Mage = 26.83) 
performed both a property generation task and a category judgment task. Another 
group of 16 adults (10 females), ranging in age from 20 to 55 years old (Mage = 30.42) 
performed a property applicability judgment task. 
4.2.1.3 Materials 
The stimuli were sets of 15 possible exemplars from each of 8 semantic 
categories. Inspired by Ameel et al. (2008), the categories were chosen in pairs of a 
superordinate (high) level and a corresponding basic (low) level category (specifically, 
clothes-trousers; fruit-berries; musical instruments-guitars; vehicles-bicycles). The 
exemplars were presented in the form of pictures in both the category membership 
judgment and property applicability judgment tasks, whereas in the property 
generation task only the category names were presented. Within each set of 15 items, 
ten were presumed category members and five were presumed non-members (based 
on discussions of the selected materials by two of the authors). Each picture was printed 
in colour on a 11x10 cm cardboard form. Figure 4.1 displays some of the stimuli (the 
stimuli were the same as in Chapter 3 see Appendix 3.A for all items). Note that there 
are two primary differences with H&P’s study in terms of the materials used: H&P only 
selected superordinate categories, some of which were of a non-physical nature (i.e., 
sports and science), and the exemplars were presented in the form of words instead of 
pictures. However, these variations from H&P’s study were not theoretically motivated. 
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Figure 4.1. Sample of the stimuli used in Study 1. From the top left to the bottom right: 
category clothes, fruit, musical instruments, vehicles, trousers, berries, guitars, and 
bicycles. 
 
4.2.1.4 Procedure 
In a first phase of the study, participants completed the property generation task 
and then continued to the category membership judgment task, within a single session. 
The task order assured that participants’ generated properties were not influenced by 
the pictures. That is, participants only saw the pictures in the category membership 
judgment task. In a second phase of the study, a different group of participants 
performed the property applicability judgment task, which involved the properties 
gathered in the first phase of the experiment (i.e., in the property generation task).  
In the property generation task, participants were given a MS Excel file that 
contained eight worksheets, one for each category name. Participants were asked to 
imagine they had to explain the terms to someone who did not know their meaning. 
They performed the task individually by typing in the properties. They were instructed 
to finish one category before moving on to the next one. The categories were presented 
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in different random orders to each participant with superordinate and basic category 
pairs (e.g., clothes-trousers) never occurring immediately one after the other.  
After completing the property generation task, participants were given a link to 
an online survey (i.e., the category membership judgment task) where each set of 15 
pictures was presented and they were asked to click on the pictures of exemplars they 
judged to be members of the category mentioned above the picture set. Each category 
name was embedded in a question, for instance, “which pictures below are members of 
the category fruit?” The category name was written in bold and underlined. All 15 
pictures were presented in three rows of five, so that participants could see all the 
pictures on their computer screen at the same time. Participants were also always able 
to see the target category name when they were selecting pictures. Before moving on to 
the next category, participants were asked to check whether they were sure of their 
answers. If they did, they were allowed to click the ‘next’ button to continue to the next 
category. In the survey, each participant received a different random order of the 
categories and pictures. 
To select the properties for the property applicability judgment task, we followed 
the procedure described in McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (1997). First, all generated 
properties were simply tallied for each category name. Synonym properties (i.e., 
properties that have essentially the same meaning, e.g., to produce music and to make 
music) were given an identical code. Properties phrased with an adjective-noun 
combination (e.g., heavy iron) and conjunctive properties (e.g., red and small) were 
split and treated as separate properties if they provided different information. 
Redundant quantifiers (e.g., most of them) were dropped and properties which only 
mention exemplars of the category (e.g., apple for the category fruit) were eliminated. 
The total number of properties (i.e., the number of types, not tokens) generated across 
participants for each category ranged from 39 to 53 (see Table 4.1 for the average 
number of tokens of generated properties per category). In a next step, the 15 possible 
exemplars per category were combined with the generated category properties to form 
property by exemplar matrices. Thus, every matrix consisted of 15 columns, one for 
every exemplar, and 39 to 53 rows, one for every generated property. 
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Table 4.1 
Mean and standard deviation of number of generated properties and category 
judgment scores for each category in Study 1. 
 Generated properties Category judgments 
M SD M SD 
Clothes 8.69 4.06 0.66 0.13 
Fruit 8.50 4.73 0.70 0.06 
Musical instruments 7.13 4.51 0.70 0.08 
Vehicles 8.13 3.36 0.64 0.15 
Trousers 8.81 4.17 0.62 0.13 
Berries 8.81 3.99 0.54 0.18 
Guitars 8.06 4.58 0.61 0.18 
Bicycles 9.94 5.85 0.63 0.10 
M 8.51 4.41 0.64 0.13 
 
In the property applicability judgment task, a different group of participants 
individually received an excel file in which they indicated whether the exemplars 
possessed the properties by entering a 1 if the property applied to the exemplar, or a 0 
if not. Each participant was randomly assigned to fill in the matrices for two categories. 
In total, four participants were assigned to each category. All the tasks were conducted 
in Dutch and none of the tasks had a time limit. 
4.2.2   Results  
The results are structured as follows. First, we will describe the intensional and 
extensional measures and explain how these were transformed into similarity matrices. 
Then, we will test whether similarity between individuals for extensional judgments 
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maps onto similarity between individuals for intensional judgments by correlating 
extension and intension similarity matrices (i.e., H&P’s approach). Finally, we will 
introduce a new method using an individual’s properties to predict her own category 
judgments and compare the results. 
4.2.2.1 Extension similarity matrix 
The category judgments were first quantified by scoring each decision as 0 or 1, 
depending on whether the item was judged a non-member or a member of the category 
(see Table 4.1 for the mean and standard deviation of the category judgment scores, the 
proportion of yes responses, per category). These scores were then tabulated for each 
participant in each category. To measure between-participant consistency, Cronbach’s 
alpha reliability coefficients (Lord, Novick, & Birnbaum, 1968) were calculated for the 
category judgment scores. Agreement between people (and a large sample size) 
translates into a high alpha. The reliability coefficients obtained in the present study 
varied between .92 and .99 across the eight categories. For each category, a participant 
by participant (16x16) similarity matrix was then constructed with the correlations 
between participants’ category judgments. This matrix shows the similarity between all 
pairs of participants in their category judgments. 
4.2.2.2 Intension similarity matrices 
Based on the property generation task, we constructed two intension similarity 
matrices. The first one was a property overlap measure and the second one was derived 
from the property applicability scores.  
For the first matrix, property overlap scores were computed (see Tversky, 1977). 
That is, for every two participants and every category, the number of common 
properties (i.e., properties that were generated by both participants) was divided by the 
sum of common and distinctive properties (i.e., the number of unique properties from 
both participants). For each category, we then constructed a 16x16 similarity matrix 
with participants’ property overlap scores. This matrix will be termed the “property 
overlap similarity matrix”.  
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For the second matrix, summed property applicability scores were computed for 
each exemplar separately for each participant based on the properties that she herself 
generated. The idea is that if an exemplar possesses many of the properties generated 
by person X (i.e., the exemplar has a high property applicability score), it is more likely 
to be included as a category member by that person. The procedure to calculate the 
property applicability scores is illustrated in Figure 4.2 for the category fruit (the same 
holds for the other seven categories). The applicability judgments (0 or 1) for each 
property × exemplar combination were first summed over the four participants who 
completed the property applicability judgment task, resulting in property applicability 
scores that ranged from 0 to 4. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for these 
property applicability judgments varied between .78 and .90 across the eight 
categories. Using the specific properties a participant generated (i.e., individual 
properties), summed property applicability scores were then calculated by adding the 
property applicability scores of the individual properties for each of the 15 exemplars 
separately. For instance, to calculate the summed property applicability score of the 
exemplar banana for participant X, the applicability scores for banana were summed 
across all the properties generated by participant X (see the vertical box under the 
exemplar banana in Figure 4.2). This procedure was carried out for all the 15 exemplars 
separately and for every participant using her own individual properties. The result is 
a vector with 15 elements for each participant × category combination, representing the 
degree to which each exemplar possesses the properties generated by that participant. 
Finally, a 16x16 similarity matrix for participants was constructed using the 
correlations between participants’ summed property applicability scores. To avoid 
confusion, this matrix will be termed the “property applicability similarity matrix”. 
Thus, both the property applicability and the property overlap similarity matrices 
provide some insight into how similar or dissimilar participants are in terms of their 
category intensions3. 
                                                   
 
3 One could argue that property applicability similarity is an imperfect reflection of intensional 
similarity. Two people might generate completely different properties, yet if these yield similar 
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Figure 4.2. Calculating the property applicability scores in Study 1. 
 
  
                                                   
 
amounts of evidence for a given set of exemplars belonging in the category, the property applicability 
scores could be strongly correlated. It should be noted that property applicability similarity does 
correlate reliably with property overlap similarity, as will be shown later . 
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4.2.2.3 Correlation between similarity matrices 
In order to discover whether there is a link between extension and intension, we 
correlated, for each category, the lower triangular extension similarity matrix with the 
corresponding property applicability and property overlap similarity matrices. Before 
extension and intension similarity matrices were correlated, the central tendency and 
variability of the similarities was checked. Table 4.2 shows the average of each of the 
three similarity measures per category, whereas Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of 
these measures across all eight categories. Because our data were non-normally 
distributed (with skewness of the similarities from the category judgment, property 
overlap, and property applicability matrices: -1.93, 1.00, and -1.17, respectively), we 
used Spearman’s non-parametric rank-order correlation to examine the 
correspondence between the extension and intension matrices4. 
For each category, we first calculated the correlations between the extension 
similarity matrix and the two different intension matrices (see the first and third 
columns of Table 4.3 under the subheading “Within-category”). Collapsing across 
categories, the average correlations were close to zero: M = .03 for property 
applicability and M = -.07 for property overlap. Following H&P, we also correlated the 
extension similarity matrix from a particular category (e.g., clothes) with the intension 
matrices from the other seven categories (see columns with subheading “Between-
category”). This procedure provides a control for non-specific similarities in how 
people may be approaching each task. Mean correlations were very close to zero. Using 
independent samples t tests to compare the (Fisher’s Z transformed) eight within- and 
56 between-category correlations, we found no significant difference for category 
judgment – property applicability (p = .97) and category judgment - property overlap 
(p = .18). These results conceptually replicate H&P’s findings and might thus suggest 
that there is no clear link between people’s individual category extension and intension. 
                                                   
 
4 All correlations used to construct similarity matrices are Pearson product-moment correlations. 
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For completeness sake, Table 4.3 also shows the correlations between the two 
different intensional matrices. Seven of the 8 categories showed significant positive 
correlations, with a mean of .41. This result is to be expected, given how the matrices 
were constructed. 
Table 4.2 
Average of each of the three similarity measures per category in Study 1. 
 Category 
judgments 
Property overlap 
Property 
applicability 
Clothes .68 .14 .69 
Fruit .80 .18 .56 
Musical instruments .81 .15 .66 
Vehicles .43 .13 .79 
Trousers .71 .17 .32 
Berries .50 .17 .33 
Guitars .46 .17 .30 
Bicycles .68 .16 .88 
M .63 .16 .57 
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Figure 4.3. Distribution of the similarity measures for each matrix in Study 1 (based 
on the category judgments, property overlap, and property applicability matrices), 
collapsed across the eight categories. Note that the category judgments and property 
applicability similarity measures are correlations, whereas property overlap is a 
proportion. 
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Table 4.3 
Spearman rank-order correlations in Study 1 between similarity matrices for 
category judgments, property overlap, and property applicability. 
 Category judgments- 
Property overlap 
Category judgments - 
Property applicability 
Property 
overlap- 
Property 
applicability 
 Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-
category 
Clothes .05 -.02 .06 -.04 .39* 
Fruit -.13 -.04 .08 .05 .21* 
Musical instruments .11 .00 .40* .02 .16 
Vehicles -.03 .00 .02 .07 .58* 
Trousers -.18* -.03 -.17 -.01 .59* 
Berries -.08 .12 -.15 .13 .41* 
Guitars .07 -.09 .03 .01 .48* 
Bicycles -.26* .03 -.06 -.09 .50* 
M -.07 .00 .03 .02 .41 
*correlation is significant at the .05 level  
 
4.2.2.4 Predicting category judgments from individual properties 
The previous analyses showed correlations between intension similarity 
matrices and extension similarity matrices that were close to zero. This could mean that 
participants’ category judgments were not based on their own properties. It is, 
however, possible that properties from other participants contain useful information 
for the prediction of one’s own category judgment. In other words, it is feasible that 
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people use properties in judging category membership that they do not come up with 
in a property generation task (Bellezza, 1984), but that are nevertheless generated by 
other participants. Thus, a mixed effects logistic regression analysis was run to 
investigate to what extent the particular properties that a person generated (i.e., the 
individual properties) contribute to his/her own particular category judgment. 
The analyses were carried out in R (version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (Bates, 
Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). Category judgment of a given individual to a given 
exemplar, a binary variable, was included as the response of interest and two fixed 
effects were included. The first one comprised the individual property applicability 
scores (i.e., based on the set of properties that that specific participant generated, see 
Figure 4.2) and the second predictor contained the residual property applicability 
scores (i.e., based on the properties that were generated by the other participants, see 
Figure 4.2). For each participant × category combination, we z-transformed both the 
individual and residual property applicability scores. 
In addition, category level (basic and superordinate levels of a category) and 
domain (clothes, fruit, musical instruments, and vehicles) were included as dummy-
coded covariates (these effects are not the main interest of the analyses). Random 
effects for participants and items (i.e., the 120 different pictures) were also included. 
Following the suggestion from Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013), the random 
effects structure was maximal except when it concerned the control variables category 
level and domain, and random correlations were excluded as well5. The analysis 
revealed that individual properties have a significant contribution to the prediction of 
the person-specific category judgments (β = 0.87, SE = 0.16, χ²(1) = 20.20, p < .001). 
This might lead to the conclusion that people’s own properties are directly linked to 
their category extension. We also found a significant effect of the residual properties (β 
= 2.02, SE = 0.26, χ²(1) = 50.70, p < .001). This means that properties that participants 
did not generate also play a role in predicting category judgment.  
                                                   
 
5 The analysis code can be found on Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/8vewz/).  
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However, if all properties are (to some extent) predictive for category 
judgments, it shouldn’t be a surprise that we found a significant effect of the individual 
property applicability scores in the previous analyses. Indeed, these results did not 
prove that one’s own properties are special. Thus, in an additional analysis, we sought 
to compare how well a person’s properties predict their own category judgments as 
opposed to other people’s category judgments. To examine whether intension predicts 
extension at the individual-specific level, we conducted a similar analysis, except that 
we now shuffled the category judgments of all participants. That is, each participant’s 
individual property applicability score was paired with another participant’s category 
judgments. For example, the category judgment scores of Participant 1 were paired 
with the individual property applicability scores of Participants 2, 3, 4,…., or 16 (there 
were 16 participants in total – see Table 4.4 for a simplified illustration). In the previous 
analyses a person’s category judgments were predicted by the specific properties she 
generated and the properties generated by the remaining 15 participants. Now, a 
person’s category judgments will be predicted by a different person’s properties and 
the 15 other participants’ properties. The latter entails that a person’s own properties 
are now included in the residual property applicability scores. 
A similar mixed effects logistic regression analysis was again run, but this time, 
instead of using category judgment as the dependent variable, we used the shuffled 
category judgments data as the response of interest. We repeated this procedure for 
1,000 random shuffles of the category judgment data. Each time we compared the 
regression weights obtained from this model with the regression weight obtained from 
the previous analysis (i.e., using the original non-shuffled category judgment data). If 
there is a link between someone’s category intension and extension, we would expect 
that the regression weight of the individual property applicability scores would be 
higher in the original analysis compared with the shuffled data. In contrast, we expect 
that the regression weight of the residual property applicability scores would be higher 
with the shuffled data, because a participant’s own properties are now actually included 
in the calculation of the residual property applicability scores. We found that for 
98.69% of all the simulations, as expected the original regression weight of individual 
property applicability scores was higher than the one obtained using the shuffled data. 
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We also found that in 97.78% of all the simulations, the regression weight of residual 
property applicability scores was lower than the one obtained using the shuffled data6. 
Taken together, these results do provide evidence that there is a relation between 
people’s category extensions and their intensions, for certain categories at least. 
Table 4.4 
Illustration of the shuffling procedure used in the mixed effects logistic regression 
analysis for Study 1 and Study 2. The coloured boxes indicate the shuffle moves. Note 
that in Study 1, the property applicability scores were based on the generated 
properties, whereas in Study 2 were based on the property judgments. 
participants items category 
Category 
judgments 
Category 
judgments 
shuffled 
Individual 
prop-app 
Residual 
prop-app 
pp 1 item 1 Category 1 1 1 26 99 
pp 1 item 2 Category 1 0 1 28 93 
pp 1 item 3 Category 1 1 1 27 97 
pp 2 item 1 Category 1 1 1 13 112 
pp 2 item 2 Category 1 1 0 11 110 
pp 2 item 3 Category 1 0 1 10 114 
pp 3 item 1 Category 1 1 1 15 110 
pp 3 item 2 Category 1 1 1 12 109 
pp 3 item 3 Category 1 1 0 10 114 
 
                                                   
 
6 In some cases the shuffling caused convergence problems during the mixed effects logistic 
regression analysis. These were removed from the analyses.    
 Relationship between extensions and intensions in categorization 105 
 
 
4.3     Study 2 
In order to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1, Study 2 was conducted 
using a larger sample (i.e., 80 participants and 24 exemplars per category). The same 
methods, correlating extension and intension similarity matrices and mixed effects 
logistic regression analyses, were again used to examine the extension-intension 
relation. There were a few differences compared to Study 1. First of all, we employed a 
property judgment task instead of a property generation task to measure category 
intension, and hence the calculation of the property applicability scores was slightly 
different from Study 1. The reason was that, during a property generation task, people 
may forget to mention certain properties or give properties they are not actually using 
when judging category membership. Although their own properties may still predict 
their category judgments to some degree, there is ample room for improvement. The 
latter statement is supported by the finding in Study 1 that residual properties (i.e., 
properties generated by other individuals) were predictive for person-specific category 
judgments too. In other words, the few properties a person generates play a role in their 
category judgments, but properties they do not generate are an even bigger factor. The 
notion that people fail to generate some crucial properties may make it difficult to 
obtain a reliable intension similarity matrix. As found in Bellezza’s (1984) study, the 
test-retest reliability of generating properties for category terms can be quite low. He 
argued that since there is no well-defined meaning of a word, it is difficult to retrieve 
the same information on different occasions. This could in turn explain why we did not 
find a correlation between extension and intension similarity matrices.  
So, in order to address the concern that people cannot consciously access all 
relevant properties that they employ to define a concept, we used a property judgment 
task instead of a property generation task. If people tacitly “know” which properties to 
use when making a category decision, they may be able to recognize them in a property 
judgments task even though they (partly) fail to retrieve them during a property 
generation task.  
A second difference with respect to Study 1 is that we now added a filler task 
(i.e., solving analogies), between the property judgment and category judgment task, 
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in order to eliminate or at least reduce any potential carry-over effect. Finally, we 
selected three different categories for this study, from Verheyen and Storms (2013), 
which were also used by H&P (as opposed to the eight categories used in Study 1): 
insects, tools, and sciences. The 24 items per category, including clear members, clear 
non-members, and borderline cases, were also taken from Verheyen and Storms as 
were the property applicability matrices. This study was pre-registered on Open 
Science Framework (OSF, https://osf.io/bqekx/), and all data and analysis code, can 
be found using this link (https://osf.io/8vewz/). 
4.3.1   Method 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Eighty participants (50 females), ranging in age from 18 to 32 years old (Mage = 
19.05) performed a property judgment task and a category judgment task. They 
participated voluntarily or received study credit for their participation. Five 
participants unexpectedly showed no variability in their property or category 
judgments for at least one complete category, so they were excluded from the analyses7. 
4.3.1.2 Materials 
As in H&P, the materials were taken from Verheyen and Storms’ (2013) study. 
In the latter, eight categories were used, representing four different category types 
(animals: fish and insects; artefacts: tools and furniture; activities: sports and sciences; 
and borderline artefact-natural-kind categories: fruit and vegetables). To keep the task 
practically feasible for participants, we reduced the number of categories to three, 
based on these criteria: (1) we wanted to have one category from each type, except for 
the artefact-natural-kind group, because the category fruit was already included in 
                                                   
 
7 We did not take into account the possibility that some participants would give the same response 
to all questions, which is why this exclusion criterion was not mentioned in the pre -registration 
plan. Showing no variance across items rendered it impossible to compute correlatio ns with other 
participants. 
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Study 1; (2) since the main aim of our study is to investigate consistency between 
extension and intension, inter-individual diversity is important. To determine this, we 
used the category judgment data from Verheyen and Storms (2013). After case-wise 
removal of missing data and exclusion of participants without any variability in their 
category judgments, we calculated Cronbach’s alpha and average pair-wise correlations 
(i.e., correlations between subject X’s category judgments and subject Y’s category 
judgments). The following categories demonstrated the most inter-individual 
variability (from high to low): sciences, insects, sports, and tools. As we wanted one 
category per type, we ultimately selected sciences (activities), insects (animals), and 
tools (artefacts).  
Verheyen and Storms selected 24 items per category, comprising clear 
members, clear non-members and borderline cases, all of which were used in the 
category judgment task. In addition, they gathered property generation data as well as 
property applicability judgments for all categories. All resulting properties (i.e., 39 for 
sciences, 35 for insects, and 34 for tools) were included in the property judgment task. 
In contrast to Study 1, exemplars were presented as words instead of pictures. 
4.3.1.3 Procedure 
Each participant was given a link to an online survey consisting of three tasks 
presented in the following order: a property judgment task, an analogy test (i.e., a filler 
task), and a category judgment task. Participants were tested in one session. 
In the property judgment task, participants were shown a list of properties 
underneath a category name. They were asked to judge whether each property was true 
for that category name by clicking a “yes” button or a “no” button. They could only 
continue to the next category if they had given a response to all the properties. The 
order of the categories and the properties within a category were randomized for each 
participant. 
A similar procedure was used in the category judgment task. However, instead 
of a list of properties, participants were shown a list of exemplars (presented as words) 
and they had to judge category membership of each exemplar by clicking a “yes” button 
if they thought that the exemplar belonged to that category or a “no” button if they 
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thought it wasn’t a member of the category. They had to give a response to all 24 
exemplars before they could go on to the next category. Each participant received a 
different random order of categories and exemplars within a category. 
The analogy test consisted of 10 multiple choice questions such as “wrist : elbow 
:: ankle : ?”  (where the correct response was knee in this case). All tasks were conducted 
in Dutch and none of the tasks had a time limit. 
4.3.2   Results 
4.3.2.1 Extension similarity matrix 
Again, category judgments were quantified by giving a score of 0 or 1, based on 
whether the item was judged a non-member or a member of the category. Table 4.5 
shows the mean and standard deviation of the category judgments scores (the 
proportion of yes responses) per category. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for 
the category judgment scores were .99, .99, and .98 for the categories insects, tools, 
and sciences, respectively. A participant by participant (75x75) similarity matrix was 
then constructed for each category with the correlations between participants’ category 
judgments. 
 
4.3.2.2 Intension similarity matrices 
Two intension matrices were constructed, the first one was based on property 
judgments and the second one was based on property applicability scores. To construct 
the first matrix, the property judgments were quantified by giving a score of 1 if the 
property was judged to apply to the category and a score of 0 if not (see Table 4.5 for 
the mean and standard deviation of the property judgments, expressed as the 
proportion of properties judged to be true of the category). These scores were then 
tabulated for each participant in each category. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients 
for the property judgment scores were .96, .97, and .97 for the categories insects, tools, 
and sciences, respectively. A participant by participant (75x75) similarity matrix was 
constructed for each category by correlating participants’ property judgment scores, 
which we will call the “property judgment similarity matrix”. 
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Table 4.5 
Mean and standard deviation of category judgment scores and property judgment 
scores per category in Study 2. 
 Category judgments Properties judgments 
M SD M SD 
Insects 0.58 0.14 0.74 0.14 
Tools 0.61 0.16 0.76 0.12 
Sciences 0.73 0.14 0.81 0.07 
M 0.64 0.15 0.77 0.11 
 
To construct the second intension matrix, a similar procedure as in Study 1  was 
employed to compute the individual summed property applicability scores (see Figure 
4.4), only this time, the property scores were taken from Verheyen and Storms (2013). 
Unlike Study 1, the individual properties were those properties that were considered 
to apply to a category according to a particular participant. Using these individual 
properties, summed property applicability scores were then calculated by adding the 
property applicability scores for the properties of each of the 24 exemplars separately. 
A 75x75 similarity matrix was constructed with the correlations between participants’ 
summed property applicability scores. This matrix will be termed the “property 
applicability similarity matrix”. 
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Figure 4.4. Calculating the property applicability scores in Study 2. 
 
4.3.2.3 Correlation between similarity matrices 
As in Study 1, the similarity matrices from each task and each category were 
correlated. Before doing so, the central tendency and variability of the similarities was 
first checked. Table 4.6 shows the average of each of the three similarity measures per 
category, whereas Figure 4.5 shows the distribution of these measures across all 
categories. Spearman’s non-parametric rank-order correlations were again used to 
measure the relation between extension and intension, since our data were non-
normally distributed (with skewness of the similarities from the category judgment, 
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property judgment, and property applicability matrices: -0.19, -0.12, and -2.81, 
respectively). 
Table 4.6 
Average of each of the three similarity measures per category in Study 2. 
 
Category judgments Property judgments Property applicability 
Insects .58 .23 .96 
Tools .47 .29 .96 
Sciences .46 .34 .99 
M .50 .29 .97 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Distribution of the similarity measures for each matrix in Study 2 (based 
on the category judgments, property judgments, and property applicability matrices), 
collapsed across the three categories. 
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Table 4.7 shows the correlations between the extension similarity matrix and the 
two different intension matrices per category. Collapsing across categories, the mean 
correlations were again found to be close to zero (see the first and third columns of 
Table 4.7 under the subheading “Within-category”): M = .03 for property judgments 
and M = .06 for property applicability8. These results, again, confirm H&P’s findings, 
suggesting that there is no (strong) link between a person’s category extension and 
his/her intension. 
Table 4.7 
Spearman rank-order correlations in Study 2 between similarity matrices for 
category judgments, property judgments, and property applicability. 
 Category judgments- 
Property judgments 
Category judgments - 
Property applicability 
Property judgments- 
Property applicability 
 Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-
category 
Between-
category 
Within-category 
Insects .06* .01 -.07* -.02 .36* 
Tools -.02 .09* .16* .15* .16* 
Sciences .07* .02 .09* .09* .60* 
M .03 .04 .06 .07 .37 
*correlation is significant at the .05 level  
                                                   
 
8 Because people presumably endorsed properties that they may have failed to come up with during 
the property generation task (Study 1), the resulting applicability scores are more similar. However, 
the results showed comparable correlations with the other measures of intensional similarity (.41 in 
Study 1 and .37 in Study 2), mitigating concerns about potential ceiling effects. The high values 
should not come as a surprise, given that people generally agree on category extension (see Verheyen 
& Storms, 2013 and the high Cronbach's alpha for category judgment).  
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4.3.2.4 Predicting category judgments from individual properties 
A mixed effects logistic regression analysis was again run to investigate to what 
extent the properties that a person considers applicable to a category (i.e., the 
individual properties) can predict his/her own category judgment. Analogous models 
as in Study 1 were used in the analyses. Category judgment was the response of interest 
and two fixed effects were included. The first one consists of the individual property 
applicability scores (i.e., based on the properties that apply to a category according to 
a participant), and the second one contained the residual property applicability scores 
(i.e., based on the properties that were not endorsed by a given participant). These can 
be considered residual properties because they were responses from participants in 
Verheyen and Storms’ (2013) property generation task. For each participant × category 
combination, we once again z-transformed both the individual and residual property 
applicability scores. In addition, category (with levels insects, tools, and sciences) was 
included as a covariate and the same random effect structure as in Study 1 was used. 
The analysis revealed that individual properties contribute significantly to the 
prediction of the person-specific category judgments (β = 2.11, SE = 0.22, χ²(1) = 67.00, 
p < .001), whereas the residual properties did not (p = .30). These findings seem to 
support the conclusion that people’s set of properties are directly linked to their 
category extension. They also suggest that, when presented with potential properties, 
participants are able to select those properties that drive their category membership 
judgments. In contrast, when people have to generate properties themselves, as was 
the case in Study 1, they only come up with a subset of all properties that they actually 
take into account when making category membership decisions. That is probably why 
residual properties significantly predicted category judgments in Study 1, but not in the 
present study.      
Finally, the same shuffling procedure as in Study 1 (see Table 4.4) was run to 
compare how well a person’s intension predicts her own category judgments as 
opposed to other people’s category judgments. The results showed that the original 
regression weight of the individual property applicability scores was higher than the 
one obtained using the shuffled data in 100% of the simulations. Similarly, the 
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regression weight of the residual property applicability scores was lower than the one 
obtained using the shuffled data in 99.90% of the simulations. These results strongly 
suggest that there is a relation between people’s category extensions and their 
intensions. 
4.4     General discussion 
Across two studies, we investigated the relationship between category extension 
and intension in eleven semantic categories. It is often tacitly assumed that there is a 
(strong) extension-intension link, yet, a recent study by H&P called this hypothesis into 
question. They found that systematic inter-individual variability in extensional beliefs 
did not significantly correlate with inter-individual variability in intensional beliefs.   
Because of the theoretical importance of these findings, we sought to extend 
H&P’s findings using other measures of category extension and intension. To capture 
category intension we asked participants to describe categories based on their own 
perspective (Study 1) or to judge whether a set of properties are true for a particular 
category (Study 2). In addition, instead of typicality judgments, we used a category 
judgment task to measure individuals’ category extensions. Although typicality 
judgments are a common and valid measure of category extension, it is a gradual 
measurement that allows members of a category to vary in how good they are as an 
example of a category or how typical they are of the category. On the other hand, 
category judgment is a more decisive binary measurement, which might capture 
different information. More specifically, H&P raised the possibility that different 
properties may determine category membership as opposed to typicality. So to rule out 
the possibility that H&P’s findings were merely caused by the use of typicality ratings, 
we employed category judgments as a measure of extension. 
Using H&P’s method (i.e., correlating extension and intension similarity 
matrices) in both studies, we found evidence suggesting that similarity between 
individuals for extensional judgments did not map onto similarity between individuals 
for intensional judgments. These findings indicate that H&P’s results were not merely 
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a product of the particular intensional and extensional measures they used. So contrary 
to popular belief, it may appear that there is a disconnection between category 
extensions and intensions. However, H&P’s approach is a bit unconventional as it does 
not directly compare an individual’s intension with her extension. As we will discuss 
later, the nature of this procedure brings about some methodological concerns that may 
invalidate their conclusions. 
 
4.4.1  A match made in heaven after all? 
In a follow-up analysis, we directly related people’s category judgments to the 
properties they themselves generated or endorsed for a certain category. The latter 
analysis, however, provided evidence in favour of a link between intension and 
extension. That is, the properties a person generated (Study 1) or endorsed (Study 2) 
were generally a better predictor of her category judgments than of the category 
judgments of other people. The question is, why do both approaches, using the same 
dataset, lead to conflicting findings? And what should we actually conclude about the 
relation between a person’s category intension and his/her extension? 
We see three possible explanations for these differences. First, even though the 
reliability coefficients for the property applicability judgments were high (e.g., in Study 
1, they varied between .78 and .90), there seems to be some disagreement among 
participants as to which properties apply to which exemplars. This could be an issue 
for H&P’s method, because two people with the same category intension, may disagree 
about which exemplars possess certain properties resulting in (partly) different 
category extensions (and vice versa). Thus, intensional similarity does not necessarily 
translate into extensional similarity. Note that every participant with “atypical” 
property applicability views can influence N - 1 data points in the property applicability 
similarity matrix (i.e., all similarities with the other participants). This could be one of 
the reasons why both H&P and the present study showed non-significant correlations 
between intensional and extension similarity.  
On the other hand, the mixed effects logistic regression method might not be 
affected by idiosyncratic property applicability views to the same extent. If a person 
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holds unconventional beliefs about which exemplars possess which property, her 
individual property applicability scores will be inaccurate. Whereas the appropriate, 
yet unknown, property applicability scores of that participant may predict her category 
judgments, the derived applicability scores may not. This would in turn decrease the 
fit of the mixed effects logistic regression model, but the relation between the derived 
applicability scores and the category judgments will still hold for the average person. 
Hence, the regression weight of the person-specific properties will differ significantly 
from zero, as was the case in both Study 1 and 2. Furthermore, because the subsequent 
shuffling procedure considers all participants simultaneously, atypical participants will 
literally get lost in the shuffle. That is to say, if the category judgments are shuffled, 
nothing changes for participants whose derived applicability scores are an imperfect 
reflection of their true applicability scores: on average, the derived applicability scores 
will predict someone else’s category judgments equally badly compared to their own 
category judgments (or even slightly worse). The story is different for the other 
participants (the majority in all likelihood), whose derived applicability scores more 
accurately reflect their true applicability scores. On average, their derived applicability 
scores will predict someone else’s category judgments considerably worse than their 
own, assuming of course that there is an intension-extension link and inter-individual 
variability in both measures. So that is probably why, as a whole, individual property 
applicability scores are a better predictor of one’s own category judgments as opposed 
to someone else’s judgments. More generally, because this procedure considers all 
participants at the same time, it is probably more likely to detect subtle effects. 
A second reason why the two approaches may lead to different conclusions has 
to do with the reliability of the similarity matrices. More precisely, the correlation 
between the extension and intension similarity matrices is necessarily constrained by 
the reliability of the two matrices. Our data do not allow us to estimate the reliability of 
the similarity matrices (since, unlike H&P, our participants performed every task just 
once), but in H&P’s data, the reliability estimates were rather low (ranging from .18 to 
.51). If one takes this unreliability into account, for instance by applying Spearman’s 
correction for attenuation formula, the resulting correlations are considerably higher. 
On average, the resulting corrected correlation was .35, which seems to suggest that 
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there might be a (weak) relation between extension and intension after all. On the other 
hand, H&P’s meta-analysis of their effect sizes suggested a 95% CI for the correlation 
of between +0.1 and -0.1 which is a very small effect. 
Finally, based on the literature (Ameel et al., 2008; Malt et al., 1999), there is 
arguably no perfect link between extension and intension. This notion likely 
compounds the reliability issue. If on the one hand, the extension and intension 
similarities are not very reliable, and on the other hand, the link between extension and 
intension is, at the very least, imperfect, one may have trouble finding significant 
correlations between the intension and extension similarity matrices. Furthermore, 
there may be inter-individual variability in the extension-intension link. Put 
differently, some people may be very consistent in their category extensions and 
intensions, whereas other people may have a weaker link between their extensions and 
intensions. In conclusion, the present study confirms H&P’s results in that extensional 
similarity does not necessarily map onto intensional similarity. Taken at face value, 
they may challenge the long-held belief that there is a direct, but perhaps imperfect, 
relation between category intension and extension. However, the method of correlating 
intensional and extensional similarity matrices is a rather indirect way to test whether 
intensions and extensions are connected. The outcome critically depends on a) 
agreement about which properties apply to which exemplars, b) the reliability of both 
similarity matrices, c) the strength of the extension-intension link, and d) inter-
individual variability in the strength of the extension-intension link. The combination 
of these factors might result in very low and even negative correlations (the latter due 
to random noise). In contrast, directly predicting a person’s category judgments from 
the properties she generated or endorsed does not suffer (to the same extent) from 
these issues. Using this, presumably more sensitive method, we did find a significant 
relation between a person’s category intension and his/her extension, indicating that 
properties are important even though they might not tell the whole story (Ameel et al., 
2008; Malt et al., 1999). 
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Chapter 5 
Developmental trajectory of category 
extension and intension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part of the research presented in this chapter has been submitted for publication: 
Djalal, F. M., Storms, G., & Heyman, T. (under review). Developmental trajectory 
of category extension and intension.  
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Abstract 
The present research investigated the relation between extension (i.e., the set of 
category members) and intension (i.e., the properties that define or characterize 
concepts) in school-aged children and adults. It is a long-held belief that a category 
extension and its corresponding intension have a direct relationship. This belief was 
recently challenged by Hampton and Passanisi (2016). However, their conclusions 
were based on studies using adult participants. To test the generality of their findings, 
we employed a category judgment task and a property generation task to measure 
extension and intension in children and adults. A method based on property 
applicability scores was then used to examine the extension-intension relationship. The 
results provide evidence that, in all age groups, there is a clear link between intension 
and extension. The specific tendencies across age groups are discussed in light of the 
development of category representations.   
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5.1     Introduction 
Many studies have addressed the development of semantic knowledge in first 
language acquisition (e.g., Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008; Bloom, 2001; Clark, 1973; 
Gelman, 2009, etc.). These studies involve central questions such as: how does a child 
develop word meanings and how does she structure her knowledge? How does this 
knowledge develop and change over time until it resembles adult knowledge? To 
answer these questions, children’s intensions (i.e., the properties that define or 
characterize concepts) and extensions (i.e., the set of category members) can be 
compared at different ages. The relationship between extension and intension can be 
illustrated by means of a simple example. Suppose you ask a child ‘what is a ball?’ You 
might get answers such as: it is round, it rolls, it is to play with, and so forth. You can 
also show the child pictures of a balloon, an apple, or marbles and ask her whether 
those items are examples of balls. The child might tell you that all the items are balls, 
because they are round, they all can roll, and the child can play with them (although 
parents might forbid children to play with apples). In that case, we might say that the 
child’s understanding of the concept ball is consistent with her list of category 
members; a balloon, an apple, and marbles are balls because they all possess the 
properties that are included in the child’s meaning of ball.  
One of the earliest theories that provided a specific prediction on the extension-
intension relation was the property-based approach from Clark (1973). Her semantic 
feature hypothesis suggested that “the child will begin by identifying the meaning of 
words with only one or two general properties rather than with the whole combination 
of meaning properties that are used by adults” (Clark, 1973, p.193). As children gain 
more experience, they will add more properties and gradually learn the full meaning of 
the word. Thus, in Clark’s view, children initially have only a partial understanding of 
the word’s meaning. Therefore, their lexical categories may often differ from the 
corresponding categories of adults. Clark’s work inspired many other studies and 
theories on the development of concepts (e.g., Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008; Carey, 
2000, 2010; Nelson, 1974; Mervis, 1987). However, Clark’s assertions were not based 
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on carefully controlled experiments, but on natural observations and diary notes from 
parents.  
Several more recently advanced major theories also make predictions about 
children’s extensions and intensions, without explicitly focusing on the link between 
both. For example, the intentionality theory proposed by Bloom (1996, 1997, 2001) 
states that an item is a member of a particular (artefact) category if it was created with 
the intention to be a member of that particular category, based on its shape and its 
intended function. He found that young children tend to focus on shape and ignore the 
intended function before they learn to attend to cues regarding the referential intention 
of the speakers. Further, studies from Gelman (see Gelman & Markman, 1986, 1987; 
Gelman, 1998, 2009) showed that children construct their knowledge of concepts 
through the process of induction. That is, children tend to generalize a novel item’s 
property to the other items of the same category. Other studies on category 
representation specifically examined children’s category intension (for examples, see 
Barton & Komatsu, 1989; Gelman & O’Reilly, 1988; Keil & Batterman, 1984), but none 
of these studies explicitly tried to capture the relation between children’s extension-
intension and how this relation evolves over age. Indeed, very few studies have 
gathered relevant experimental evidence regarding the development of the extension-
intension relation. 
A notable exception is the study from Caplan and Barr (1989), which 
investigated to what extent children’s and adults’ intensions were consistent with their 
extensions. They studied kindergarteners, school-aged children, and adults by asking 
them to complete a property generation task, a category judgment task, and a property 
possession judgment task for four different categories. Caplan and Barr found that 
children, even kindergarteners, appeared to be at least as consistent as adults in the 
sense that children were likely to include objects that possessed their own generated 
defining properties as members of the studied categories. They also found that the 
properties children used to describe the categories were more specific than adults’ 
properties. In order to investigate whether this age-related qualitative difference in 
generated properties caused category underextension in children, all the properties 
were rated for their power. More specifically, they operationalized estimated power as 
 Developmental trajectory of category extension and intension 127 
 
 
reflecting the number of items in the world that possess each generated property. Then, 
they investigated whether the use of specific properties (i.e., properties with small 
power) was associated with smaller category extensions, but no such relation was 
observed. Therefore, they concluded that the observed underextension in children 
could not be explained by this qualitative difference in generated properties. 
However, Caplan and Barr’s conclusions (1989) can be called into question for 
two reasons. First, their method of estimating the properties’ power is questionable, as 
it seems very difficult to estimate the number of objects in the world that possess a 
given property. Second, in their property generation task, they asked children and 
adults to define the category terms, but they only recorded the first three properties 
that participants generated. From this limited number of properties, they concluded 
that children generated more specific properties than adults did. It is, of course, 
possible that children would generate more general properties later on in the task. 
That said, the findings of Caplan and Barr (1989), as well as many theories of 
category learning, do suggest that there is a direct link between category extension and 
intension. However, a recent study from Hampton and Passanisi (2016) challenged this 
assumption, suggesting instead that intension might not map onto extension at all. In 
their study, they asked adult participants to perform two tasks, a typicality judgment 
task to measure category extension and a property importance rating task to measure 
category intension. Hampton and Passanisi reasoned that, if there is a direct link, 
individuals with a similar category extension should also have a similar category 
intension. That is, if two persons show similar typicality judgments, then their 
judgments of property importance should also be similar. Based on four studies (with 
slight variations in the methodology), they came to the conclusion that similarity 
between individuals in extensional judgments did not map onto similarity between 
individuals in intensional judgments, a conclusion that was argued to undermine 
almost all theories on category learning. 
Hampton and Passanisi’s (2016) findings were challenged by a recent study 
from Djalal, Hampton, Storms, and Heyman (2017), though. Djalal, Hampton, et al. 
proposed a new method which directly links a person’s intension to his/her extension, 
that is, it seeks to predict a person’s extension using the properties she herself 
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generated (i.e., the intensions). The results on adult data, did yield evidence for a link 
between a person’s intension and her extension. 
5.2     Present study 
Both Hampton and Passanisi (2016), and Djalal, Hampton et al. (2017) 
examined the extension-intension link in adults. The goal of the present paper is to 
extend this research to children, thereby using the same methodology as in Djalal, 
Hampton, et al. (2017). More concretely, we wanted to investigate whether the 
extension and intension of categories are already consistent in children as claimed by 
Caplan and Barr (1989). In doing so, we address the methodological concerns raised 
above about Caplan and Barr’s study. That is, unlike Caplan and Barr, we do not restrict 
participants to generate only three properties, but encourage them to name all the 
properties they think are relevant to define the studied categories. Secondly, we refrain 
from using the questionable power estimation task, but rather opt for a more 
straightforward measure of the extension-intension relation inspired by Hampton 
(1979). More concretely, for each studied age group, we will examine whether a 
participant’s own properties predict her category judgments and whether properties 
generated by other participants, from the same and different age groups, additionally 
contribute to the prediction of category judgments. 
In order to do so, category intensions and extensions for eight categories were 
first collected using, respectively, a property generation task and a category 
membership judgment task, administered to school-aged children (aged 5, 7, and 10), 
and adults. In a next step, a property applicability judgment task was constructed based 
on the generated properties, which were subsequently used to evaluate the consistency 
of category intension and extension in the different age groups. Note that the materials 
and data are also partly described in Djalal, Hampton, et al. (2017), and Djalal, Storms, 
Ameel, and Heyman (2017).  
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5.3     Method 
5.3.1   Participants 
A total of 96 children, from three different age groups, performed both the 
property generation task and the category membership task: 32 kindergarteners (18 
males; Mage: 5.5 years old), 32 second graders (15 males; Mage: 7.5 years old), and 32 
fifth graders (22 males; Mage: 10.6 years old). They were recruited from two different 
schools in the Flanders region, in Belgium. In addition, sixteen adults (8 males; Mage = 
26.83) performed the same tasks as the children and another group of sixteen (6 males, 
Mage = 30.42) performed the property applicability judgment task1. The adults were 
friends and colleagues of the researchers, recruited in Flanders, Belgium. 
5.3.2   Materials 
The materials were the same as used in Djalal, Storms, et al.’s study (2017). Eight 
semantic categories, consisting of four corresponding pairs of basic (low level) and 
superordinate (high level) categories (i.e., trousers-clothes; berries-fruit; guitars-
musical instruments; bicycles-vehicles) were selected. Each category comprised of 15 
exemplars or related stimuli which were presented as coloured pictures (11x10 cm; see 
Figure 5.1 for black-and-white examples). These pictures were used in the category 
judgment and property applicability judgment task (the stimuli were the same as in 
Chapter 3 see Appendix 3.A for all items), whereas in the property generation task, 
participants only received the category labels. Similar to Caplan and Barr (1989), each 
set of 15 pictures consisted of ten pictures portraying presumed category members and 
five depicting related non-members (based on discussions of the selected materials by 
three of the authors). 
                                                   
 
1 Two children of 5 years old also participated in this task in order to compare property applicability 
judgments of children and adults. However, the estimated reliability of the judgments of the children 
was extremely low, proving that the task was too difficult for the youngest children. Therefore, their 
data were omitted from the analyses. 
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Figure 5.1. Sample of the stimuli of the categories clothes, fruit, musical instruments, 
vehicles, trousers, berries, guitars, and bicycles (from the top left to the bottom right). 
5.3.3   Procedure 
Analogous to Djalal, Storms, et al.’s (2017) study, children and adults first 
completed the property generation task and then continued to the category 
membership judgment task, within a single session. The order of the tasks was fixed 
across all participants, and they were tested individually. This was done to assure that 
participants’ generated properties were not influenced by the pictures, since 
participants only saw the pictures in the category membership judgment task. In a 
second part of the study, a different group of adults performed the property 
applicability judgment task, which involved the properties gathered in the first phase 
of the experiment (i.e., in the property generation task). Below, we explain the 
procedural details for the three tasks, separately. All the tasks were conducted in Dutch 
and none of the tasks had a time limit. 
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5.3.3.1 Property generation task   
Children were told that two creatures from another planet, Mr. Mouse and Mrs. 
Monkey wanted to know all about the human world and the children were asked to 
explain the meaning of a set of terms. As an example, the experimenter explained to 
Mr. Mouse and Mrs. Monkey what furniture was by giving properties of furniture (e.g., 
it is in the house, you can sit on it, you can put something on top of it, etc.). When it 
was clear that the child understood the task instructions, the child started the property 
generation task. Different from Caplan and Barr (1989), children (and also adults) were 
asked to generate as many properties as they could. The experimenter wrote down all 
the answers. In order to limit the duration of the experiment, for both tasks, children 
received four categories from each of the four domains in a different random order: two 
superordinate and two basic categories. However, they never received the 
superordinate together with the corresponding basic category (e.g., clothes-fruit-
guitars-bicycles). The adult participants, on the other hand, were given an MS excel file 
that contained eight worksheets, one for each category name. They too were asked to 
imagine they had to explain the terms to someone who did not understand them. The 
adults performed the task individually by typing in the properties. They could move to 
the next category only after they were done with the previous one. The categories were 
presented in different random orders to each participant with superordinate and basic 
category pairs (e.g., clothes-trousers) never occurring immediately one after the other. 
Note that all participants responded to the category names, not the pictures. 
Following the procedure described in McRae, de Sa, and Seidenberg (1997), all 
the properties generated by the participants were tallied for each category name. 
Synonym properties (i.e., properties that have essentially the same meaning, e.g., to 
race and to compete) were given an identical code. Properties phrased with an 
adjective-noun combination (e.g., soft fabric) and conjunctive properties (e.g., sweet 
and sour) were split and treated as separate properties if they provided different 
information. Redundant quantifiers (e.g., most of them) were dropped and properties 
which only mention exemplars of the category (e.g., car, bicycles, and airplane for the 
category vehicles) were eliminated from the list. The total number of properties (i.e., 
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the number of types, not tokens) generated across participants for each category ranged 
from 47 to 74. All the selected properties were put in the rows of the property by 
exemplar matrices used for the property applicability judgment task (see 5.3.3.3). 
5.3.3.2 Category membership judgment task   
After completing the first task, the 15 pictured stimuli of a category were 
presented randomly one by one to the children. They were asked to judge which 
exemplars belonged to the category. The order of the categories was the same as in the 
property generation task. For the children, this task was again presented in the context 
of helping Mr. Mouse and Mrs. Monkey. By means of an example, the experimenter 
explained to Mr. Mouse and Mrs. Monkey what the meaning of furniture is by giving 
examples of furniture (e.g., chairs, tables, closets, beds, etc.). When it was clear that the 
child understood the task instructions, the child started the category judgment task. 
The experimenter presented the pictures one by one and asked whether it was an 
example of the category X or not (e.g., is this furniture?). The adult participants 
performed the task on a computer. After completing the property generation task, a 
link to an online survey was given. In the survey, each set of 15 pictures was presented 
and they were asked to make their judgments by clicking on the pictures of exemplars 
they judged to be members of the category name mentioned above the picture set. Each 
category name was written in bold and underlined, and embedded in a question (e.g., 
“Which pictures below are members of the category fruit?”). In the survey, each 
participant received a different random order of categories and pictures. In contrast to 
the children, adults performed the task for all eight categories. 
5.3.3.3 Property applicability judgment task 
For all eight categories, the 15 possible exemplars that were used in the category 
membership judgment task and the properties generated by children and adults were 
combined in property by exemplar matrices. Thus, every matrix consisted of 15 
columns, one for every potential exemplar (represented by pictures), and 47 to 74 rows, 
one for every generated property. The participants were asked to indicate whether the 
exemplars possessed the properties by entering a 1 if the property applied to the 
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exemplar, or a 0 if not. Each participant was randomly assigned to fill in the matrices 
for two categories. In total, four participants were assigned to each category. 
Participants performed the task individually in MS excel files. 
5.4     Results 
Every participants’ category judgments were first quantified by scoring each 
decision as 0 or 1, depending on whether the item was judged a non-member or a 
member of the category. For each age group, the between-participant consistency was 
calculated using Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients (Lord, Novick, & Birnbaum, 
1968) based on the category judgment scores. A high alpha means high agreement 
between people (and a large sample size). The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient 
for the category judgment scores varied between .76 and .99 across the eight categories 
and four age groups (see Table 5.1). 
Further, property applicability scores were computed for each participant in 
each age group based on three types of properties: individual properties (i.e., the 
specific properties a participant generated for a certain category), age-specific residual 
properties (i.e., the properties that were generated by the remaining participants within 
the same age group) and general residual properties (i.e., the remaining properties that 
were only generated by the other age group). The procedure is illustrated in Figure 5.2 
for the 5 year-olds’ properties for the category fruit (the same holds for the other three 
age groups and the other seven categories). The applicability judgments (0 or 1) for 
each property × exemplar combination were first summed over the four (adult) 
participants who completed the property applicability judgment task, resulting in 
property scores that ranged from 0 to 4. The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for 
these summed property applicability scores varied between .73 and .89 across the eight 
categories. Based on individual properties, summed property applicability scores were 
calculated by adding the property applicability scores for each of the 15 exemplars 
separately. This procedure was repeated for every participant in every age group using 
her specific properties. 
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Table 5.1 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients of the category judgment task for the eight 
categories for each age group. 
 
5 year-olds 7 year-olds 10 year-olds Adults 
Clothes .95 .95 .96 .97 
Trousers .96 .96 .96 .98 
Fruit  .93 .97 .97 .99 
Berries .91 .93 .95 .94 
Musical instruments .95 .97 .98 .99 
Guitars .92 .95 .97 .93 
Vehicles .76 .94 .93 .92 
Bicycles .97 .97 .99 .97 
 
In order to examine which properties contribute most to the prediction of the 
category judgments, mixed effect logistic regression was employed. The analysis was 
carried out in R (version 3.1.2) using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2014). The response of interest in the analysis is the category judgment, a 
binary variable, of a given individual to a given exemplar. Three fixed effects were 
included: the first contained the individual property applicability scores; the second 
predictor comprised the age-specific residual property applicability scores; and the 
third predictor consisted of the general residual property applicability scores. For each 
participant × category combination, we z-transformed all three variables (i.e., 
individual, age-specific residual, and general residual property applicability scores). In 
this way, we were able to examine to what extent each predictor contributed to the 
prediction of category judgment.  
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Figure 5.2. Calculating the property applicability scores. 
 
Additionally, category level (basic and superordinate levels of a category) and 
domain (clothes, fruit, musical instruments, and vehicles) were included as covariates 
(these effects are not the main interest of the analyses). Random effects for participants 
and items (i.e., the 120 different pictures) were also included. As suggested by Barr, 
Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) the random effects structure was maximal, except 
when it concerned the covariates and random correlations were excluded as well. These 
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analyses, run for each age group separately, revealed the following results (see also 
Table 5.2). 
At the individual level (see the first row of Table 5.2), the analyses revealed that 
individual properties have a significant contribution to the prediction of the person-
specific category judgments in each age group (except the 7 year-olds, p = .061). This 
suggests that people’s own properties are directly linked to their category extension. 
Additionally, the regression weights of the individual properties appeared to increase 
with age, suggesting that the properties people generate gradually become more 
informative for determining category membership. 
At the age-specific level (see the second row of Table 5.2), the results showed 
that, for each age group, the properties that were generated by other participants 
within the same age group (i.e., age-specific residual properties) also contributed 
significantly to the prediction of category judgments. Moreover, the results also showed 
that the properties that were generated by other participants from different age groups 
(i.e., general residual properties; see the last row of Table 5.2) were also predictive for 
category membership judgments. The only exception was that the general residual 
properties of the adults (i.e., properties that were generated by the children but not by 
the adults) yielded no significant predictive value to the adults’ category judgments (p 
= .069). In other words, children’s generated properties failed to significantly predict 
adults’ category extensions when taking into account the properties adults themselves 
generated. 
Taken together, these results do provide evidence that, in all four age groups, 
there is a relation between people’s category extensions and their intensions. 
Interestingly, the properties that participants did not generate (i.e., age-specific and 
general residuals properties) also seem to play a role in predicting category judgments.  
 
  
  
 
Table 5.2 
Mixed effects logistic regression results for the four age groups, collapsed across the eight categories. 
Predictor 5 year-olds 7 year-olds 10 year-olds Adults 
Individual 
properties  
β = 0.33, SE = 0.10, 
χ²(1)=9.27, p = .002 
β = 0.24, SE = 0.13, 
χ²(1)=3.52, p = .061 
β = 0.50, SE = 0.14, 
χ²(1)=13.35, p < .001 
β = 0.78, SE = 0.16, 
χ²(1)=18.18, p < .001 
Age-specific 
residual 
properties 
β = 0.45, SE = 0.19, 
χ²(1)=5.38,  p = .020 
β = 0.87, SE = 0.28, 
χ²(1)=10.23,  p = .001 
β = 1.05, SE = 0.27, 
χ²(1)=14.05,  p < .001 
β = 1.77, SE =0.29, 
χ²(1)=37.83,  p < .001 
General 
residual 
properties 
β = 1.45 SE = 0.24, 
χ²(1)=38.06, p < .001 
β = 1.93, SE = 0.31, 
χ²(1)=39.68, p < .001 
β = 1.90, SE = 0.34, 
χ²(1)= 34.14, p < .001 
β = 0.56, SE = 0.31, 
χ²(1)=3.31, p = .069 
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5.5     Discussion 
The present study investigated the relationship between category extension and 
intension in school-aged children (aged 5, 7, and 10) and adults. Seemingly in contrast 
to Hampton and Passinisi’s (2016) claims, we found evidence that there is a relation 
between category extension and intension. That is, we directly related people’s category 
judgments to the properties they themselves generated for a certain category. The 
results showed that properties generated by a particular participant can predict her/his 
own category judgments, and this was even the case for 5 year-olds. This finding 
indicates that a person’s category membership judgment was based on her own 
generated properties. Furthermore, we found that age-specific residual and general 
residual properties have significant contributions as well. This means that other 
properties (i.e., properties that participants did not generate) also play a role in 
predicting category judgment. 
5.5.1   Are children as consistent as adults? 
The fact that we found a significant contribution of the individual properties to 
the prediction of category judgments, provides evidence in favour of a link between 
intension and extension. These results corroborate with findings from numerous 
studies on categorization, which conclude or presume that category extension and 
intension are closely related (e.g., Hampton, Dubois, & Yeh, 2006; Murphy, 2002; 
Verheyen & Storms, 2013), including many developmental studies that make similar 
assumptions about children’s category extension and intension (e.g., Ameel et al., 
2008; Bloom, 2001; Carey 2010; Djalal, Storms, et al., 2017; Gelman, 2009; Hills, 
Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & Smith, 2009). However, to the best of our knowledge, 
none of these studies have gathered relevant experimental evidence regarding the 
development of the extension-intension relation, especially at the individual level. 
The study of Caplan and Barr (1989) is one notable exception in this respect. 
They found that children’s category intensions were consistent with their category 
extensions. Moreover, they claimed that children, even kindergarteners, appeared to 
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be at least as consistent as adults in the sense that children were likely to include objects 
that possessed their own defining properties as members of the studied categories. The 
results of the present study partly confirm Caplan and Barr’s (1989) findings. 
Children’s properties indeed predict their own category judgments significantly, yet it 
appears that this relation strengthens with age. That is, the properties people generate 
gradually become more informative for determining category membership. This would 
run counter to Caplan and Barr’s claim that children are as consistent as adults. 
Perhaps the difference in methodology could account for this discrepancy. Caplan and 
Barr restricted the number of properties to three per participant, whereas we 
encouraged participants to list as many properties as they deemed necessary. The 
former procedure might limit the predictive value of the properties, thus creating the 
illusion that children’s intension-extension relation is as consistent as the adults’. 
Taking away this limit, allowed participants to generate more properties, which turned 
out to better predict category judgments in adults compared to children.  
5.5.2   Children’s’ properties 
To reiterate, we found that there is consistency between category extension and 
intension in children, but the link appeared to be stronger in adults. This does not 
necessarily mean, however, that children’s properties are subsets of the adults’ 
properties. For instance, in a study of object naming, Ameel and colleagues (2008) 
found that children attend to different kinds of properties and gradually learn to 
acquire the adults’ set of properties. They also found that children and adults perceive 
the commonalities between objects differently. It is possible that children share 
properties with other children of the same age, but not with people from different age 
groups. In the present study, we found some peculiar properties that were generated 
only by specific age groups. For instance, properties such as have wings for the category 
vehicles, is purple for the category berries, or to wear in school for the category clothes 
were only generated by the 5-year-olds. Whereas, properties involving a more complex 
vocabulary, such as contains antioxidants for the category berries, it is 
environmentally friendly for bicycles, it emphasizes a certain status for the category 
clothes, were generated only by adults. These properties not only come as a product of 
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language acquisition, in which complex nouns or verbs are learned at later stages of 
lexical development (see Gentner, 2005), but also because of knowledge and 
experience that children acquire at a specific age. Further, we also found that children 
are not only enlarging their property set by adding adults’ properties, they also drop 
properties that younger aged children generated. For instance, a property like it 
contains vitamins for the category fruit was regularly generated by 7 year-olds and 
older participants. It is possible that children learn about vitamins at school around 
the age of seven (only one 5 year-old also generated this property, possibly because she 
learned it from her parents). So children add properties like it contains vitamins, but 
they also drop properties such as purple for the category berries because they are too 
narrow (leading to underextension) or too broad (leading to overextension).  Thus, 
even though certain age-specific properties were not generated by a particular person, 
but by her peers, it makes sense that they are predictive for a person’s category 
judgments, because people of the same age tend to have a similar understanding of 
concepts. 
5.5.3   People fail to generate all relevant properties 
In this study, we found not only that a person’s category extension is based on 
her own generated properties, but also the properties a person did not generate (i.e., 
age-specific and general residual properties). This suggests that people cannot access 
all relevant properties that they employ to define a concept. People may tacitly “know” 
which properties to use when making a category decision without always being able to 
activate the complete set of relevant properties consciously. However, other 
participants, both from the same age-group (i.e., age-specific residuals) and from 
different age groups (i.e., residual properties), may pick up the slack. In other words, 
the properties listed by other participants, regardless of their age, also play a role in 
predicting a person’s category judgments.  
To conclude, in this study we found evidence that there is a relationship between 
category extension and intension. People seem to use the properties they generated to 
judge category membership. We also found that this relationship is already apparent 
at an early age (i.e., 5 year-olds), however, children may not be as consistent as adults 
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in their extension-intension link. Interestingly, we also found that properties that were 
not generated (i.e., age-specific and general residual properties) contributed 
significantly to the prediction of a person’s category judgments. 
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Abstract 
Two studies examined how lexical information contained in words affects people’s 
category representations. Some words are lexically suggestive regarding the taxonomic 
position of their referent (e.g., bumblebee, starfish). However, this information differs 
from language to language (e.g., in Dutch the equivalent words hold no taxonomic 
information: hommel, zeester). Three language groups, Dutch, English, and 
Indonesian speakers, were tested in similarity and typicality judgment tasks. The 
results show that the lexical information affects only the users of the language (e.g., 
Dutch speakers rated Dutch-informative items, both in similarity and typicality tasks, 
higher than English and Indonesian speakers). Results are discussed in light of theories 
of concept representation and the language relativity hypothesis. 
  
 
 Language informativity: The effect of informative labels  149 
 
6.1     Introduction 
In concept research, the meaning of a word is generally related to the properties 
of the (category of) objects it refers to. These properties cover a broad range, such as 
physical, contextual and taxonomic properties. This information is activated when 
people have need of the word meaning, for instance when they have to interpret the 
word in a sentence, or make concept-dependent judgments, such as similarity (how 
similar are salmon and trout) or categorization decisions (is this novel object a fish?). 
A number of theories propose that categorization follows a property-based approach, 
meaning that people tend to put objects in the same category the more properties they 
have in common (e.g., Clark, 1973; Nelson, 1974; Mervis, 1987). For instance, an object 
that grows in soil and has branches and leaves is called a tree. Consequently, all objects 
that share the same properties will be called a tree as well.  
Language, however, is generally not considered merely a system of signifiers 
that map on classes of objects with certain (physical) properties. Indeed, it also entails 
a particular way of carving up the world and manners of thinking about reality, subtly 
encoding cultural knowledge, and metaphors that describe ways of viewing natural 
phenomena (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is often claimed that, when learning a 
language, one does not only learn what the different words in a language refer to, but 
also these more subtle aspects. In other words, learning a particular language may have 
particular effects on thinking about and perceiving the world (e.g., Casasanto, 2016; 
Lucy, 2014).  
The idea that language shapes thought and perception has some interesting 
consequences, which become tangible when considering the myriad of languages that 
can be found in the world. According to language relativity, as two languages are 
structurally different, their respective speakers should differ in how they think, act and 
perceive in objectively similar situations. This hypothesis has been examined and 
confirmed in a number of cognitive domains. The effects on cognition of particular 
manners of classification have been documented in domains such as colour (e.g., 
Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & Kuipers, 2009), causation (e.g., Fausey & 
Boroditsky, 2011), and space and motion (e.g., Slobin, 1996). Also, it has been shown 
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that grammatical categories such as gender and tense have effects on cognitive tasks 
(e.g., Boroditsky, Schmidt, & Phillips, 2003), and language specific metaphors that 
describe abstract domains such as time, musical pitch, and mathematical and number 
terminology have been shown influential in cognitive tasks in these domains (e.g., 
Casasanto, 2008; Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid,  & Casasanto, 2013). 
Considering the evidence available at the moment, the question is not so much 
whether language can influence thought, but how, in which domains and to what extent 
this is the case. In the present study, we examine whether the representation of 
categories in a taxonomically structured domain are under influence of the vocabulary 
that a language provides for the domains. In some cases, the name that a language 
provides for a category of objects sometimes holds information regarding its position 
in the taxonomic structure. For example, sunflower is a type of flower, a bumblebee is 
closely related to bees, a goldfish is a type of fish and a blackbird is a type of bird. 
Clearly, in English, the names are more than just arbitrary signifiers, containing what 
we will refer to as “lexical information”: Information regarding the referent of a word 
that follows from the word itself, generally because the name is a combination of 
constituents of which at least one has a meaning in the language. The obvious question 
from a language relativistic point of view then is whether the availability of lexical 
information in a name influences the representation of the category it refers to. To the 
extent that languages differ in terms of lexical information, one may find 
representational differences for everyday categories such as bumblebees or 
cauliflowers1. From the perspective of the dominant theories in concept representation 
(e.g., exemplar theory, Smith & Medin, 1981; family resemblance, Rosch & Mervis, 
1975; prototype theory, Hampton, 1995), we do not expect category labels to have any 
influence in how the category is represented. Although some theories consider the 
labels to be properties that matter (e.g., the rational model of categorization; Anderson, 
                                                   
 
1 Some names provide useful taxonomic information, but sometimes the information can be 
misleading. Another example: the word whale in Dutch (walvis) wrongly implies that the animal 
belongs in the fish category. We will consider both cases. 
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1991), the labels are considered arbitrary, and thus their meaning is not taken into 
account. To examine whether a word’s lexical information influences the 
representation of the object category it refers to, we look at objects for which one 
language has a head noun that is informative as to the object’s position in a broader 
taxonomy, whereas the equivalent in another language does not entail such 
information. The word bumblebee, for instance, is informative in English, but not in 
Dutch, where no reference to bee is made in the word (hommel) or in Indonesian 
(kumbang). Conversely, inktvis (squid) is suggestive in Dutch (i.e., the word vis in 
Dutch means fish) but not in English (squid) or Indonesian (cumi-cumi). 
If the representation of object categories is influenced by lexical information, we 
expect that people’s judgments regarding the objects will subtly vary across language 
groups in a systematic way, particularly when the judgments rely on the 
representations of the categories. For example, as starfish in English contains a 
category suggestion, but not in Dutch, we expect English participants to judge a starfish 
to be more similar to a goldfish than Dutch participants, as starfish in Dutch does not 
hold the same category suggestion (zeester). Moreover, we expect English participants 
to judge starfish as more typical for the fish category than Dutch participants. 
Similarity and typicality are fundamental notions in concept representation research, 
and directly related to how people represent classes of objects. As such, they form a 
perfect arena to test whether lexical information influences representation. 
6.2   Study 1: Similarity 
In the first study, we examined how lexical information included in object names 
can influence people’s judgments of similarity between two objects that share lexical 
category information in their name (e.g., the Dutch pair walvis and inktvis; in English, 
respectively, whale and squid) and whether the three language groups, English, Dutch, 
and Indonesian speakers, give higher similarity ratings for pairs of items that are 
lexically informative in their own language. 
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6.2.1     Method 
6.2.1.1   Participants 
Sixty English speakers (44 females and 16 males, mean age: 21 years and 10 
months), 74 Dutch speakers (59 females and 15 males, mean age: 18 years and 3 
months), and 60 Indonesian speakers (33 females and 27 males, mean age: 24 years 
and 6 months) were tested. Two Indonesian participants were excluded from the 
analyses as there was no variability in their answers. The Dutch speakers were students 
who got credits in exchange for participation, the Indonesian participants were 
students who live and study in Indonesia, and the English speakers were recruited 
online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
6.2.1.2   Materials2 
A list of 70 questions was presented in a web survey. Each question contained a 
pair of words that shared the same lexical information in one of the three languages. In 
16 word pairs the words were informative in Dutch but not in English nor in Indonesian 
(e.g., wasbeer and beer [raccoon and bear]; aardappel and sinaasappel [potato and 
orange]), 16 word pairs were informative in Indonesian but not in English nor in Dutch 
(e.g., ikan hiu and ikan pari [shark and stingrays]; burung hantu and burung 
kakaktua [owl and cockatoo]), and 16 word pairs were informative in English  (e.g., 
bumblebee and bee; catfish and jellyfish), but not in Dutch nor Indonesian. As fillers, 
eight word pairs were informative in all three languages and 14 word pairs were 
uninformative in all three languages. 
  
                                                   
 
2 In a pilot study, different participants from the three language groups were asked to judge the  
familiarity of all the objects’ names on a 10-point scale. The results revealed that participants were 
relatively familiar with all items. 
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6.2.1.3   Procedure 
Dutch and Indonesian participants were given a link to an online survey, 
whereas the English speakers participated via Mechanical Turk. In the survey, each 
word pair was presented in the format: “How similar are X and Y?”. Participants 
answered on a 10-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 10 (extremely 
similar). The survey took about 5 to 7 minutes. All items were translated into the three 
languages and all three groups of participants received the survey in their own 
language. Thus, with the exception of the filler items, items that were informative in 
one language were uninformative in the other two languages. Each participant was 
randomly assigned to one of four randomized orders of the items sets. 
 
6.2.2     Results and discussion3 
First, the consistency of the similarity judgments within each language group 
was computed using the split-half method combined with the Spearman-Brown 
formula. The reliability estimates for English, Dutch, and Indonesian speakers were, 
respectively, .80, .89, and .90, indicating a high agreement among participants of the 
same language group in the similarity judgment task. Next, we computed average 
similarity scores by first calculating by-participant conditional means and then 
collapsing across participants (see the upper panel of Figure 6.1). 
In order to test the hypothesis that people’s similarity judgments are influenced 
by the lexical information in the objects’ names, mixed effect analyses were performed 
on the similarity judgment scores. In the analyses, the language group (English, Dutch, 
and Indonesian speakers) and the language informativity were included as fixed effects, 
whereas participants and items were included as random effects such that a maximal 
random structure was created (Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tilly, 2013). The crucial test of 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis concerns the interaction between language group 
and language informativity: If lexical information influences the similarity judgments, 
                                                   
 
3 The stimuli, data, and analysis scripts can be found on osf.io/tfqhw 
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we expect that two categories are judged more similar by speakers of the language in 
which the categories’ names are informative. 
 
Figure 6.1. Averaged raw (upper panel) and z-transformed (lower panel) similarity 
scores in each condition with 95% confidence intervals. The z-transformed values 
reflect the effect of lexical informativity, controlled for differences between language 
groups and item groups. 
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To test for this interaction, a model that includes the interaction term was 
compared with a model that does not. The analyses were carried out in R (version 3.1.2) 
using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2014). As predicted, the 
analyses revealed a significant language group × language informativity interaction 
(χ²(4) = 34.49, p < .001), suggesting that similarity judgments can be influenced by 
lexical information. However, the interpretation of the interaction is not that 
straightforward, because baseline similarity scores differed in the three language 
groups. This is best exemplified by a separate analyses of the filler data, which showed 
a strong effect of language group (χ²(2) = 26.60, p < .001). Remember, fillers were 
either uninformative or informative in all three languages, so this finding entails that 
the three language groups have diverging baselines.     
To aid the interpretation of the language group × language informativity 
interaction, we transformed the similarities into z-scores for every participant 
separately, after which by-participant conditional means were calculated. Collapsing 
across participants then yields the average similarity scores shown in the lower panel 
of Figure 6.1 (some are negative as a result of the by-participant z-transformation). 
Figure 6.1 suggests that items informative in a certain language receive relatively higher 
similarity ratings from the speakers of that language. Additional contrast analyses 
performed on the untransformed similarity data confirmed this (β = 0.86, SE = 0.26, 
Z = 3.25, p = .001, for Indonesian; β = 1.17, SE = 0.25, Z = 4.66, p < .001, for Dutch; 
and β = 1.07, SE = 0.23, Z = 4.73, p < .001, for English)4. These results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that each language group judges similarity higher for item pairs 
that are lexically informative in their own language.  
In general, it is assumed that people judge similarity based on properties that 
objects have in common. However, this study shows that lexical information may also 
                                                   
 
4 The statistical model is the same as in the previous analyses, except that Helmert coding was used 
to extract the relevant comparisons. Furthermore, to obtain p-values, we treated the t-statistic as a 
z-statistic following Barr and colleagues (2013, p. 266).The data and the scripts of the mixed eff ects 
analyses can be found on osf.io/tfqhw 
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affect similarity judgments between two objects, even when it concerns objects that are 
rather perceptual in nature. Note that the participants were most likely not aware of 
the purpose of the study, as nothing in the instructions hinted at the research question 
of interest, and the item list contained a relatively large number of fillers. This finding 
suggests that the particular language, and the implicit cultural knowledge it carries, can 
influence people’s judgments. 
6.3   Study 2: Typicality 
In Study 2, we examine whether lexical information that is included in objects’ 
names could affect people’s typicality judgments. Typicality refers to the graded 
membership structure of concepts, and is considered a crucial variable in natural 
language concept research (see, e.g., Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Similar to Study 1, items 
that are informative either in English, Dutch, or Indonesian were presented in order to 
investigate whether language users rate typicality higher for words that are informative 
in their own language.  
 
6.3.1     Method 
6.3.1.1   Participants 
Sixty one English speakers (46 females and 15 males, mean age: 22 years and 
4.5 months), 60 Dutch speakers (48 females and 12 males, mean age: 18 years and 5 
months), and 67 Indonesian speakers (41 females and 25 males, mean age: 24 years 
and 8 months) participated in the second study. One participant was excluded since 
she was originally from Malaysia and spoke Malay as her mother tongue. None of them 
participated in Study 1, nor were they aware of the purpose of this study. The Dutch 
speakers were students who got credits in exchange for participation, the Indonesian 
participants were students who live and study in Indonesia, and the English speakers 
were recruited online using Mechanical Turk. 
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6.3.1.2   Materials 
A list of 46 questions was presented to the participants in a website survey. Six 
items were informative in English (e.g., ladybird, eggplant, jellyfish), six items were 
informative in Dutch (e.g., kikkervisje, inktvis, stinkdier [tadpole, squid, skunk]), and 
another six items were informative in Indonesian (e.g., ikan hiu, burung hantu, burung 
kakaktua [shark, owl, cockatoo]). The remaining items were fillers, consisting of eight 
items that were informative in all three languages (English, Dutch, and Indonesian), 
and 20 items that were not informative in any of the three languages. 
6.3.1.3   Procedure 
All questions were of the following format: “How typical is x for the category of 
X?”. All informative items (x) were paired with the category name (X) that was included 
in the objects’ name. For example: “How typical is a goldfish for the category of fish?”. 
Participants were asked to answer on a 10-point rating scale, ranging for 1 (extremely 
atypical) to 10 (extremely typical). The survey took about 3 to 5 minutes. All 
participants were tested in their own language and received one out of three sets of 
questions, which only differed in the order of the items. 
 
6.3.2     Results and discussion 
The consistency of the typicality judgments in each language group was 
computed using the same method as in Study 1 (i.e., split-half method combined with 
the Spearman-Brown formula). The results were, for English, Dutch, and Indonesian 
speakers, respectively, .91, .91, and .97. These results indicate a very high consistency 
between subjects in each language group (see the upper panel of Figure 6.2 for the 
average typicality scores in each condition). Mixed effects analyses were then 
performed on the typicality judgment scores in order to investigate whether lexical 
information included in objects’ names could affect people’s typicality judgments. The 
analyses were run in the exact same manner as in Study 1. Again, the effect of interest 
in this study, the interaction between language group and language informativity, was 
statistically significant (χ²(4) = 13.08, p = .011). 
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Figure 6.2. Averaged raw (upper panel) and z-transformed (lower panel) typicality 
scores in each condition with 95% confidence intervals. The z-transformed values 
reflect the effect of lexical informativity, controlled for differences between language 
groups and item groups. 
 
As in Study 1, the interpretation of the interaction gets clouded by cross-cultural 
differences in baseline (typicality) judgments. More specifically, analyses of the filler 
data showed a main effect of language group once again (χ²(2) = 7.96, p = .019). 
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Analogous to Study 1, we first transformed the typicality judgments into z-scores per 
participant, then we calculated by-participant conditional means, and finally we 
collapsed across participants to obtain the average typicality scores shown in the lower 
panel of Figure 6.2. The pattern of results looks very similar to those displayed in Figure 
6.1. That is, items informative in a certain language receive relatively higher typicality 
ratings from the speakers of that language. Additional contrast analyses performed on 
the untransformed typicality data are in line with this, although the effect did not reach 
statistical significance for Indonesian (β = 0.89, SE = 0.57, Z = 1.54, p = .123, for 
Indonesian; β = 1.19, SE = 0.49, Z = 2.42, p = .015, for Dutch; and β = 1.52, SE = 0.43, 
Z = 3.57, p < .001, for English). 
The results of Study 2 suggest that in all three language groups, participants 
rated typicality higher for items that were informative in their respective languages. 
Similar to Study 1, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that people are 
influenced by lexical information in giving typicality judgments, even if sometimes the 
lexical information provided is misleading (e.g., starfish and inktvis [squid] were rated 
as more typical members of the category fish for, respectively, English and Dutch 
speakers). Again, it seems that not only non-lexical properties are considered when 
making these judgments – as is the general assumption of models of concept 
representation – but also suggestive information that is available in the linguistic name 
of an object. 
6.4   General discussion 
Two studies were conducted to investigate the influence of lexical information 
on semantic tasks related to taxonomic concept representation. In Study 1, evidence 
was found that participants rated similarity higher for item pairs that were informative 
in their language, as well as in Study 2, where the participants judged typicality higher 
when the items’ name was suggestive of a particular taxonomic position in their mother 
tongue. Interestingly, these findings suggest that language has some influence on how 
categories are represented simply by means of the particular names that are used. Not 
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only does this finding have consequences for models of concept representation and 
categorization, it is also interesting to consider it in light of the discussion concerning 
the influence language can have on thought. 
 
6.4.1     More than properties? 
Both the similarity and typicality judgment task showed that even if the 
information contained in the objects’ names was misleading, people are tempted to use 
this information to categorize the object.  While this is an interesting finding as such, 
the obvious question is which cognitive processes underlie the observed effect of lexical 
information. Broadly speaking, the effect can be driven either by the representation 
that is influenced by the label, or the response processes underlying the judgment. 
At a representational level, it is possible that some properties of the informative 
constituent of the label are automatically transferred to the representation of the 
category the label refers to. For example, the representation of starfish in English 
speakers may automatically include some properties of fish, by virtue of the label. 
When making a judgment of similarity or typicality, these properties, although not 
experientially acquired, will make the categories more similar, or typical: a starfish will 
be considered more typical of fish and more similar to goldfish because of these 
transferred properties. Alternatively, it may be merely because of the label. According 
to the rational model of categorization, labels are just another property, without any 
special status. Thus, according to this approach, a similarity or typicality judgment also 
relies on the label, and shared labels or partly shared labels are expected to influence 
the judgment. 
The effect could also reside at the response level. Given that in both experiments, 
informative trials presented participants with two labels that share a constituent, it is 
possible that participants were influenced by the mere commonality in the labels. This 
explanation would imply that whatever the label, independent of it being informative 
or not, commonality between labels will influence judgments of typicality and 
similarity (for example, this would imply that English speakers judge a beer and a 
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beehive more similar than Dutch speakers). While this is not our preferred 
interpretation, it cannot be refuted on the basis of the two experiments presented here. 
To examine this hypothesis, an additional study (see Chapter 7) is conducted 
using pairs of items in which an item with lexical information is paired with an item 
that is considered to be a typical member of the category mentioned in the name of the 
first item (e.g., jellyfish and salmon). As in the present studies, critical items are only 
informative in one language. In this way, the idea that people make an inference about 
the likely relation between the words (e.g., share the ending ‘-fish’) can be controlled. 
Importantly, while we cannot conclude to either explanation, our results do not 
in any way contradict the basic idea that similarity drives categorization, nor that 
perceptual, contextual and relational properties are important. In general, people do 
categorize objects based on these properties and then compare them with the other 
members or the prototype of the category. However, relying on properties – in the 
traditional sense – may not tell the complete story. As demonstrated in Djalal, Storms, 
Ameel, and Heyman (2017), there is no clear-cut correspondence between the 
generated properties and the prediction of category membership, and thus it should 
not come as a surprise that sometimes information of a different nature is relied upon. 
 
6.4.2     Language shapes thought? 
The present study provides evidence for language specific characteristics being 
influential in two fundamental cognitive tasks that have been extensively shown to rely 
on concept representation. The leap to concluding that the labels in a language can 
influence meanings should not be made without care, however. For one, as explained 
in the previous section, the effect may reside at the response level.  
Here, we consider another possible explanation that points to a particularly 
subtle way of how language can shape behaviour in certain tasks. Perhaps the effect of 
label informativity depends on uncertainty. When people cannot form a sufficiently 
detailed image of the object a word is referring to, they may rely on other sources of 
information, one of which is the knowledge encoded in the labels of the language. For 
example, when people are uncertain as to whether a squid is a fish (a boundary case at 
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least for some people), Dutch speakers may indeed rely on the “cultural knowledge” 
present in their language (in which the word for squid makes reference to fish) as a 
source of information, whereas English and Indonesian speakers do not have this 
knowledge available. While most objects used in the present studies were relatively 
familiar to participants, this interpretation requires further examination.  
While not a mere response effect, relying on language in this way is presumably 
not what is understood when theorizing about language and thought. However, the 
question is whether the potential relation with an individual’s knowledge would make 
the observed effect less interesting. Perhaps one of the most basic ways in which 
culture, and language, are influential in a person’s behaviour and thought, is the mere 
fact that she can rely on knowledge that is encoded in the culture, without the need for 
first-hand experience. 
In sum, the present findings in the domain of concept representation are 
consistent with the (abstract) hypothesis that language shapes thought, but more 
importantly, they point to a number of hypotheses as to the cognitive processes or 
representational differences involved in the behavioural effects. 
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Chapter 7 
Language informativity: Revisiting the 
effect of informative labels 
This chapter was submitted for publication: 
Djalal, F. M., Voorspoels, W., Storms, G., & Heyman, T. (under review). Is jellyfish 
more of a fish in English than in Dutch? The effect of informative labels. 
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Abstract 
Some words are lexically suggestive about the taxonomic position of their referent 
(e.g., jellyfish in English) and this information can vary across languages (e.g., in 
Dutch the equivalent of jellyfish holds no taxonomic information: kwal). To evaluate 
whether lexical suggestions affect the corresponding concept representation, we 
conducted a cross-linguistic study in which similarity judgments from two language 
groups (Dutch and English speakers) were compared. We paired asymmetrically 
informative items with items that are considered to be typical members of the 
referenced category (e.g., jellyfish-salmon). Our analyses revealed that items were 
deemed more similar by speakers of a language in which the lexical information was 
present (e.g., English speakers tended to give relatively higher ratings for jellyfish - 
salmon than Dutch participants did for the non-informative equivalent kwal - zalm). 
Results are discussed in light of theories of concept representation and the language 
relativity hypothesis. 
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7.1     Introduction 
The mental representation of a concept has been shown to depend on the 
properties of the (category of) objects it refers to (see Murphy, 2002, for an overview). 
It is assumed that these properties – physical, relational, taxonomic, … - make up the 
core of a word’s meaning and are activated when people have need of the word 
meaning, for instance when they have to interpret the word in a sentence, or make 
concept-dependent judgments (e.g., Hampton, 1979, 2006; Gelman, 2009; Tversky 
1977; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Indeed, cognitive capacities, such 
as judging similarity (i.e., how similar are salmon and trout?) or categorizing novel 
objects are thought to be property-based in some form: Concepts that share many 
properties, and have few distinguishing properties are considered more similar (Larkey 
& Markman, 2005; Tversky, 1977) and people tend to identify novel objects depending 
on their similarity with the target concept (Soto & Wasserman, 2010). For instance, a 
tree is considered an object that grows in soil and has branches and leaves (among 
other things). Consequently, shrubs are considered similar to trees, and a previously 
unseen species of pine will be called a tree as well. 
Traditionally, it is thought that “objective” properties of the category members 
make up the representation of the corresponding concept (to make this point more 
tangible, it is informative to look at norm studies, such as De Deyne et al., 2008; 
McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, &  McNorgan, 2005, and examine the properties that people 
generate). These properties entail perceptual (has leaves), relational (required for 
production of paper), ecological (the home of birds) information, and have been the 
focus of studies on how people form such representations, both in artificial category 
learning (Anderson, 1991; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Navarro & Lee, 2004; Nosofsky, 
1986), natural language concepts (Ameel, Malt, & Storms, 2008; Rosch & Mervis, 
1975), and semantic cognition (McClelland & Rogers, 2003; Smith, Shoben, & Rips, 
1974).  
Objective properties undoubtedly form an important part in a concept’s 
representation, but they do not tell the entire story. Indeed, a number of factors have 
been identified that are also of considerable importance. For example, experience with 
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particular labelled examples of categories (Nosofsky, 1986; Voorspoels, Vanpaemel & 
Storms, 2008), the contexts in which words figure (Frermann & Lapata, 2015; 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997), the relation to other words in the semantic network, and 
general world knowledge are ascribed an important role in the conceptual apparatus of 
people (Murphy & Medin, 1985). In the present paper, we consider the role of another 
factor that tends to be overlooked: The contingencies that accompany the particular 
language one speaks, and in particular, the words that are used for particular referents.  
While most words in a language are purely conventional and arbitrary signifiers, 
a number of categories are referred to by compounds that are (rightly or wrongly) 
suggestive of a particular meaning, such as goldfish or jellyfish. Both terms include a 
reference to fish, and therefore seem to suggest that they refer to a subspecies of fish. 
While this makes perfect sense for goldfish, it is slightly more surprising for jellyfish, 
because the latter do not share many properties with fish (and are – in a 
biological/taxonomic sense – not fish at all, but cnidarians). Be that as it may, both 
labels contain information suggestive of their taxonomic position. The question then 
is: are the mental representations of these concepts influenced by the contingent label?  
Theoretically, the answer depends on the status of the label. The labels that draw 
our interest are by definition those that contain at least one meaningful constituent 
(e.g. jellyfish). If one assumes that the meaning of jellyfish is the result of an active, 
online process of concept combination on the receiver’s end, one expects the label to be 
crucial for the meaning. In that scenario, the receiver constructs the meaning of the 
combination from the meaning of the constituents (but, see, e.g., Connolly, Fodor, 
Gleitman, & Gleitman, 2007). Yet, if we focus on labels that are highly familiar and 
idiomatic, such as jellyfish, it is doubtful that a combination process is relied upon. 
Rather, these labels can be considered semantically atomic lexical units (e.g., Hampton, 
1997; Kamp & Partee, 1995), which require no special treatment. Following the 
dominant theories in concept representation (e.g., exemplar theory, Smith & Medin, 
1981; family resemblance, Rosch & Mervis, 1975; prototype theory, Hampton, 1995), 
we would not expect the category labels to have any influence on their meaning in that 
case. Although some theories consider labels to be properties that matter (e.g., the 
rational model of categorization; Anderson, 1991), they are often thought to be 
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arbitrary, and thus their meaning is not taken into account. In other words, according 
to these theories, jellyfish should not be actually mentally represented as fish (rather 
than cnidarians) because of the label. 
 
7.1.1   A cross-linguistic approach 
Interestingly, given the contingency of the processes that drive naming patterns 
(Malt, Sloman, Gennari, Shi, & Wang, 1999), not all languages provide lexically 
informative signifiers for the same categories, and thus referents can be found for 
which some languages have lexically informative labels, while others do not. We can 
thus detect the potential influence of labels by comparing concept representations of 
speakers of different languages, focusing on concepts associated with labels that are 
informative in one language, but not in another. In a previous study (Djalal, 
Voorspoels, Heyman, & Storms, 2016), we asked participants from three language 
groups (English, Dutch, and Indonesian speakers) to judge the similarity between 
concepts that shared the same lexical information in one of the three languages (e.g., 
jellyfish-catfish, chestnut-peanut), but not in the other two (e.g., jellyfish-catfish 
became kwal-meerval in Dutch and ubur-ubur--ikan lele in Indonesian; which contain 
no lexical information). In addition, we examined whether the lexical information that 
is included in objects’ names could affect people’s typicality judgments (“how typical is 
jellyfish for the category of fish?”). We found that participants rated similarity and 
typicality relatively higher for items that were informative in their own language, 
suggesting that their judgments are influenced by the label’s lexical information. 
However, these studies leave open the possibility that participants relied on the 
phonetic and orthographic similarity of the terms. That is, jellyfish and (cat)fish also 
look and sound more similar than their Dutch and Indonesian equivalents due to the 
common constituent, which could in turn influence participants’ judgments. 
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7.1.2   Current study 
In the present study we isolate the (potential) impact of the label on a concept’s 
representation using stimuli that are not orthographically nor phonologically similar 
(e.g., jellyfish-salmon). More specifically, we ask participants of different language 
groups to judge the similarity of concept pairs. One item of each pair has a label that in 
one language is informative as to the concept’s taxonomical position (e.g., jellyfish is 
informative in English, but not in Dutch kwal). Conversely, the label for a squid is 
suggestive in Dutch (i.e., inktvis; the word vis in Dutch means fish) but not in English 
(squid). Such words will be paired with an item that is considered to be a typical 
member of the category mentioned in the label (e.g., jellyfish-salmon; squid-herring). 
If lexical information influences the representation of concepts, we expect participants 
to judge similarity relatively higher for pairs with an item that is lexically informative 
in their own language, as compared to participants from a different language group. 
7.2     Method 
7.2.1   Pre-registration 
We pre-registered this experiment before the data collection on March 10th 2016 
(see: osf.io/kq956/). The pre-registration contains a short description of the 
hypothesis, the stimulus material, and statistical analyses. We have performed data 
collection and analyses as described in the pre-registration, unless otherwise stated. 
Materials, data, and analysis scripts are publically available (see:   
https://osf.io/4ndmc/?view_only=ff9f596ed890403ea30bd4cb91b9e36a). 
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7.2.2   Participants 
Sixty English speakers (22 females, mean age: 25.42 years) and 68 Dutch 
speakers (32 females, mean age: 18.67 years) completed the experiment1. The Dutch 
speakers were students who participated on a voluntary basis, whereas the English 
speakers were recruited online using Prolific. 
 
7.2.3   Materials 
A list of 60 item pairs was presented in a web survey. The critical pairs always 
comprise one word that contains lexical information either in Dutch or in English, but 
never in both languages. The second word is related to the informative part of the first 
word in that it is either a typical member of the category (e.g., jellyfish-salmon; salmon 
is considered a typical member of the category fish) or a similar category coordinate 
(e.g., titmouse-rat; rat is considered a similar category coordinate of mouse). Of the 60 
pairs, 20 are informative in English (e.g., jellyfish-salmon), 20 are informative in 
Dutch (e.g., inktvis-haring [squid-herring]), and 20 are fillers. 
 
7.2.4   Procedure 
In the survey, each word pair was presented in the format: “How similar are X 
and Y?” Participants answered on a 10-point rating scale ranging from 1 (not at all 
similar) to 10 (extremely similar). The survey took about 5 to 7 minutes. The order of 
item pairs was randomised per participant. The study was presented as a similarity 
                                                   
 
1 As mentioned in the pre-registration report, we planned to collect data of 60 participants per 
language group. However, we ended up with 68 Dutch participants, because the call to participate 
was distributed to a larger group, with no limit on the maximum number of participants. Therefore, 
two sets of analyses were conducted: one on the entire sample, and one using only the data of the 
first 60 Dutch participants. Because the outcome was the same, we only report the former results 
here. 
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rating task and self-evidently, participants were not informed about the purpose of the 
study. 
7.3     Results 
In order to test the hypothesis that people’s similarity judgments are influenced 
by the lexical information in the objects’ names, we performed mixed effects analyses 
on the similarity judgment scores. In the analyses, language group and language 
informativity (i.e., the language which contains the lexical information) were included 
as fixed effects. Participants and items (i.e., the 40 critical pairs) were included as 
random effects such that a maximal random structure was created (Barr, Levy, 
Scheepers, & Tilly, 2013). 
The results revealed that similarity scores did not significantly differ across the 
two language groups (χ²(1) = 0.47, p = .493) or the two language informativity 
conditions (χ²(1) = 1.45, p = .228). Crucially, however, the interaction between 
language group and language informativity proved to be statistically significant (χ²(1) 
= 6.10,  p = .014), suggesting that similarity judgments are influenced by lexical 
information, as can be seen in Figure 7.1. 
7.4     Discussion 
We presented evidence that for some concepts, not only the objective properties 
of their referent (i.e., perceptual, functional and encyclopaedic properties) make up the 
representation, but also the information that is present in the label. In the present 
study, we showed that, for objects with informative labels in one language but not in 
another, similarity judgments of speakers of either language were subtly different, as 
can be expected if the information in the labels influences the representation. In what 
follows we will consider the cognitive processes underlying the observed effect of lexical 
information, as well as how our findings fit in with other research on the interplay 
between language and thought. 
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Figure 7.1. Similarity scores averaged across participants per language group and 
items per informativity level. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
7.4.1   Why labels may matter 
We see three potential, and not mutually exclusive, loci of the effect of 
informative labels. First, label informativity may be due to contextual similarity, that 
is, the co-occurrence of labels in similar contexts. It is possible that, say, jellyfish and 
salmon occur more often in the same context than their non-informative, Dutch 
equivalents (and vice versa for informative Dutch, but non-informative English items), 
which in turn influences people’s similarity judgments. To examine this possibility, we 
calculated corpus-derived similarities for the items using snaut (Mandera, Keuleers, & 
Brysbaert, 2017)2. These suggest that people’s sensitivity to lexical information, 
                                                   
 
2 Two items were not present in the snaut database, so the analyses are restricted to 38 item  pairs. 
To obtain similarities we used the cosine measure and the standard settings of the website 
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exemplified by the observed language group × language informativity interaction (see 
Results), cannot be traced back to corpus-based contextual similarity. 
Second, it has been shown that the presentation of a compound can activate its 
constituents’ conceptual representation. In research on semantic priming, for example, 
Zwitserlood (1994) showed that compound words can prime associates of its 
constituents (e.g., blackbird could prime white). If we translate this logic to the present 
study, the informativity effect could be attributed to the (additional) activation of the 
concept referenced in the label. For instance, jellyfish may activate the concept fish 
(more than the Dutch equivalent kwal at least), which in turn could boost the perceived 
similarity with a typical fish like salmon. Such an explanation would entail that all 
compounds with the same informative label would show a similar informativity effect. 
That is, words like jellyfish, starfish, and crayfish should all activate the concept fish 
to a similar extent compared to the uninformative Dutch translations kwal, zeester, 
and rivierkreeft. However, post-hoc analyses of our data suggest that the effect of an 
informative label not only differs across items, but does so in a meaningful way. 
Specifically, the item-level effect size of the informative label correlated -.26 (95% CI [-
.53, .06]) with judged familiarity and -.51 (95% CI [-.72, -.22]) with log-transformed 
contextual diversity (Keuleers, Brysbaert, & New, 2010; Van Heuven, Mandera, 
Keuleers, & Brysbaert, 2014), two measures for how widely known a label is. 
Informative items that are well-known (e.g., jellyfish) tended to show smaller effects 
than lesser-known items (e.g., crayfish)3. Thus, even though a pure (automatic) 
activation based explanation can account for the informativity effect, it would need to 
                                                   
 
http://meshugga.ugent.be/snaut/. A mixed effects ANOVA performed on these similarities did not 
show a significant language group × language informativity interaction (F(1,36) = 0.45,  p = .506). 
3 The item-level effect size of an informative label was calculated by subtracting the similarity 
judgments per language group for each item. Familiarity judgments were collected in a separate 
study with ten Dutch (for the items informative in Dutch) and ten English participants (for the items 
informative in English), and averaged across participants. To eliminate group differences, all 
variables were z-transformed separately for items informative in Dutch and items informative in 
English. 
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make some additional assumptions to explain the entire pattern of results (e.g., well-
known compounds do not activate their constituents as strongly or the activation is 
partly inhibited). 
Finally, it is conceivable that some properties of the informative constituent of 
the label are automatically inherited to the representation of the category the label 
refers to (as in the default-to-prototype view, Jönsson & Hampton, 2012; Hampton, 
Passanisi, & Jönsson, 2011). For example, the representation of jellyfish may 
automatically include some properties of fish, by virtue of the label. When making a 
judgment of similarity, these properties will make the categories more similar: jellyfish 
will be considered to be more similar to salmon when it inherits typical fish properties 
such as “can breathe under water”.  
Although automatic, direct, and full inheritance of prototypical properties has 
been challenged in a number of studies (e.g., Connolly et al., 2007; Gagné & Spalding, 
2011, 2014), it is reasonable to assume that at least some of the meaning of a compound 
is derived from its constituents, especially when one’s knowledge about the referent of 
the compound is limited. Indeed, Gagné and Spalding (2011) show that people are 
likely to agree that properties that are generally true for bottles are also true for brinn 
bottles even though the modifier concept brinn is completely unknown. Apparently, 
they use their meta-knowledge on how concepts combine to infer that brinn bottles 
must be a subclass of bottles, and they project the properties of bottles to brinn bottles 
(albeit to a lesser extent, see Gagné & Spalding, 2011, 2014). Translating this idea to the 
present study, it stands to reason that people encountering the word jellyfish will assign 
some properties from fish. This will especially be the case for lesser-known concepts 
like crayfish or polecat, because, in absence of first-hand experience with the members 
of these categories, and/or lack of sufficient knowledge, participants need to rely on the 
informative label and meta-knowledge on how concepts combine: A crayfish is a fish 
(same as mountain rivers are rivers and brinn bottles are bottles), and therefore has 
some fishy properties. 
Property inheritance driven by lacking knowledge can also explain the negative 
correlation between the item-level informativity effect and familiarity/contextual 
diversity of the informative item. For example, English participants would assign some, 
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but not all properties of cat to polecat (Mfamiliarity = 6.10), but Dutch participants would 
not, because the equivalent bunzing does not make reference to cat. In other words, 
English speakers may rely on the cultural knowledge present in their language as a 
source of information, whereas Dutch speakers do not have this ‘knowledge’ available. 
As a consequence, English speakers tended to give higher similarity ratings for the item 
pair polecat-tiger (Msimialrity = 5.07) than Dutch speakers (Msimialrity = 3.22). When 
people are very familiar with the concept (e.g., blackbird Mfamiliarity = 7.80), property 
inheritance may still occur, but their concept representation will not differ much across 
languages (i.e., difference in average similarity was 0.54 for blackbird-dove versus 
merel-duif). 
 
7.4.2   Or how language can influence thought 
When learning a language, one does not only learn what the different words in 
a language refer to, but also more subtle aspects, such as the particular way the world 
is carved up, which properties are considered important, grammatical properties and 
metaphors that reflect ways of thinking about various domains. The simple observation 
that more than words is learnt, has formed the foundation of the idea that learning a 
particular language has effects on thinking about and perceiving the world (Casasanto, 
2016; Lucy, 2014). According to language relativity, as languages are structurally 
different, their respective speakers should differ in how they think, act and perceive in 
objectively similar situations. The effects on cognition of particular manners of 
classification have been documented in domains such as colour (Roberson, Davies, & 
Davidoff, 2000), causation (Fausey & Boroditsky, 2011), and space and motion (Slobin, 
1996). 
In the present paper, we examined a domain that, to our knowledge, has not 
been documented yet in the context of language relativity: The effect of informative 
labels. Note that the explanations provided in the previous section are clear examples 
of how language can shape cognitive processes. Perhaps transference of properties, 
either at a representational or a response level, is arguably a weaker form of how 
language can shape thought. However, one of the most basic ways in which culture, and 
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language, are influential in an individual’s behaviour and cognition, is the possibility to 
rely on knowledge that is encoded in the culture, without the need for first-hand 
experience. 
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Chapter 8 
Concluding remarks 
In this last chapter, I will draw a general conclusion, the take-home message of 
this dissertation, if you will. After that, I will consider limitations to some of the 
research I conducted. That is, I got some new insights after looking back on the studies 
described in the previous chapters and I also received some useful feedback from 
reviewers and colleagues that could have affected the setup of the studies or the 
analyses. I will explain these limitations and afterthoughts by chapter in order to give 
a clear overview. Finally, I will describe ongoing projects and topics that I plan to work 
on after my PhD. 
8.1     General conclusion 
As mentioned in the beginning of this dissertation, three research lines were 
developed to examine category extension, category intension, and how these two 
aspects are measured and connected. I will summarize the findings from each chapter 
in turn. 
The first research line focused on the measurement of category extension and 
intension. In Chapter 2, I succeeded in providing a new, valid method to measure the 
typicality gradient in young children. That is, I proposed the typicality ranking task as 
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an alternative to the more commonly used variant involving ratings, because it does 
not require advanced numerical or linguistic knowledge. Using this new method, I also 
demonstrated that preference is not so much a confounding variable to be avoided, but 
that both variables (i.e., typicality and preference) are often significantly correlated in 
older children and even in adults. In Chapter 3, I shifted my focus from category 
extension to category intension. I found that children generated different types of 
properties, and that, as they grow older, their properties started to resemble those of 
adults. I also found that situation properties predict category membership better than 
other types of properties. 
The second research line focused on the relationship between category extension 
and intension both in adults (Chapter 4) and in children (Chapter 5). In both chapters, 
I directly related people’s category judgments to the properties they themselves 
generated or endorsed for a certain category. The results showed that the properties a 
person generated or endorsed were generally a better predictor of her/his category 
judgments than of the category judgments of other people (Chapter 4). Interestingly, I 
also found that properties that were not generated also seem to play a role in predicting 
category judgment, a finding that implies that people do not have full introspective 
access to the properties they use when categorizing. In Chapter 5, I discovered that the 
relationship between category extension and intension is already apparent at an early 
age (i.e., 5 year-olds), however, children may not be as consistent as adults in their 
extension-intension link. Similar as in Chapter 4, I also found that properties that were 
not generated contributed significantly to the prediction of a person’s category 
judgments. 
Even though the results in Chapters 3 until 5 showed that the category extension 
and category intension are related, they also suggest that there is still ample room to 
improve the prediction of category membership. Thus, in Chapters 6 and 7, I 
investigated other factors that might influence category extension. In Chapter 6, I 
found evidence that lexical information contained in category labels affects people’s 
category representations. That is, across language groups, people judged two objects 
that share a category label as more similar (Study 1). In addition, such objects are 
considered more typical members of the category suggested by the label (Study 2). In 
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order to exclude the possibility that people merely relied on the phonetic and 
orthographic similarity of the terms, a study described in Chapter 7 was conducted, in 
which the concept pairs are no longer orthographically or phonologically similar (e.g., 
jellyfish-salmon). The analysis revealed that even though the item pairs no longer share 
a category label, they were deemed more similar by speakers of a language in which the 
lexical information was present (e.g., English speakers tended to give relatively higher 
ratings for jellyfish-salmon than Dutch participants did for the non-informative 
equivalent kwal-zalm). The results in Chapters 6 and 7 both provide evidence for the 
effect of lexical information on a person’s category representation. 
To sum up, in this dissertation, I provide evidence that there is a relationship (at 
the subject level) between category extension and intension, and that this relationship 
develops at an early age. Even though children generate different kinds of properties, 
they are consistent in their category extensions-intensions. I also found that category 
representations are not solely based on the properties, but that information conveyed 
by the label also plays a role. 
8.2     Limitations and afterthoughts 
8.2.1   Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 describes different types of generated properties and how they fare in 
the prediction of category membership. Even though the results suggest there is a 
disconnection between the type of properties people generate and the type of properties 
that delineate category extensions, situation properties are deemed to play an 
important role in predicting category judgments across all age groups. As explained by 
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005), the meaning of a concept is understood and 
represented against background situations. Relatedly, Keil and Batterman (1984) 
claimed that situation properties are often defining properties, whereas entity 
properties are mostly characteristic properties. If one accepts the classical view, then 
in order to be endorsed as a category member, an object has to possess the defining 
properties, which, according to Keil and Batterman (1984), are situation properties. 
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For instance, to understand the meaning of vehicle, people do not rely (solely) on the 
physical entities, but on the setting where they are found (e.g., roadway), the activities 
performed with them (e.g., driving), and also the functions (e.g., to transport things).  
Their claim makes me wonder whether the type of properties that best predict 
category judgments, would be different if one used a different extension measure, such 
as typicality judgments. Typicality, as opposed to category judgment, is an extension 
measure that allows the membership within categories to be naturally graded 
(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978). It is possible that different types of properties, such 
as entity properties, would predict typicality better than situation properties. For 
instance, properties such as has wheels, has engine(s), it is big, would not determine 
whether an object is a member of the vehicles category, but it could define whether an 
object is a typical or atypical vehicle (e.g., an air balloon does not have wheels or 
engines, but people would still consider it a member of the vehicles category, albeit an 
atypical member). Thus, predicting different kinds of extension measures based on 
different kinds of properties, would be interesting future research. 
Further, it might also be better to include more categories, in particular to 
examine natural kind categories. Since this study was actually set up for the study 
described in Chapter 5, only two natural kinds categories (i.e., fruit and berries) were 
included. Even though the results showed that situation properties predict category 
judgment the best regardless of the category type, it might be useful to have a larger 
number of categories in the comparison. Another reason why natural kinds are an 
interesting case, is that differences between typicality and category membership may 
be more pronounced. For example, seals and whales are fairly unlikely to be included 
in the category fish, yet they are considered to be moderately typical members of the 
category fish (Hampton, 1998). Thus, it might be particularly interesting to investigate 
whether different extension measures are predicted by different kinds of properties for 
natural kinds. 
8.2.2   Chapter 4 
The main aim of Chapter 4 was to investigate the relationship between category 
extension and intension at the individual level. In Study 1, eight different semantic 
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categories were studied. Inspired by Ameel, Malt, and Storms (2008), these categories 
were chosen in pairs of a superordinate (high) level and a corresponding basic (low) 
level category (i.e., clothes-trousers; fruit-berries; musical instruments-guitars; 
vehicles-bicycles). These chosen categories were actually part of another project with 
additional, unrelated research questions concerning the effect of category level (see 
Chapter 3). Consequently, analyses comparing the two category levels were not 
included. However, to satisfy one's curiosity (and my own), the mixed effects logistic 
regression and shuffling analyses were run for the different levels separately. The 
logistic regression analyses showed that both individual and residual properties 
contribute significantly to the prediction of the person-specific category judgments at 
the superordinate level: β = 1.03, SE = 0.30, χ²(1) = 11.61, p < .001 for individual 
properties, β = 3.19, SE = 0.58, χ²(1) = 34.07, p < .001 for residual properties; and at 
the basic level: β = 0.74, SE = 0.20, χ²(1) = 15.28, p < .001 for individual properties, β 
= 1.64, SE = 0.32, χ²(1) = 24.22, p < .001 for residual properties. For the superordinate 
and basic level, the shuffling analyses revealed respectively that (1) for 92% and 87% of 
all the simulations, the regression weight for the individual property applicability 
scores was lower; (2) for 85% and 93% of all the simulations, the regression weight for 
the residual property applicability scores was higher. Because we did not have any a 
priori predictions about category level, these results were not included in the actual 
chapter. 
Furthermore, in Study 2, one might have noticed in Table 4.6 (showing the 
average correlation of each similarity matrix) and Figure 4.5 (showing the distribution 
of the similarity measures for each matrix), that the property applicability similarity 
estimates are generally  very high (on average .96, .96, and .99, for insects, tools, and 
sciences, respectively). Although it was explained in Footnote 8 (page 112), that these 
high values are to be expected and that they do not pose problems in terms of ceiling 
effects, some further analyses to examine this ostensibly bizarre finding were 
conducted. 
It is possible that even though people endorse a completely different set of 
properties, they still end up with similar (highly correlated) property applicability 
scores. In order to test that, the properties of each category were divided into two 
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groups. Next, property applicability scores were derived based on the two sets of 
properties and the results were correlated. This method was applied to ten random 
property divisions, yielding average correlations of .90, .84, and 78, for sciences, 
insects, and tools, respectively. This suggests that completely different sets of 
properties actually contain similar information about the category. Thus, even if two 
people totally disagreed on which properties accurately described a category (e.g., from 
a total of 20 properties in a category, participant A endorsed properties 1-10, and 
participants B endorsed properties 11-20), the correlation between their property 
applicability scores would still be fairly high. Note that such a situation would translate 
in a correlation between property judgments of -1. In the actual data, these correlations 
were of course a lot higher (.29 on average), explaining why the applicability scores are 
even more similar. 
These results may incidentally point to something of a flaw in Hampton and 
Passanisi’s (2016) method. If the properties are in fact quite highly correlated, then 
there is a lot of redundancy in the specification of category membership, and one would 
not expect similarity in property weight judgments to translate into similarity in 
typicality or membership judgments, since the different weights could generate the 
same membership function (J. A. Hampton, personal communication, May 17, 2017). 
This could be another explanation of the failure to find any correlation in the method 
Hampton and Passanisi used (i.e., correlating extension-intension similarity matrices).  
8.2.3   Chapter 5 
In this Chapter, I investigated the relation between children’s extensions and 
intensions in comparison with adults. Using an analogous method as in Chapter 4, that 
is, mixed effect logistic regression analyses, I found a significant contribution of a 
person’s generated properties to the prediction of his/her own category judgments in 
each age group. Furthermore, since the analyses also revealed that properties that were 
generated by other people (i.e., age-specific residual and general residual properties) 
also contributed to the prediction of a person’s category judgments, further analyses 
like those in Chapter 4 (i.e., the shuffling analyses) would be interesting to further 
examine this. 
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In the shuffling analyses of Chapter 4, I compared how well a person’s properties 
predict her own category judgments as opposed to other people’s category judgments. 
This was done by comparing the regression weights derived from shuffled data with 
non-shuffled data. However, since it is necessary to have a balanced number of 
observations in each category, this analysis cannot be done with the present children’s 
data.  The children performed the tasks (category judgment and property generation) 
for a random half of the studied categories. The combination of (1) categories being 
randomly selected for each child and (2) missing data (due to fatigue or a lack of 
variability in their answers) resulted in an unbalanced dataset. Consequently, it is 
impossible to shuffle the complete dataset. It would be possible to conduct the analyses 
for each category separately. However, this would give us eight fairly small datasets, 
which would only yield imprecise estimates. Thus, for a future study, it would be better 
to have a balanced (relatively high) number of participants in each category, and in 
order to motivate children to do the task for more categories, one should spread it over 
two sessions 
8.3     Further directions 
As follow-up on the research I conducted during my PhD, there are some 
ongoing projects I am currently working on. These projects are in the pipeline, meaning 
that some (pilot) data have been gathered and, in certain instances, some (exploratory) 
analyses have been carried out. I will briefly discuss the objectives and methodology of 
each of the ongoing projects in turn. 
In Chapters 6 and 7, the effect of lexical information on people’s category 
representations was examined. The results revealed that items informative in a certain 
language elicited relatively higher similarity and typicality ratings from the speakers of 
that language. However, it is possible that the language itself mediated the effect, thus 
replicating the effect with non-linguistic stimuli would strengthen the findings. Using 
non-linguistic stimuli, such as pictures, will enable us to investigate whether the lexical 
information contained in the name of the pictures will still influence people’s category 
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representation. Since the lexical information is not presented visually, accessing the 
object names will be an intermediary process before making a judgment. That is, when 
people encounter a picture containing two objects with similar names, they might 
activate those names, which could in turn boost the perceived similarity. Put 
differently, if the effect of lexical information is present, picture pairs with similar 
names in a certain language (e.g., pictures of a starfish and a jellyfish) might get higher 
similarity ratings of people speaking that language in comparison to people speaking a 
language in which the names aren’t similar (e.g., starfish-jellyfish translates to zeester-
kwal in Dutch). Thus, in a follow-up study, I will examine whether lexical information 
will still have an influence on people’s category representation when the information is 
not visually available. For this project, a picture naming pilot study has already been 
conducted with English and Dutch participants to establish that the pictures elicit the 
critical labels in both languages. On the basis of these data, 26 picture pairs were 
selected. In the main experiment, English and Dutch participants will judge the 
similarity of these pairs. Their judgments will be compared as in the previous studies 
(Chapters 6 and 7). 
Since the results of Chapters 6 and 7 showed that the non-property-based 
intension (i.e., lexicalization) influences category extension, I will also examine 
another, more extensional (exemplar-based) predictor of category membership. More 
concretely, the second ongoing project compares two categorization models, namely 
property-based models (Hampton, 1979, 2006; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) and exemplar-
based models (Storms, 2004; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts, 2000, 2001) in predicting 
category membership in children and adults. Heit and Barsalou’s (1996) exemplar-
based instantiation model will be compared to a prototype-predictor model based on 
Rosch and Mervis’ (1975) family resemblance. For eight semantic categories (clothes, 
trousers, fruit, berries, musical instruments, guitars, vehicles, and bicycles), category 
judgments were collected for 25 possible exemplars. Four age groups (5-, 7-, 10-year-
olds, and adults) performed a category membership judgment task and an exemplar 
generation or property generation task. Since it was much harder to gather data from 
young children, the data collection has just been completed for all age groups. In a next 
phase, the category judgment scores will be correlated with the family resemblance 
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measure based on the generated properties to assess the validity of the prototype-based 
model. On the other hand, the exemplar-based model will be tested by correlating 
category judgment scores with the rated similarity of the 25 possible exemplars (i.e., 
the exemplars that were used in the category judgment task) towards generated 
category exemplars (i.e., the 12 most generated exemplars of each age group). The 
results will be compared with the results of Chapters 3 and 5, and are expected to show 
which model is better in predicting children’s and adults’ categorization. 
 The last project in the pipe line investigates the extension-intension 
relationship in abstract concepts. Different from concrete concepts, abstract concepts 
refer to entities that are neither physical, nor spatially constrained (Barsalou & 
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Hampton, 1981; Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). Yet, despite 
this manifest difference, abstract concepts have received little attention in the concept 
development literature as a whole and specifically in terms of the relationship between 
extension and intension. In this project, children’s (aged 5, 7, and 10) and adults’ 
intensions and extensions of abstract concepts will be examined and compared to 
concrete categories. An identical procedure as in Chapters 4 and 5 will be applied to 
examine the relationship between intension and extension for five abstract concepts 
(i.e., work of arts, professions, rules, sports, and holidays). Mixed effects regression 
analyses will be conducted to investigate the relationship between extension and 
intension at the individual level and also across age groups. The results will then be 
compared with the findings from Chapters 4 and 5. 
  
194 Chapter 8 
  
References 
Ameel, E., Malt, B. C., & Storms, G. (2008). Object naming and later lexical 
development: From baby bottle to beer bottle. Journal of Memory and Language, 
58(2), 262-285. doi:10.1016/j.jml.2007.01.006 
Barsalou, L. W., & Wiemer-Hastings, K. (2005). Situating abstract concepts. 
Grounding cognition: The role of perception and action in memory, language, 
and thought (p.129-163). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 
Hampton, J. A. (1979). Polymorphous concepts in semantic memory. Journal of Verbal 
Learning and Verbal Behavior, 18(4), 441-461. doi: 10.1016/S0022-
5371(79)90246-9 
Hampton, J. A. (1981). An investigation of the nature of abstract concepts. Memory 
and Cognition, 9(2), 149-156. doi: 10.3758/BF03202329 
Hampton, J. A. (1998). Similarity-based categorization and fuzziness of natural 
categories. Cognition, 65(2), 137-165. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(97)00042-5 
Hampton, J. A. (2006). Concepts as prototypes. Psychology of Learning and 
Motivation, 46, 79-113. doi: 10.1016/S0079-7421(06)46003-5 
Hampton, J. A., & Passanisi, A. (2016). When intensions do not map onto extensions: 
Individual differences in conceptualization. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 42(4), 505-523. doi: 10.1037/xlm0000198 
Heit, E., & Barsalou, L. W. (1996). The instantiation principle in natural categories. 
Memory, 4(4), 413-451. doi: 10.1080/096582196388915 
Keil, F. C., & Batterman, N. (1984). A characteristic-to-defining shift in the 
development of word meaning. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 
23(2), 221-236. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(84)90148-8 
McCloskey, M. E., & Glucksberg, S. (1978). Natural categories: Well defined or fuzzy 
sets? Memory & Cognition, 6(4), 462-472. doi: 10.3758/BF03197480 
Rosch, E., & Mervis, C. B. (1975). Family resemblances: Studies in the internal structure 
of categories. Cognitive Psychology, 7(4), 573-605. doi: 10.1016/0010-
0285(75)90024-9 
 Concluding remarks      195 
 
Storms, G. (2004). Exemplar models in the study of natural language concepts. 
Psychology of Learning and Motivation, 45, 1-39. doi: 10.1016/S0079-
7421(03)45001-9 
Storms, G., De Boeck, P., & Ruts, W. (2000). Prototype and exemplar-based 
information in natural language categories. Journal of Memory and Language, 
42(1), 51-73. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1999.2669 
Storms, G., De Boeck, P., & Ruts, W. (2001). Categorization of novel stimuli in well-
known natural concepts: A case study. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 8(2), 377-
384. doi: 10.3758/BF03196176 
Wiemer‐Hastings, K., & Xu, X. (2005). Content differences for abstract and concrete 
concepts. Cognitive Science, 29(5), 719-736. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog0000_33
  
